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Abstract 
This thesis has three major objectives relating to leadership succession in Chinese 
family firms: (1) to identify the determinants of the successor choice, (2) to investigate 
the impact of the succession on firm performance, and (3) to explore the effect of the 
successor decision on the firm’s access to debt finance.  
Most prior studies on the leadership transition issue in family businesses are based on 
developed economies. Little attention has been paid to this issue in China’s context, 
probably because many Chinese family firms have always been managed by the 
founder during the past decades. However, after more than 30 years’ dedication to the 
business, most founders are recently retired or very close to retirement. Thus, it is 
clearly important and urgent to investigate the leadership succession issue in Chinese 
family firms. Moreover, as a country whose institutional, social, and cultural context is 
distinctive from developed economies, China provides an interesting setting for the 
exploration of the succession issue in family businesses.  
To achieve the above objectives, this thesis uses a sample of 348 Chairman or CEO 
succession cases in publicly listed family firms in China during 2003-2014. In relation 
to the first objective, I find that family firms without foreign ownership and whose 
founder is deeply affected by clan culture are more likely to choose a family successor. 
In addition, the founders who are strongly affected by Confucian values and having 
more political connections are more likely to appoint not only a family successor but 
also a nonfamily successor having a guanxi with them.  
Regarding the second objective, I document that the leadership succession does not 
cause a significant change in firm performance. Moreover, family and nonfamily 
successors do not have significantly different impacts on firm performance. 
Furthermore, family or guanxi-connected successors’ acquisition of the founder’s 
specialised assets can significantly increase the firm performance after the succession.  
Finally, relating to the third objective, I find that family successors have a significant 
and negative impact on the firm’s post-succession access to debt financing but their 
acquisition of the founder’s specialised assets greatly contributes to the access after the 
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succession. 
Overall, this thesis makes the following key contributions. First, it contributes to the 
literature on the determinants of the successor choice in family businesses by 
identifying several new factors that have never been explored before in the context of 
family firms. This, in turn, can provide several new research avenues for future studies. 
Second, this thesis is the first to shed light on the existence and importance of a unique 
type of successors, i.e. nonfamily members having a guanxi with the founder. This also 
contributes to a novel research direction, i.e. paying attention to the founders’ guanxi-
connected members, for researchers interested in family firms in China or other 
economies having a similar cultural background with China. In addition, this thesis 
proposes innovative criteria for identifying a guanxi-connected successor, which may 
be useful in future research. Moreover, while prior research recognises the importance 
of successors’ acquisition of the founder’s specialised assets in theory, this thesis is the 
first to empirically demonstrate the importance.  
In practice, this thesis, first, may help investors in Chinese family firms to predict the 
identity of the new leader more accurately based on the firm and the firm founder’s 
publicly available information. Second, it provides an important implication for the 
founders regarding the choice of the successor: both their family and guanxi-connected 
members can acquire their specialised assets and can use the assets to improve firm 
performance. Finally, this thesis provides a useful suggestion for the founders’ 
descendants who may inherit the business in the future that their potential inferior 
ability in debt-financing compared with nonfamily agents can be largely remedied by 
the specialised assets that they obtain from the founder.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents research background, describes research objectives and 
motivation, discusses the main findings, and provides the structure of this thesis.  
1.2 Research background: The choice of China 
The existing literature suggests that family firms, i.e. firms controlled by their founder 
or by the founder’s families and heirs, have become the dominant form of economic 
organisations across the globe (La Porta et al., 1999; Burkart et al., 2003; Anderson & 
Reeb, 2003a; Venter et al., 2005). These firms occupy the majority of economic 
activities, and have become one of the most important contributors to worldwide 
wealth creation and employment (Sharma, 2001; Astrachan & Melissa, 2003; Ward, 
2004). For example, in Western Europe, such as the UK, family firms represent over 
65% of the enterprises and contribute to more than 30% of the GDP (Laforet, 2016). 
In East Asia, such as Singapore, family businesses occupy almost 90% of registered 
enterprises and are responsible for more than half of the country’s workforce (Sharma 
& Chua, 2013). Even in the US, where a dispersed ownership structure is prevalent, 
family firms still generate about 65% of the GDP and 62% of the labour force 
(Astrachan & Melissa, 2003; Ibrahim et al., 2008).  
Due to their great contributions, family firms have gained increasing attention in the 
economics, finance, and corporate governance literature. One of the most popular 
issues in the discussion of family firms is the leadership succession. This is because 
forced by nature – the ageing of the family business founder, the succession issue has 
to be faced at some point. In addition, the leaders of family businesses, normally 
referring to the Chairman of the Board and the CEO, dominate the majority of 
important decisions in the business (Minichilli et al., 2010). As a result, the transition 
of the leadership positions plays a crucial role in determining the firm’s future 
strategies and activities, thus, in turn, being critical to the firm’s continuity, 
profitability, and development (Bennedsen et al., 2007).  
Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 2 
Researchers interested in family firms’ leadership successions mainly focus on factors 
that facilitate or damage a smooth succession (e.g., Sharma et al., 2001, 2003, 2004; 
Venter et al., 2005; Royer et al., 2008); determinants of the choice of the successor 
(e.g., Pérez-González, 2006; Bocatto et al., 2010; Ansari et al., 2014); and the 
financial consequences of the leadership transitions (e.g., Villalonga & Amit, 2006; 
Bennedsen et al., 2007; Amore et al., 2011; Bennedsen et al., 2015). These studies 
provide valuable insights and abundant evidence, which greatly contribute to the 
readers’ understanding of the complexity of family businesses’ succession issues. A 
detailed review of the literature shows that most existing research focuses on western 
and developed countries. While some studies deal with family businesses in Asian 
economies, family businesses in one of the largest and fastest-growing emerging 
economies in Asia, i.e. mainland China, are rarely studied (Jiang & Peng, 2011; Peng 
& Jiang, 2010). 
One reason for the above situation is the short history of the businesses. The family 
business is a relatively new concept in China. Its development is closely related to 
that of Chinese private enterprises (Qin & Wang, 2012). Specifically, private 
enterprises were forbidden in China before the late 1970s (Cai et al., 2012). Later on, 
due to the implementation of the Reform and Opening policy in 1978, China began to 
transform from a centralist-planned economy to a market-based socialist economy 
(Anderson et al., 2003a). Since then, private firms have been permitted. However, at 
the beginning of the reform, private businesses were only permitted to operate at the 
margins of the economy, and thus developed very slowly (Qin & Wang, 2012). A 
turning point came at the 15th National Congress of the Communist Party in 1997, 
where the non-public sector was for the first time stated as an “important component” 
of the socialist market economy rather than merely a “complement” to the economy 
as it had been in the past (Chow et al., 2012). From then on, private enterprises started 
to grow rapidly in China. For example, the number of registered private firms 
increased from fewer than one million in 1997 to 8.18 million in 2010, and almost 
90% of those firms are family businesses (Qin & Wang, 2012). 
In other words, unlike many of their counterparts in western and developed 
economies having a history of more than 100 years, the majority of family firms in 
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China were just developed by the founder about 30 years ago. As a result, many 
Chinese family businesses are still managed by the founder, and yet their counterparts 
in developed countries have been transferred to the third or even fourth generation of 
the founder (Qin & Wang, 2012). Therefore, the extant attention to the leadership 
succession in family businesses in China, compared to that in developed countries, is 
much limited.  
However, precisely because family firms in China has a relatively short history, the 
leadership transition, nowadays, is becoming an increasingly important and 
impendent issue for most of the firms. This is because, after more than 30 years’ 
dedication to the business, most of the firm founders recently are old enough to retire 
or very close to retirement. In other words, many family businesses in China are just 
about to have their first leadership transition. This makes the founders’ choice of the 
successor especially crucial for the businesses. This is because family business 
founders are widely viewed as the most valuable leaders1, the best stewards of the 
firm2, and the main source of the firm’s competitive advantages3 (e.g., Villalonga & 
Amit, 2006; Royer et al., 2008; Villalonga & Amit, 2010). Their successors, however, 
are often regarded as having a weaker stewardship sense to the firm and may dissipate 
the firm’s competitive advantages, and thus may be adversary to the firm’s longevity 
and development (e.g., Fan et al., 2012; Liu et al., 2012).  
In addition, although Chinese private enterprises have a short history, their 
contributions to China’s economy are prominent. For example, the GDP generated by 
the state-owned enterprises (SOEs), i.e. the dominant type of business organisations 
in China before the permission of private businesses, declined sharply from 77% in 
                                               
1 For example, by using S&P 500 firms as the sample, Villalonga and Amit (2006) find that founder-CEO firms 
have the highest average Tobin’s q of all family and nonfamily firms.  
 
2 The founders are those who create the company, responsible for the company’s early development, and who 
have devoted most of their wealth, time and energy to run the business from scratch to success (Villalonga & 
Amit, 2010). In this case, the founders’ emotional attachment to the company should be the strongest, and thus 
their stewardship sense towards the business is the strongest (Liu et al., 2012). However, successors neither invest 
most of their personal wealth in the firm nor take responsibility for the firm’s earliest operations, i.e. the hardest 
phase for the business, and hence their emotional attachment and stewardship awareness to the business should be 
much weaker.  
 
3 Family business founders’ specialised assets, e.g. their tacit knowledge and personal connections, have been 
widely agreed as the key contributor of the firm’s competitive advantages (Cabrera-Suárez et al., 2001; Lee et al., 
2003; Royer et al., 2008). However, because the specialised assets are intangible and individual-specific, they may 
be dissipated when being transferred across individuals (Fan et al., 2012).  
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1978 to around 28% in 1999 (Anderson et al., 2003a). Meanwhile, the GDP produced 
by private enterprises increased from 0% to 33% (Chow et al., 2012). Moreover, the 
private sector was reported to account for about 75% of the industrial output and new 
employment opportunities in 2005 (Amit et al., 2010). Furthermore, private firms 
have been becoming increasingly important in the Chinese economy during recent 
years, contributing to more than 60% of the GDP, half of the tax revenues, and 90% 
of the new employment every year (Huang, 2010).  
Given the above figures and the aforementioned fact that 90% of private enterprises in 
China are family firms, it should be no exaggeration to say that the sharp rise of 
family businesses is one of the main reasons for the unprecedented growth of the 
Chinese economy. This, in turn, causes China to become one of the largest and 
fastest-growing emerging countries around the world (Amit et al., 2010). 
Consequently, Chinese family firms’ leadership succession issues, such as the choice 
of the successor and the financial consequences of the choice, deserve special 
attention. These issues are critical not only for the future of the family businesses per 
se but also the prospect of China’s economy and living standards.  
1.3 Research objectives, motivation, and main findings 
To extend current knowledge on the leadership succession in Chinese family 
businesses, this thesis has three main objectives. Firstly, it aims at identifying the 
factors determining the successor choice in the businesses.  
When it is the time to “pass on the baton” (Plath, 2008:6), family business founders 
often struggle between appointing their family members and nonfamily agents as the 
successors (Lee et al., 2003). This is a critical junction for the firm, because whether 
the founder can choose an appropriate successor directly determines whether the firm 
can survive and make profits after the succession (Wasserman, 2003; Royer et al., 
2008; Pinheiro & Yung, 2015). Given such importance, the identity of the successor 
has received a lot of attention in the existing literature. However, most of the 
literature focuses on the different financial outcomes driven by different successors 
(e.g., Pérez-González, 2006; Bennedsen et al., 2007; Amore et al., 2011). The 
research dealing with the driving force of the successor decision is relatively scarce. 
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Moreover, as mentioned above, among the few studies on the determinants of the 
successor, the vast majority are conducted on western and developed economies. The 
literature for family firms in China is even more limited.4 Nevertheless, as previously 
discussed, the successor decision in Chinese family businesses is de facto an 
important issue for not only the businesses per se but also China’s economy.  
Moreover, China also offers a distinctive setting to study the above issue. This is 
because, firstly, China is one of the most ancient countries in the world (Tam & 
Redding, 1993), whose traditional culture has exerted a durable and profound impact 
on Chinese people’s cognitions and behaviour. However, in contrast to the developed 
countries where most succession research focuses on, i.e. the countries where 
individualistic cultures prevail, such as the US and the UK, the Chinese traditional 
culture has been recognised as being mostly collectivist (Chen et al., 1998; Hofstede, 
1991). In this case, focusing on China’s context and exploring whether the Chinese 
culture has an impact on the successor choice should be an interesting issue.    
Secondly, due to the transitional economy from centrally planned to market-oriented, 
China has been experiencing a market-based reform within a socialist economic and 
political governance system (Xu et al., 2015). As a direct consequence, the Chinese 
government controls most economic resources, such as materials, land, and financial 
capital (Chen et al., 2013c; Cao et al., 2017). In this background, the whole business 
environment in China has been heavily affected by its political climate, and political 
connections can generate great economic value for Chinese enterprises (Xu et al., 
2015). Such importance and identifiability of political connections in China may 
make Chinese family firms behave very differently from their counterparts in other 
countries, and thus increase the interestingness of studying family firms’ successor 
decisions in such a context.  
Finally, China was strict in executing a one-child policy until 2016.5 This policy has 
imposed significant human capital constraints on Chinese family business founders 
                                               
4 Based on my literature review in Chapter 2, only two papers to date focus on this issue for China. 
 
5 This policy was enacted in late 1979. It applies to all families in China. It officially restricts married couples to 
have only one child. Some exceptions are permitted. For example, couples in which both partners are single 
children are allowed to have two kids. Some parents are also permitted to have a second child if their firstborn is a 
girl or if they suffer “hardship” as determined by local officials. Minorities (such as Uighurs and Tibetans) are 
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for their selection of a qualified family successor, as many of them have only one 
child (Cao et al., 2015).6 Nevertheless, in the meantime, China is featured with weak 
shareholder protection, an underdeveloped managerial labour market, and a low level 
of social trust outside of kinship (Xu et al., 2015). This makes it difficult for the 
founders to find a competent and trustworthy nonfamily successor. In other words, 
compared with the founders in other contexts who typically have many heirs and 
those in developed economies who are protected by strong legal systems and provided 
with developed labour markets, selecting an appropriate successor should be much 
more difficult for the founders in China, no matter they prefer a family or nonfamily 
succession. This, in turn, makes China a more distinctive and interesting setting for 
the exploration of the successor decision in family firms.  
The above reasons lead to the first objective of this thesis, i.e. the identification of the 
determinants of the successor in family firms in China. To this end, a unique hand-
collected sample of 348 Chairman or CEO succession cases in publicly listed family 
firms in China during 2003 to 2014, with the firm founder as the predecessor, is 
employed. In addition, five factors are postulated as the determinants, i.e. foreign 
ownership, Confucianism, clan culture, the founders’ overseas experience, and the 
founders’ political connections. The motivation for focusing on these factors will be 
elaborated in Section 2.1 of Chapter 2. 
My empirical evidence indicates that all the five factors have a significant influence 
on the choice of the successor. More specifically, family firms without foreign 
ownership and whose founder is deeply affected by clan culture are more likely to 
choose a family successor. Moreover, the founders strongly influenced by 
Confucianism, without overseas experience, and with more political connections are 
more likely to appoint not only a family successor but also a nonfamily successor 
                                               
allowed to have a second, and sometimes a third child, whichever the gender of the firstborn. Children born 
overseas are not counted under the policy if they do not take Chinese citizenship. Chinese returnees are permitted 
more children born overseas. In most cases, couples who violate the policy must pay fines and could be punished 
in various ways ranging from social pressure to job loss (Cao et al., 2015). 
However, the government has officially relaxed this policy by allowing a second child since late 2015. 
6 The policy has led to a pronounced drop in China’s population growth rate over the last three decades. It has 
prevented 400 million births in China from 1979 to 2011 (Bennedsen et al., 2015). For family businesses in China, 
the policy has also imposed large constraints on the availability of heirs for within-family successions. Cao et al.’s 
(2015) survey in 2002 shows that 69% of their sampled family business owners have only one child, and the 
average number of children in the sample is only 1.22.  
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having a guanxi with them. Here, guanxi, a Chinese indigenous construct, refers to the 
direct particularistic relations between two or more individuals (Fan, 2002a, 2002b; 
Bedford, 2011). Those relations are highly informal and personal, and the parties in 
the relations are bounded by an implicit psychological contract to follow social norms 
such as reciprocity, mutual trust, and mutual obligations (Chen & Chen, 2004; Chen 
et al., 2013b). How to identify a guanxi between the founder and the successor will be 
elaborated in Section 2.4 of Chapter 2. Moreover, the above findings and the 
contributions of the findings will be discussed in detail in Section 2.1 of Chapter 2.   
The second objective of this thesis is to explore the impact that leadership successions 
have on firm performance. For this objective, the following three research questions 
are answered: 
1) Do leadership transitions cause a significant change in firm performance? 
2) Do family successors have a significantly different impact on firm performance, 
compared with nonfamily successors? 
3) Does successors’ acquisition of the founder’s specialised assets have an impact on 
firm performance? 
There are some studies related to the first question. Specifically, they focus on cross-
sectional comparisons between founder- and successor-managed firms in terms of 
their performance. Most of them find that the former, on average, perform better than 
the latter (e.g., Anderson & Reeb, 2003a; Villalonga & Amit, 2006). However, 
research exclusively focuses on the first issue above, i.e. whether the leadership 
transition from the founder to the successor leads to a significant change in firm 
performance, especially compared with the usual performance variation in firms 
without the transition, is surprisingly lacking. The extant cross-sectional studies 
undoubtedly can provide some clues on this issue, but exclusive empirical evidence 
on it is still necessary, which contributes to a thorough and accurate understanding of 
the dynamics of leadership successions in family businesses.  
In addition, as previously mentioned, the founders often face a dilemma between 
appointing a family member and a nonfamily agent as the successor, and what 
concerns them most should be the potential different impacts that these two types of 
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successors may have on firm performance. This gives me the motivation for exploring 
the second issue above. There is some literature focusing on that issue in western and 
developed contexts, and most of which indicates that family successors have a 
significant and negative impact on firm performance, compared with their nonfamily 
counterparts. However, the relevant evidence specific for China is still lacking. 
Moreover, most of the literature are based upon agency theory, stewardship theory, or 
the resource-based view7, whose efficacy, however, may change in China’s unique 
institutional, social, cultural context. Taking agency theory as an example, as 
previously discussed, China is characterised by ineffective shareholder protection and 
an underdeveloped managerial labour market. In such a context, both the principal-
agent (PA) problem, e.g., the conflicts between the controlling family and nonfamily 
managers, and the principal-principal (PP) problem, e.g., the conflicts between the 
family and nonfamily shareholders, may deteriorate in family firms (Liu et al., 2012). 
Moreover, being affected by the Confucian familism culture, the founders in China 
generally have a low degree of trust towards nonfamily members (Xu et al., 2015). 
This may further aggravate the PA problem. However, in the meantime, the one-child 
policy may greatly reduce the benefits of having a family successor suggested by 
agency theory. This is because the largely restricted talent pool within the family and 
the founders’ strong unidirectional altruism to their single child may significantly 
increase the likelihood of unqualified family successors and the successors’ 
opportunistic behaviours.  
The above discussion explains how the validity of agency theory varies in China’s 
institutional and cultural background. The effectiveness of the aforementioned two 
other theories, i.e. stewardship theory and the resource-based view, may also change 
to some extent when embedding the theories into the context of China. This will be 
elaborated in Section 3.2.5 of Chapter 3. In this regard, the investigation of the 
preceding issue, i.e. whether family successors have a significantly different effect on 
firm performance relative to nonfamily successors, in China’s setting becomes 
necessary and worthwhile. This is because the finding may be different from that in 
western and developed countries.  
                                               
7 These theories will be elaborated in Section 3.2 of Chapter 3.  
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Furthermore, family firm founders’ specialised assets, normally referring to their tacit 
knowledge and social connections, have been widely recognised as the key 
contributor to the firm’s competitive advantages, thus being crucial to the firm’s 
sustained development (e.g., Royer et al., 2008; Bracci & Vagnoni, 2011; Fan et al., 
2012). This is particularly the case in China. More specifically, despite the 
aforementioned great contributions to the economy, family firms have long suffered 
political, financial, and social discrimination in China (Chen et al., 2013). The main 
reason for this situation is the fact that, in China, it is the government who dominates 
the majority of economic resources. As a result, most of the resources often flow into 
SOEs rather than private enterprises such as family businesses (Allen et al., 2005; Fan 
et al., 2008; Li et al., 2008), In addition, as private enterprises in China are typically 
younger, smaller, and lack political support relative to SOEs, they are normally of 
higher risk in the eyes of investors. Therefore, Chinese family firms often suffer 
discrimination not only in terms of policy and resource allocation, but also in terms of 
financing, investment, and business cooperation. As a consequence, the firms have to 
heavily rely on their founders’ specialised assets, such as reputation and social 
network resources, to lower transaction costs and to obtain external funds and 
business opportunities (Allen et al., 2005; Chen et al., 2011).  
In other words, unlike family firms in developed economies having easy access to 
institutional resources (Carney et al., 2009), the family firms in China, due to the 
preceding discrimination, have to largely rely on the founder’s personal specialised 
assets to survive and develop. This makes those assets especially important and 
valuable for the firm. In this case, for Chinese family firms experiencing or about to 
experience a leadership transition, whether the successor can acquire the founder’s 
specialised assets should be critical to the firm’s survival and development after the 
succession.  
There have been some studies highlighting the importance of successors’ acquisition 
of the specialised assets in theory (e.g., Bjuggren & Sund, 2002; Lee et al., 2003; 
Sharma & Irving, 2005). However, empirical research to demonstrate the importance, 
such as the potential contribution to the firm’s financial consequences, is lacking. 
This research gap together with the above significance of the assets for family 
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businesses in China motivate me to explore the third research issue above, i.e. 
whether successors’ obtainment of the founder’s specialised assets has an impact on 
firm performance.   
To answer the above three questions, the preceding 348 succession cases together 
with a control group of 337 non-succession firms are employed. The non-succession 
firms are publicly listed Chinese family firms with the founder as both the Chairman 
of the Board and the CEO and without a leadership transition during the period 2003-
2014. As to the empirical evidence, I find that family firms do not experience a 
significant variation in firm performance around their leadership transitions, 
compared with their counterparts without a leadership transition during the same 
period. An appropriate interpretation for this finding is that the positive effect of 
leadership transitions in family firms is cancelled out by the negative effect. In 
addition, I find that family successors do not exhibit a significant difference in firm 
performance, relative to their nonfamily counterparts. This also suggests a balanced 
perspective, i.e. the benefits of having a family successor are likely to be offset by the 
costs in the context of China. Finally, I find that family or guanxi-connected 
successors’ acquisition of the founder’s specialised assets has a significant and 
positive impact on firm performance. This proves that successors’ obtainment of the 
assets indeed greatly contributes to the firm’s profitability and development after the 
succession. Here, I use the successors’ pre-succession internal experience as a proxy 
for their acquisition of the specialised assets. The rationale for this proxy and why I  
apply it only to the successors who are the founder’s descendant or guanxi-connected 
member will be elaborated in Section 3.4.3 of Chapter 3. In addition, the above 
findings and the contributions of the findings will be detailed in Section 3.1 of 
Chapter 3.   
After the investigation of the impact of the successor choice on firm performance, the 
following question arises: Apart from the effect on firm performance, does the 
successor decision have any other financial consequences which are also critical to 
the firm’s growth and development? This question leads to the final objective of this 
thesis, i.e. to investigate whether the successor decision has an impact on the firm’s 
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access to debt. To this end, the following two research questions are attempted to be 
answered: 
1) Do family successors have a significantly different impact on the firm’s access to 
debt, compared with nonfamily successors? 
2) Does successors’ acquisition of the founder’s specialised assets have an impact on 
the firm’s access to debt? 
Debt financing has been widely regarded as an important source of capital for family 
businesses and critical to their growth and development (Amore et al., 2011; Chua et 
al., 2011). This is because, compared with equity financing, debt capital can satisfy 
the business owners’ need for external capital without diluting their control over the 
firm and can be less costly after tax (Graham, 2000; Romano et al., 2001; López-
Gracia & Sánchez-Andújar, 2007). In addition, debt finance is especially important 
for family firms in China. This is because China is featured with an underdeveloped 
capital market, in which more than 70% of the financial resources are dominated by 
the four largest state-owned banks (Allen et al., 2005; Chen et al., 2013a; Shi, 2013).8 
In this background, debt financing, particularly in the form of bank loans, has become 
the major source of external finance for Chinese enterprises (Zou & Xiao, 2006; Fan 
et al., 2008; Cull et al., 2015). For example, as reported by the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (2008), in the year 2006, the capital structure of Chinese 
listed companies was comprised by 84.9% of debts from the banks, 10.1% of 
corporate bonds, 3.9% of stock finance, and only 1.1% of asset-backed securities.  
However, the Chinese government’s controlling power in the state-owned banks 
makes the majority of the bank credit resources allocated to state-owned enterprises 
rather than their private counterparts, such as family businesses (Allen et al., 2005; 
Fan et al., 2008; Li et al., 2008). Moreover, as mentioned above, family firms in 
China are generally younger and smaller than their state-owned counterparts, and thus 
are much riskier in the eyes of most lenders (Xu et al., 2013). Due to these factors, 
family firms in China have long been subject to severe financial constraints, which 
have become one of the primary obstacles for the firm’s longevity and development 
                                               
8 The four banks include the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), the Agricultural Bank of China 
(ABC), the Bank of China (BOC), and the China Construction Bank (CCB).  
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(Li et al., 2008; Yu et al., 2012; Xu et al., 2013). For example, World Bank (2006) 
conducted a survey of 12,400 firms in 120 cities in China, and 75% of the surveyed 
family firms viewed constraints in accessing external financial resources as the main 
barrier to the development of the firm. 
Given the above situations and a prevalent view that firm leaders plays a crucial role 
in shaping the firm’s financing policy and access to external finance (e.g., Minichilli 
et al., 2010; Amore et al., 2011), the relationship between the successor choice and 
the firm’s access to debt in China’s context deserves special attention. However, 
compared to the preceding importance of the successor decision and debt financing 
for family businesses, the extant literature on this issue is surprisingly scarce, let alone 
the research specific for Chinese family firms. This research void and the 
aforementioned situations give me the motivation for investigating the first research 
issue above, i.e. whether the choice of a family or nonfamily successor has a 
significant impact on the firm’s access to debt finance. 
Moreover, due to the aforementioned credit discrimination against private enterprises, 
family firms in China, as mentioned above, have to heavily rely on their founders’ 
specialised assets to compete for external finance (Allen et al., 2005). In this case, 
whether successors can acquire the assets should be critical to the firm’s access to the 
credit market after the succession. Thus, an investigation of the second research 
question above in China’s setting is also worthwhile.  
To solve the above two research issues, the preceding 348 succession cases are used. 
My empirical evidence shows that family successors have a significant and negative 
impact on the firm’s access to debt capital, compared with their nonfamily 
counterparts. I contend this is because the former are less capable of raising debt 
capital than the latter. The reason behind is that China’s familism culture and one-
child policy make the founders very likely to appoint an incapable family successor. 
This, in turn, may cause lenders greater monitoring costs and default risks, and thus 
further decreases the successor’s financing ability. Moreover, I find that family 
successors’ acquisition of the founder’s specialised assets has a significant and 
positive impact on the firm’s access to debt. This suggests that family successors’ 
inferior debt-financing ability, compared with nonfamily agents, can be significantly 
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mitigated by the specialised assets that they obtain from the founder. These findings 
and their contributions will be discussed more in detail in Section 4.1 of Chapter 4.  
1.4 Structure of the thesis 
The remainder of this thesis comprises four chapters and is structured as follows. 
Firstly, considering that the above three research objectives are de facto three 
independent research topics, Chapters 2 to 4 are organised as three self-contained 
studies on the objectives. More specifically, each of the three chapters contains six 
main sections: Introduction, Literature review, Hypothesis development, Data and 
methods, Empirical results and discussion, and Conclusion. Secondly, Chapter 2, 
which focuses on the determinants of the successor, has an additional section 
providing six criteria for the identification of a guanxi between a Chinese family 
business founder and his or her nonfamily successor. Similarly, Chapter 3, which 
explores the succession-firm performance relationship, also includes an additional 
section. The section reviews the main theories employed in the previous literature 
regarding the family management-firm performance relationship and how China’s 
institutional, cultural, and social context affects the applicability of the theories. This 
section aims at providing theoretical foundations for the relevant hypothesis 
development. Finally, Chapter 5 concludes this thesis, summarising the findings, 
highlighting the contributions and implications, and acknowledging the limitations.
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Chapter 2 Determinants of the successor choice 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims at providing empirical evidence on what factors play a role in the 
successor choice in Chinese family firms. Specifically, I mainly focus on five factors, 
i.e. foreign ownership, Confucianism, clan culture, the founders’ overseas experience, 
and the founders’ political connections. The reasons for considering these factors are 
detailed as below. 
My interest in foreign ownership comes from the fact that China has been the largest 
recipient of foreign investment in the world since its entry into the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) in 2001 (Zou & Adam, 2008). As a result, Chinese companies 
have made great progress to adjust to global financial markets, and foreign investment 
has exerted a prominent impact on the companies (Liu & Kroll, 2011). Moreover, 
foreign shareholders are a unique type of investors in China. More specifically, due to 
China’s inefficient stock market and weak protection systems for investors, most 
Chinese domestic investors are short-term speculators who make gains by trading 
rather than via long-term investment (Wang & Xu, 2004; Wong, 2006; Cai, 2010). 
However, foreign investors, most of which are from mature capital markets, tend to 
have a long-term investment horizon. Their investment is more likely driven by the 
companies’ fundamental values and potential (Huang & Shiu, 2009; Liang et al., 
2012).9 As a result, foreign investors, different from their domestic counterparts, 
                                               
9 A unique feature of China’s stock market is that a small number of listed firms issue two classes of common 
shares, i.e. A and B shares. These two classes of shares have identical voting and dividend rights and are listed on 
the same exchanges (Shanghai or Shenzhen stock exchanges), but are issued for different participants. Class A 
shares were restricted to domestic residents. Class B shares were limited to foreign investors before 2001. Since 
February 2001, China’s domestic investors have been allowed to purchase B shares by using U.S or Hong Kong 
dollars. However, due to the Chinese government’s capital controls and exchange controls (domestic Chinese 
investors only have limited access to the necessary foreign currency), the main players in the B-share market are 
still foreigners, even after the rule change.  
 
Under this background, Mei et al. (2009) provide a good example of the different investment motivations between 
the domestic and foreign investors. Specifically, by studying A and B shares issued by Chinese companies during 
1993-2000, they find that, despite the identical payoffs and voting rights offered by these two types of shares, A 
shares are traded more actively, on average 420% more than the corresponding B shares. Additionally, A shares’ 
turnover rate is shown to be much higher, which is 500% versus 100% per year for B shares. Mei et al. (2009) 
argue that this is because domestic investors’ speculative motives generate a speculative component in A-share 
prices, and this component is positively related to the turnover rate of A shares. 
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usually play an efficient monitoring and governance role in the companies they have 
invested in (Huang & Shiu, 2009; Choi et al., 2012).  
Researchers have provided much evidence on the importance of foreign investment in 
Chinese enterprises in terms of various aspects, such as firm performance, capital 
structure, and corporate transparency.10 However, there is little attention to foreign 
shareholders’ role in family businesses, let alone their effect on the businesses’ 
successor selections. This chapter fills this gap by empirically demonstrating that 
family firms with foreign ownership are more likely to choose a nonfamily successor. 
This supports my posit that foreign shareholders typically prefer a nonfamily 
successor, as family successors may be detrimental to firm performance and may help 
the controlling family to expropriate minority shareholders’ interests (including those 
of foreign shareholders) (Peng & Jiang, 2010). However, I also find that a strong 
institutional environment can lower foreign shareholders’ preference for a nonfamily 
successor in the family business.  
The following three factors, i.e. Confucianism, clan culture, and the founders’ 
overseas experience are used to explore the potential impact of China’s traditional 
culture on the successor decision. National culture is often viewed as a set of values 
and beliefs, which are shared by a group of people and provide foundations for group 
members’ cognitions and behaviour (Yan & Sorenson, 2006; Schwartz et al., 2012). 
The importance of cultural factors in the investigations of family businesses has long 
been emphasised (e.g., Handler, 1994; Nordqvist et al., 2013; Cheng, 2014).11 
However, there are few relevant studies, especially empirical investigations, on the 
succession issues.   
China provides a good setting to explore the influence of culture. As one of the oldest 
countries in the world, China has a traceable history of over 5,000 years (Tam & 
                                               
10 E.g., Makhija & Spiro (2000); Xiao et al. (2004); Ahmadjian & Robbins (2005); Filatotchev et al. (2005); Bai et 
al. (2006); Douma et al. (2006); Zou & Xiao (2006); Xiao & Yuan (2007); Mohd Hassan et al. (2008); Zou & 
Adams (2008); Huang & Shiu (2009); Li et al. (2009); Gul et al. (2010); Choi et al. (2011); Huang et al. (2011); 
Liu et al. (2011); Choi et al. (2012).  
 
11 For example, Handler (1994) outlines a research agenda for future studies on the succession issues in family 
firms. The first item on the agenda is the need for exploring the impact of national culture. A recent literature 
review conducted by Cheng (2014) also suggests future research to pay more attention to the effect of culture on 
the evolvement of family firms. 
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Redding, 1993). As a result, China’s traditional culture has been woven into the very 
fabric of Chinese society and has exerted a profound influence on the everyday lives 
of Chinese people (Jacobs et al., 1995; Tu, 1998c; Xing, 1995). However, the degrees 
of people being affected by the Chinese culture may be heterogenous due to their 
different backgrounds and across different regions (Yan & Sorenson, 2006). In this 
case, it should be interesting to explore whether the founder’s selection of the 
successor is determined by his or her degree of being influenced by China’s 
traditional culture.  
In the traditional Chinese culture, Confucianism is undoubtedly the most ancient and 
influential part (Tu, 1998a, 1998b; Du, 2015, 2016). Its influence on Chinese persons’ 
ways of thinking and behaving has lasted for thousands of years (Yu, 1996; Slote & 
DeVos, 1998; Elman et al., 2002). Two of its key ideologies, familism and guanxi 
culture, have been widely recognised as the root of the organisational forms and 
management features in Chinese family firms (e.g., Yan & Sorenson, 2006; Yeung, 
2006; Zhang & Ma, 2009). Nevertheless, despite the importance of Confucianism, no 
empirical test has been conducted of the impact of Confucian ideologies on family 
businesses’ successor decisions. 
This chapter provides some evidence on this issue. I hypothesise that the degree of the 
founder being affected by Confucian values significantly affects his or her choice of 
the successor. Consistent with this hypothesis, I find that family firms headquartered 
in regions with stronger Confucianism atmosphere are more likely to appoint the 
founder’s descendant or a nonfamily member having a guanxi with the founder as the 
successor.  
In addition to Confucianism, clan culture is also an important part of the traditional 
Chinese culture (Deshpande & Farley, 2004). A clan is often viewed as an extended 
family, and thus the core principles of clan culture are very similar to that of familism 
(Hu & Chen, 2015). The Chinese clan culture also has a strong and long-lasting 
influence on people’s cognitions and behaviour. However, the attention it has 
received, compared to Confucianism, is very limited. This chapter attempts to fill this 
void by using the percentage of the founder’s clan members in the firm’s top 
management team as a proxy for the founder’s level of being affected by the clan 
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culture. The results show that the more deeply the founder is affected by the culture, 
the greater is the likelihood of a family successor.  
Apart from the above region- and firm-level factors, the founder’s certain past 
experience may also imply how strong he or she is influenced by the traditional 
Chinese culture. According to Hambrick and Mason (1984), entrepreneurs’ past 
experience can shape their cognitions, values, and beliefs, and in turn affect their 
behaviour and decision-making. People’s experience abroad, as Friedman et al. 
(2012) argue, may result in a change of their values and cultural beliefs to a certain 
extent. Chinese managers’ overseas experience has received increasing attention over 
recent years. A possible reason is that more and more Chinese have studied overseas 
and then returned to China.12 Moreover, the Chinese government has started to 
initiate a number of returnee-preferential policies in the past few years, in order to 
encourage overseas talents back to China.13 Many researchers have explored the role 
of Chinese returnees in a variety of ways, in terms of firm internationalisation, firm 
export, firm innovation, and firm performance.14 However, the majority of the 
researchers focus on the effect of returnees’ human capital and social capital, such as 
their high-quality educational backgrounds, advanced skills, and international 
network ties. None of the studies has investigated the impact of overseas experience 
from a cultural viewpoint. In particularly no prior study focuses on the experience of 
family business founders, let alone linking it to the founders’ successor decisions.  
This chapter explores the above issue and demonstrates that the founders with 
overseas study or work experience are more likely to appoint a successor who is not a 
family member and without a guanxi. This supports my conjecture that the founders 
who have worked or studied overseas are less affected by China’s traditional culture, 
and thus are less likely to choose their successor based on familism or guanxi. In 
                                               
12 For example, between 1978 and 2012, China had about 2.6 million overseas students, and almost half of them 
have been back. 
 
13 For example, to encourage more high-level overseas talent to return to China and contribute to the economy, the 
government launched a returnee-favourable policy entitled “Recruitment Program of Global Experts” in 2008. 
This policy offers returnees national-level policy support for working and living in China, and a tax-free lump sum 
of a million RMB. This scheme targets full professors at overseas universities, senior managers in multinational 
firms, and innovation-oriented entrepreneurs, and has attracted 2,263 elite returnees between 2008 and 2012 (Duan 
& Hou, 2015).  
 
14 E.g., Wright et al. (2008); Dai & Liu (2009); Filatotchev et al. (2009); Liu et al. (2010); Filatotchev et al. 
(2011); Deng et al. (2012); Li et al. (2012); Luo et al. (2013); Cui et al. (2015); Duan & Hou (2015). 
Chapter 2 - Determinants of the successor choice 
 18 
addition, I also find that the founders with longer overseas experience are more likely 
to choose a nonfamily successor without a guanxi. This confirms my posit that the 
longer the founders have stayed abroad, the less they are influenced by Chinese 
traditional culture.  
The final hypothesised determinant is a type of specialised assets that the founders 
may have, i.e. political connections. As discussed in the previous chapter, family 
business founders’ specialised assets, which normally refer to their tacit knowledge 
and personal connections, have been widely recognised as the main source of the 
firm’s competitive advantages and critical to the firm’s sustained profitability (e.g., 
Royer et al., 2008; Bracci & Vagnoni, 2011; Fan et al., 2012). As a result, the 
founders tend to have a strong desire to preserve their specialised assets within the 
firm, and this desire may affect their choice of the successor (Xu et al., 2015).  
In China, political connections should be one of the most important specialised assets 
for family business founders. This is because, firstly, the Chinese government’s 
dominant power in allocating economic resources can provide politically connected 
entrepreneurs with huge benefits, such as better access to financing, better regulatory 
protection, more tax benefits, and more government financial assistance.15 Secondly, 
due to the lack of political support, family firms in China often suffer discrimination 
in various aspects (Chen et al., 2013c). Such importance of political connections in 
China makes it interesting to study the possible impact of the founder’s political 
connections on his or her successor choice.  
To the best of my knowledge, Xu et al.’s (2015) study is the only one to date that 
provides evidence on this issue. The authors find that politically connected founders 
are more likely to appoint a descendant as the Chairman of the Board, the CEO, or a 
director in the family firm. My findings complement Xu et al.’s (2015) work. More 
specifically, I demonstrate that the founders with more political connections are more 
likely to appoint a family successor or a nonfamily successor having a guanxi with the 
founder. This result confirms my conjecture that Chinese family business founders’ 
political connections are accessible not only to their family members but also to their 
                                               
15 E.g., Fan et al. (2008); Li et al. (2008); Francis et al. (2009); Berkman et al. (2010); Chan et al. (2012); Wu et 
al. (2012a, 2012b); Cull et al. (2015); Lin et al. (2015); Cao et al. (2017).  
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guanxi-connected members. In addition, I also find that the above result attenuates if 
the firm is located in a province where the local government has a low controlling 
power in resource allocation. Moreover, I find that the more valuable are the 
founder’s political connections, the stronger is the founder’s intention of appointing a 
family or guanxi-connected successor.  
Overall, this chapter contributes to the literature in several aspects. Firstly, it 
contributes to a better understanding of the factors that drive family firms’ successor 
decisions. This is because, out of the five hypothesised determinants, four, i.e. foreign 
ownership, Confucianism, clan culture, and the founders’ overseas experience, have 
never been empirically explored in the extant literature.  
Secondly, this chapter adds to the literature on foreign ownership. To the best of my 
knowledge, this study is the first that highlights the role of foreign ownership in 
family businesses. Thus, it may enhance people’s understanding of foreign investment 
and may open a new research channel for future studies on foreign investors, i.e. 
exploring their potential impact on family businesses’ corporate decision or 
behaviour. 
In addition, this study is also among the first to empirically investigate the influence 
of national culture on the successor selections in family firms. This contributes to the 
extant literature in several ways. Firstly, the importance of culture in determining the 
successor has been largely highlighted in theory (e.g., Yan & Sorenson, 2006; Zhang 
& Ma 2009), yet there is very limited empirical support. Thus, this study fills the 
void. More specifically, it originally applies three factors at different levels, i.e. the 
regional level, firm level, and individual level, to comprehensively proxy for family 
business founders’ extent of being affected by the traditional Chinese culture, and in 
turn, explores the effect of the culture on the successor decisions. The empirical 
results suggest that national culture is more than a background condition and has a 
significant impact on the successor choices. This lends support to the call for more 
studies on the role of cultural factors in family firms’ succession issues.  
Secondly, it provides initial empirical evidence on how Confucian values affect 
Chinese family firms’ successor decisions. This may offer some implications for 
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researchers interested in other Asian contexts, such as Singapore, Taiwan, and Japan, 
where Confucian ideology still exerts influence over people’s cognitions and 
behaviour (Yan & Sorenson, 2006). For example, researchers can apply the relevant 
propositions and proxies in this study to family businesses in those economies, in 
which case they can empirically examine the impact of Confucianism on the 
businesses’ decision-making, including but not limited to the choice of successor. 
Moreover, it sheds initial light on the role of clan culture in Chinese family 
businesses. Similar to Confucianism, clan culture is also an important element of 
China’s traditional culture. However, compared to the former, the attention to the 
latter is very scarce. In this regard, this study provides a call for greater research 
attention to Chinese clan culture and may suggest a new research direction for 
scholars interested in the role of cultural factors in Chinese family firms, i.e. paying 
attention to the impact of the clan culture on the firms’ governance features or 
corporate behaviour.  
Furthermore, this chapter provides novel insights into the role of entrepreneurs’ 
overseas experience in corporate behaviour and decision-making. More specifically, 
different from most researchers studying the impact of returnees from the perspectives 
of human capital or social capital, this study suggests that it is useful to look at the 
effect through the lens of cultural switching by providing original empirical evidence 
on the role of family business founders’ overseas experience in determining the 
successor. This helps to broaden people’s understanding of returnees in emerging and 
developing economies. It may also contribute to new research channels for further 
studies focusing on returnee managers’ behaviour and decision-making in not only 
family businesses but also other forms of economic organisations.  
The fifth major contribution of this chapter is that it sheds new light on the 
relationship between the founders’ political connections and the successor selections 
in China’s context. More specifically, it extends the existing evidence, i.e. politically 
connected founders are more likely to choose a descendant as the successor (Xu et al., 
2015), by documenting that the founders’ political connections are positively related 
to the likelihood of not only a family successor but also a guanxi-connected 
nonfamily successor.  
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Additionally, unlike the previous literature focusing on family/nonfamily successors, 
this study is the first highlighting the existence of a unique type of successors, i.e. the 
nonfamily members having a guanxi with the founder. This provides a novel and 
interesting research avenue, i.e. paying more attention to the role of guanxi-connected 
nonfamily members, for researchers interested in family firms in China or other 
economies having a similar cultural background with China. This new research focus 
should be applicable not only to studies on the succession issue but also to any 
research topics related to the different identities of managers in family firms. 
Moreover, this study provides innovative criteria for defining a guanxi-connected 
successor, which may be useful in future studies.  
Finally, in practice, this study can help investors in family firms to predict the identity 
of the next leader according to the firm’s publicly available information.  
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the 
literature. Section 2.3 develops the hypotheses, and Section 2.4 discusses how to 
identify a guanxi-connected successor. Section 2.5 describes the data collection and 
research design, Section 2.6 provides the empirical results, and Section 2.7 concludes.  
2.2 Literature review 
Extant research regarding the determinants of the successor in family businesses 
primarily focuses on the following aspects: individual-level factors such as the 
founders’ specialised assets and socio-emotional wealth; family-level features such as 
the controlling power and the structure of the controlling family; firm-level 
characteristics such as past performance and board independence; and environmental 
factors such as the level of shareholder protection and national policies.16 
2.2.1 Individual level factors 
For example, Lee et al. (2003) argue that the founders’ specialised assets, i.e. their 
tacit knowledge and personal connections, are the main source of the firm’s 
                                               
16 E.g, Smith & Amoako-Adu (1999); Burkart et al. (2003); Lee et al. (2003); Bennedsen, et al. (2004); Pérez-
González (2006); Bennedsen et al. (2007); Gómez-Mejía et al. (2007); Bertrand et al. (2008); Royer et al. (2008); 
Bocatto et al. (2010); Zellweger et al. (2012); Ansari et al. (2014); Bennedsen et al. (2015); Cao et al. (2015); Xu 
et al. (2015). 
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competitive advantages and thus are crucial to the firm’s sustained development. 
However, because the assets are the founders’ personal distinctive and valuable 
resources, they are normally accessible only to the founders’ family members and 
highly trustworthy nonfamily members. Therefore, Lee et al. (2003) propose that in 
order to preserve the resources in the firm after the succession, the founders typically 
prefer a descendant as the successor, even if the descendant is less capable than 
nonfamily agents. However, if the heir is so incompetent that his or her inheritance of 
the business is a disaster for the firm’s survival and longevity, the founder will be in a 
dilemma. The strategy to solve the dilemma, as the authors advocate, is to adopt a 
seat-warmer strategy, i.e. arranging a temporary agent to manage and replacing him or 
her once there is a suitable and qualified family successor. Alternatively, the founders 
can appoint a trustworthy nonfamily member as the successor, such as a long-serving 
employee in the firm. 
Similarly, Royer et al. (2008) also acknowledge the importance of the specialised 
assets in determining the successor and that family members are more likely to 
acquire the assets compared with nonfamily agents. However, they further argue that 
family successors’ general knowledge, relevant technical or industry-specific 
knowledge may be much less than that of nonfamily professionals. Hence, the authors 
suggest that family successors are more appropriate only if their general knowledge, 
industry-specific technical knowledge, and obtained tacit knowledge from the founder 
are comprehensively greater than nonfamily agents’ general, industrial, and technical 
knowledge. The authors’ survey of 860 Australian family firms supports their 
conjecture to some extent. Specifically, they find that the founders are more likely to 
choose a family successor if the business is highly relevant to their idiosyncratic 
knowledge, and the industrial context affects their successor preference as well.   
However, different from the above researchers, Gómez-Mejía et al. (2007) and 
Zellweger et al. (2012) contend that the founders’ preference for family successors is 
derived from the desire for socio-emotional wealth. Specifically, behavioural theorists 
argue that most entrepreneurs have both economic and noneconomic goals (e.g., 
Cyert & March, 1963; Argote & Greve, 2007). For family business founders, their 
noneconomic objectives are referred to as socio-emotional wealth, which includes the 
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fulfilment of the needs for belonging, affect and intimacy, the altruism towards the 
descendants, and the realisation of family value and family dynasty (Gómez-Mejía et 
al., 2007; Zellweger et al., 2012). Moreover, because most founders have a strong 
emotional attachment to their firm and their family, they are more likely to place 
priority on the socio-emotional wealth. As a result, family members are always their 
first choice of the successor.   
2.2.2 Family and firm level determinants 
In the existing literature, family- and firm-level determinants are those that attract the 
most attention. In addition, among others, the level of the family control and the 
firm’s past performance are the most prevalent. For example, by using the proportion 
of family executives as a measure of the family’s controlling power, Smith and 
Amoako-Adu (1999), Pérez-González (2006), and Bennedsen et al. (2015) all find 
that the proportion is strongly related to the likelihood of a family successor.17 
Moreover, the likelihood also increases if nonfamily large shareholders are lacking 
(Smith & Amoako-Adu, 1999). 
Nevertheless, some researchers have different findings. For example, Bocatto et al. 
(2010) document that family ownership and the proportion of family directors do not 
have an impact on the successor decision in Spanish family businesses. In addition, 
Ansari et al.’s (2014) study, in France, Germany and the UK, shows that the three 
measures of family power, i.e. the family’s cash-flow rights, voting rights, and the 
divergence between the cash-flow and voting rights, are all insignificantly related to 
the likelihood of a family successor.  
It is worth noting that most of the aforementioned studies also explore the role of firm 
performance (except for Bennedsen et al. (2015)), and yet overwhelmingly find that 
the firm’s past performance does not affect the successor decision. This is consistent 
with some other literature indicating that the turnover-performance sensitivity tends to 
be lower for family CEOs, relative to their nonfamily counterparts (e.g., Gómez-
Mejía et al., 2001; Hillier & McColgan, 2009; Chen et al., 2013a).  
                                               
17 Smith and Amoako-Adu (1999), Pérez-González (2006), and Bennedsen et al. (2015) focus on family firms in 
Canada, the US, and three Asian economies (Hongkong, Singapore, and Taiwan), respectively. 
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Moreover, the aforementioned researchers also show interest in other factors. For 
example, Bocatto et al. (2010) also investigate the role of board independence, yet 
find no significant relationship between the percentage of independent directors and 
the successor choice. Ansari et al. (2014) also focus on this factor. However, they 
argue that those directors independent on paper may not be so de facto. Therefore, 
they propose a new way to measure directors’ independence by focusing on the 
‘independence’ relative to the controlling family. More specifically, they set six 
criteria, i.e., whether the director 1) is related to the controlling family by blood or 
marriage; 2) has at least nine years’ tenure; 3) is appointed by the controlling family; 
4) is an employee of another company controlled by the family; 5) sits on other 
boards together with a family director; and 6) is a former employee of the firm. They 
suggest that only those who do not satisfy any of the above criteria can be seen as 
independent directors. Moreover, the authors’ empirical results indicate that those 
conventionally defined independent directors do not affect the CEO successor choice, 
consistent with the aforementioned Bocatto et al.’s (2010) finding. However, the 
corrected measure, based upon the preceding six criteria, is shown to reduce the 
likelihood of a family successor significantly. Furthermore, Ansari et al. (2014) also 
find that the generation of the predecessor, i.e. whether the predecessor is the founder 
or from later generations, does not affect the successor decision. Finally, the 
preceding Bennedsen et al.’s (2015) study observes that a firm’s long-term debt ratio 
is positively related to the probability of a family successor, yet the probability 
decreases if the firm is co-founded by more than one entrepreneur.  
The role of family structure is also explored by some researchers. For example, 
Bennedsen et al.’s (2004) study in Denmark documents that the likelihood of a family 
succession increases with the number of heirs in the controlling family and yet 
decreases if the family has four or more kids. The authors contend this is because 
more children create a larger talent pool for the successor and “crowd out” the agents 
outside the family. However, if the family has too many kids, the family conflict or 
sibling rivalry may reduce the probability of a family succession. Additionally, the 
authors find that the likelihood of a family successor decreases with the ratio of 
female children within the family and the number of marriages of the founder. 
Bennedsen et al. (2007) focus on a similar sample and demonstrate that female 
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firstborns decrease the probability of a family succession. Bertrand et al. (2008) 
observe similar results as the above in Thailand, showing that a larger family size of 
the founder leads to more family members’ involvement in the business. However, 
this finding is mainly driven by the number of sons rather than daughters in the 
family.  
2.2.3 Environmental factors 
Apart from the above internal factors, the business environment also receives some 
attention. For example, Burkart et al. (2003) theorise that firms’ institutional 
environment may influence their successor selections. Specifically, family firms in 
regimes with strong investor protection are more likely to choose a nonfamily 
successor. In addition, in contexts with intermediate institutional efficiency, 
nonfamily agents should still be more appropriate. However, as the agents’ 
managerial discretion may not be sufficiently restrained in such a context, the founder 
or the controlling family may stay in the firm to monitor the agents’ behaviour. 
Nevertheless, for firms in countries with weak institutional protection, the founder 
may prefer a family succession, as the separation of ownership and management may 
cause severe agency problems. Moreover, Burkart et al. (2003) also predict that the 
level of family control will increase the founders’ likelihood of appointing a family 
successor, especially when the investor protection is moderate to low.  
The aforementioned Ansari et al.’s (2014) study has also considered shareholder 
protection. More specifically, they contend that firms cross-listing on a better market 
have better shareholder protection and document that French firms cross-listed in the 
US or UK are more likely to have a nonfamily successor.  
Finally, the preceding Bennedsen et al. (2015) has investigated the role of firms’ 
industrial contexts and indicates that the successor is more likely to be a family 
member if the firm is in a higher labour-intense industry.  
2.2.4 Determinants in China 
Evidence regarding family firms in China is very limited, and only two papers appear 
to be relevant to my study. The first one is the aforementioned Xu et al.’s (2015) 
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study. Specifically, it focuses on the founders’ political connections and finds that 
politically connected founders are more inclined to appoint a descendant as the 
Chairman of the Board, the CEO, or a board member. This finding is consistent with 
Bennedsen et al.’s (2015) viewpoint, i.e. family successions are more likely to happen 
when the founders have specialised assets transferable to the next generation. This is 
also similar to the aforementioned Lee et al.’s (2003) and Royer et al.’s (2008) 
perspective, i.e. the founders are more prone to transfer their specialised assets to 
family members rather than nonfamily agents. This preference, in turn, affects their 
successor choice.  
The second one is Cao et al.’s (2015) paper regarding China’s one-child policy and 
documents that having only one child significantly decreases the founder’s intention 
of family succession and the de facto number of the founder’s adult children working 
in the business. However, with a male child, the founder’s intention of appointing a 
family successor will increase. These findings are similar to the preceding results 
observed by Bennedsen et al. (2004), Bennedsen et al. (2007), and Bertrand et al. 
(2008).  
In summary, the extant research has explored the roles of various factors in the choice 
of the successor in family businesses. More specifically, at the individual -level, the 
founder’s specialised assets and socio-emotional wealth are theorised to drive the 
preference for a family successor, yet the predecessor’s generation is indicated to 
have no impact on the successor decision. In addition, at the family -level, the 
proportion of family top executives, as a measure of the family’s controlling power, is 
positively related to the likelihood of a family successor. Whereas the other measures 
of the family’s control level, i.e. the family’s cash-flow rights, voting rights, and the 
divergence between the rights, are shown to have no significant effect on the 
successor choice. Furthermore, the number of heirs has a nonlinear relationship with 
the probability of a family successor, i.e. the probability increases first, yet decreases 
if the family has four or more children. The likelihood of observing a family 
succession also decreases with the proportion of female kids, the number of marriages 
that the founder has, and a female firstborn. Moreover, at the firm -level, past 
performance is shown to not influence the successor decision. In addition, the 
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proportion of independent directors also has no effect if the directors are defined as 
independent on paper, yet is negatively associated with the likelihood of a family 
successor if the independence is relative to the controlling family. Some other firm-
level characteristics, such as the firm’s long-term debt level and the lack of nonfamily 
large shareholders, are shown to increase the probability of a family successor, yet the 
probability decreases if the firm is co-founded by more than one entrepreneur. 
Finally, at the environment -level, better shareholder protection and labour-intense 
industries have a positive impact on the likelihood of a family succession.  
It is worth noting that most of the above findings are observed in western and 
developed contexts while there are limited investigations of the determinants of the 
successor in family firms in China. More specifically, there are only two relevant 
studies, documenting that having political connections and a male child increase the 
founder’s likelihood of appointing a family successor, yet having only one child 
decreases the probability. A possible reason for the much-limited attention to China, 
as mentioned in the previous chapter, is the shorter history of China’s family 
businesses relative to their counterparts in developed economies.18 This causes many 
family firms in China are still managed by the founder (Qin & Wang, 2012). 
Nevertheless, as previously mentioned, after more than 30 years of operations, for 
many Chinese family firms, their founders are now old enough and about to retire. In 
such a context, the successor decision in family firms should be an important and 
meaningful issue for researchers, for the family firms per se, and for the investors of 
the firms. Therefore, further and more in-depth explorations of this issue are needed.   
2.3 Hypothesis development  
This section develops the hypotheses for the aforementioned five factors, i.e. foreign 
ownership, Confucianism, clan culture, the founder’s overseas experience, and the 
founder’s political connections, in terms of their potential effects on the firm’s 
successor decision.  
                                               
18 As previously discussed, unlike many family firms in developed economies having a history of more than 100 
years, family businesses were forbidden in China until the implementation of the Reform and Opening policy in 
1978. After that, they still developed very slowly, until their status and importance were for the first time 
acknowledged by the Chinese government at the 15th National Congress of the Communist Party in 1997 (Qin & 
Wang, 2012). 
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2.3.1 Foreign ownership 
As previously discussed, unlike China’s domestic investors whose share trading 
activities are largely driven by speculative motives, foreign investors from mature 
markets tend to have a long-term investment horizon. In this case, foreign 
shareholders should have strong incentives to actively monitor the companies they 
have invested in and exert influence on the companies’ management and operations. 
Thus, one of the most important corporate decisions, i.e. the selection of the next 
leader, should especially concern the foreign shareholders.  
Chinese enterprises normally care about their foreign shareholders’ voice, regardless 
of the shareholders’ relatively small ownership. This is because foreign investment 
can bring a local company huge benefits, such as attracting domestic investors, 
stabilising stock volatility, and more access to international markets (e.g., Liang et al., 
2012; Khanna et al. 2004; Liu et al., 2011).19 Considering such advantages, Chinese 
enterprises, including those dominated by private families, normally have strong 
incentives to attract and hold onto foreign investment. As a result, they may seek 
means to communicate with, to attract, and to satisfy foreign investors, and take 
foreign shareholders’ voice into careful consideration (Huang & Shiu, 2009).  
On the other hand, for foreign investors, if their investee is a family firm and that firm 
is going to change the leader, they are very likely to prefer a nonfamily professional 
rather than a descendant of the controlling family. The reasons are threefold. First, 
nonfamily successors tend to be more experienced, skilled, and competent than family 
successors, as the former are selected from a much larger pool of managerial talent 
than the latter (Chua et al., 2003; Amore et al., 2011). Second, family successors have 
been widely documented, by researchers from mature markets, to have a negative 
impact on firm performance, in terms of firm profitability and firm value (e.g., Pérez-
González, 2006; Bennedsen et al., 2007; Cucculelli & Micucci, 2008). Third, family 
                                               
19 Firstly, foreign investors are often perceived as informed, knowledgeable, and experienced investors, who are 
capable of picking long-term winners. Thus, their investment flows are usually deemed to be an important 
indicator for investment decisions by domestic investors (Liang et al., 2012). Secondly, foreign investors’ long-
term buy-and-hold investments help to stabilise stock volatility and reduce the firm’s cost of capital (Bailey et al. 
1999; Dahlquist & Robertsson 2001; Khanna et al. 2004). Furthermore, foreign ownership may provide the 
company with new capital, new technologies, and more access to international markets for financing and business 
opportunities (Mohd Hassan et al., 2008; Luo et al., 2009; Liu et al., 2011).  
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business owners usually hold control in excess of their ownership in the firm via 
control-enhancing mechanisms such as pyramid structures, cross-holdings, and dual-
class shares (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Mork et al., 2005). As a result, the Principal-
Principal agency problem suggested by agency theory, i.e. controlling shareholders 
may expropriate minority shareholders’ interests to satisfy their own private benefits, 
tends to be prevalent in family firms (La Porta et al., 1999).20 Family successors, in 
turn, may aggravate this agency problem (Liu et al., 2012).21  
Based on the above reasons, foreign investors, as minority shareholders in a family 
firm, are likely to exert influence on the successor decision and pressure the firm to 
select a nonfamily agent as the new leader. Thus, the following hypothesis is 
postulated: 
H1: Firms with foreign ownership have a greater likelihood of appointing a nonfamily 
successor.  
2.3.2 Confucianism 
Confucianism, as the most ancient and influential philosophy in Chinese history, has 
exerted a strong influence on Chinese entrepreneurs’ management styles and 
decision-making (Yan & Sorenson, 2006). Familism is a key element of Confucian 
values. It advocates family-centredness and family-orientation, as well as loyalty, 
strong commitment, and contribution to family (Zhang & Ma, 2009). As a result, 
Chinese family business founders who are strongly influenced by familism are very 
likely to consider the business as a family property that will be bequeathed to the 
descendants, to keep family ownership and control over the business, and to provide 
family members with good positions in the business as a means of taking care of them 
                                               
20 Agency theorists argue that the divergence between family control and family ownership provides the 
controlling family with incentives and ability to extract private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders 
(e.g., Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; La Porta et al., 1999; Su et al., 2008). This is because control in excess of 
ownership rights enables the family to carry out the expropriation with enough control but at the same time 
reduces the costs of the expropriation due to the family’s relatively low ownership. 
 
21 This is because family successors are very likely to help the controlling family carry out the expropriation (Cai 
et al., 2012). In addition, family successors may aggravate information asymmetry problems between the 
controlling family and nonfamily minority shareholders, which provides the family with more opportunities to 
expropriate the minority shareholders’ benefits (Liu et al., 2012).  
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(Chen, 1995; Zhang & Ma, 2009). This may lower the founder’s intention of choosing 
a nonfamily successor.  
Moreover, apart from familism, guanxi culture is also an important part of Confucian 
ideology (Jacobs et al., 1995; Luo et al., 2012b). Guanxi is a Chinese indigenous 
construct, which commonly refers to the direct particularistic relations between two or 
more individuals (Jacobs, 1979; Fan, 2002a, 2002b; Bedford, 2011). Those relations 
are highly informal and personal, and the parties in the relations are bounded by an 
implicit psychological contract to follow social norms such as reciprocity, mutual 
trust, and mutual obligations (Chen & Chen, 2004; Chen et al., 2013b). Such a culture 
has exerted a strong influence on the social interaction and organisational activities in 
the Chinese society (Yan & Sorenson, 2006). As a result, Chinese persons, more or 
less, have a clear in-/out-group concept. More specifically, they normally have a high 
degree of particular trust in a limited group of people based on kinship or guanxi22, 
yet their trust towards other “out-group” members tends to be low (Fukuyama, 1995; 
Gudykunst et al., 1996; Tsui & Farh, 1997).  
Similar to familism, the guanxi culture has also prominently affected the Chinese 
family business founders’ cognitions and behaviour. In consequence, the founders 
who are deeply affected by the culture are very likely to positively view, favourably 
treat, and deeply trust in nonfamily members who have a guanxi with them (Jacobs, 
1979; Tsui & Farh, 1997). In this case, apart from family members, they are also very 
likely to choose a nonfamily agent, who is connected with them through a guanxi, as 
the successor. However, for those who do not have a guanxi, the founders may hold 
conservative views on or even discriminate against them. This may further enhance 
the founders’ preference for a family successor or a guanxi-connected nonfamily 
successor.  
Confucius used to travel to various places to promote his philosophy. Because of his 
profound impact in the Chinese history, those places, where he has lived for a long 
time to accept students and spread his theory, have become nationally famous 
monuments, usually called as Confucian centres (Du, 2015). China is a large country 
                                               
22 Kinship is also a type of guanxi, and is, in fact, the most important guanxi for the Chinese (Tsang, 1998).  
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with more than 20 provinces and hundreds of cities, and yet only nine cities have a 
nationally famous Confucian centre.23 In this case, family firms headquartered in 
those cities should be surrounded by strong Confucianism atmosphere. Therefore, the 
founders of those firms, compared with their counterparts located in other regions, 
should be much more deeply edified by Confucianism, and thus more likely to select 
a descendant or a guanxi-connected member as the successor.   
According to the above arguments, the following hypothesis is formulated: 
H2: Firms headquartered in cities with a Confucian centre have a greater likelihood of 
appointing a family successor or a nonfamily successor who has a guanxi with the 
founder. 
2.3.3 Clan culture 
Apart from Confucianism, clan culture is also an important element of the traditional 
Chinese culture (Deshpande & Farley, 2004). Chinese people have an old saying that 
individuals sharing the same family name can be traced back to the same ancestor 500 
years ago, and thus are relatives. Clan members, which are generally defined as the 
people sharing the same surname, are therefore often viewed as from the same 
extended family (Chuang et al., 2012). Additionally, because a clan is often deemed 
as a big family, the core ideology of clan culture is very similar to that of Confucian 
familism. More specifically, it advocates that clan members should be united and 
reciprocal and have the responsibility to support each other, take care of each other, 
and trust in each other (Hu & Chen, 2015).  
Clan culture is particularly prevalent in China’s rural areas (Peng, 2004; Ruan & 
Zheng, 2012). Therefore, those senior Chinese family business founders, most of 
which were born in rural areas, should be affected by clan culture to some extent.24 
As a result, they may positively view and trust their clan members and provide those 
                                               
23 Those cities are: Qufu in Shandong province, Chengdu in Sichuan province, Luoyang in Henan province, 
Sanming and Longyan in Fujian province, Dongtai in Jiangsu province, Ningbo and Shaoxing in Zhejiang 
province, and Linchuan in Jiangxi province (Du, 2015).  
 
24 The All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce, one of the largest industrial and commercial associations 
in China, has published a list of the top 500 private enterprises in China in 2012. In the list, 69.4% of the business 
founders were born in rural areas (Yuan & Li, 2012).  
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members with good managerial positions in the business, due to the trust and the 
purpose of taking care of clansmen. In other words, in a family business, the 
percentage of the directors and top managers sharing the same surname with the 
founder may be an appropriate proxy for the extent to which the founder is influenced 
by clan culture. In addition, because clan culture is closely related to familism, the 
more deeply the founder is affected by the culture, the more likely he or she should be 
to prefer a family successor. Moreover, the larger the proportion of the board 
members and top managers in the company sharing the founder’s family name, the 
more likely it is that the founder’s decision of family succession can be approved 
within the firm.  
In light of the above arguments, the following hypothesis is developed: 
H3: The higher the percentage of directors and top managers sharing the same 
surname with the founder, the greater is the likelihood that the successor will be the 
founder’s descendant.  
2.3.4 Overseas experience 
According to upper echelon theory, managers’ past experience may shape their 
cognitions, values, and beliefs, and in turn, impact their behaviour and decision-
making (Hambrick & Mason, 1984).25 In this sense, family business founders’ 
overseas experience should be important, as experience abroad may lead to the 
change of values and cultural beliefs to a certain extent (Friedman et al., 2012). Just 
as Schuetz (1945) writes, “‘home-comers’ are not likely to ever fit as naturally into 
their home environment. Such people return with different assumptions --different 
‘taken-for-granted’ aspects of how they see the world”. In this case, the founders who 
have studied or worked overseas for years may have different ideas about the 
selection of the successor, relative to their counterparts without any experience 
abroad. More specifically, compared with the founders who have always lived in 
China, have received solely Chinese traditional education, and thus have always been 
                                               
25 The upper echelon theory is developed by Hambrick and Mason (1984). Specifically, it suggests that managers’ 
demographics, such as age, education, and experience, determine the managers’ cognitive base, values, beliefs, 
and competencies. These, in turn, affect the managers’ strategic choice and decision-making, and ultimately the 
firm’s financial consequences. 
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influenced by Chinese familism and guanxi cultures, those having overseas 
experience should be less likely to be deeply affected by the cultures. As a result, their 
successor choice is less likely due to nepotism or guanxi. Instead, because most 
Chinese family business founders’ overseas experience is obtained in Western and 
developed countries where individualism prevails, the founders are likely to be 
affected by individualistic cultures to a certain extent.26 Thus, their successor 
decisions are more likely to be contingent upon competences and rules only 
(Hofstede, 1991, 1994).27 This should increase the likelihood of those professional 
agents who do not have a guanxi with the founder being appointed as the successor.   
Based on the above discussion, I hypothesise that: 
H4: If the founder has studied or worked overseas, it is less likely that the successor 
will be the founder’s descendant or a nonfamily member having a guanxi with the 
founder.   
2.3.5 Political connections 
As previously discussed, Chinese family firm founders’ political connections have 
become one of the most important specialised assets for the firm due to the dominant 
power of the Chinese government in economic resource allocation (Xu et al., 2015). 
In this background, the founders should have a strong desire to transfer their political 
connections to the successor, in the hope of preserving this specialised asset in the 
firm after the succession (Lee et al., 2003; Xu et al., 2015). This is because, based on 
the resource-based view, family firm founders’ specialised assets, i.e. their tacit 
knowledge and personal connections, are one of the key contributors of the firm’s 
                                               
26 Among my sampled founders with overseas experience, 90% has the experience in developed countries 
including the US, the UK, Canada, and Australia. According to Hofstede (1991, 1994), these countries are featured 
with highly individualist cultures.  
 
27 Hofstede (1991, 1994) summarises the differences between individualistic and collectivistic societies in terms 
of various aspects. In the summary, the key difference in terms of hiring and promotion decisions is, in 
individualistic societies, the decisions are normally based on skills and rules only, yet in collectivistic societies, the 
decisions take employees’ in-group into account. And the Chinese society, as Hofstede argues, is among the most 
collectivist.  
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competitive advantages and thus are crucial to the firm’s sustained development 
(Royer et al., 2008; Bracci & Vagnoni, 2011; Fan et al., 2012).28 
The founders’ specialised assets are typically individual-specific, distinctive, and very 
valuable (Lee et al., 2003; Bracci & Vagnoni, 2011). As a result, the founders are 
normally only willing to transfer the assets to those who they highly trust (Cabrera-
Suárez et al., 2001; Lee et al., 2003; Bracci & Vagnoni, 2011). In this case, Chinese 
family business founders with more political connections should have much stronger 
intention to choose a descendant or a guanxi-connected member as the successor, and 
transfer their political capital to that person.29 Therefore, the following hypothesis is 
postulated: 
H5: The more the political connections of the founder, the greater is the likelihood 
that the successor will be the founder’s descendant or a nonfamily member having a 
guanxi with the founder.   
2.4 The identification of a guanxi between the founder and 
the successor 
As previously discussed, guanxi refers to the direct particularistic relations between 
two or more individuals (Jacobs, 1979; Fan, 2002a, 2002b; Bedford, 2011). However, 
because the relations are highly informal and personal, they are very difficult for 
researchers to observe. To solve this issue, this section proposes several criteria which 
may help to identify whether a Chinese family business founder and his or her 
successor have a guanxi.   
According to existing literature, whether a guanxi exists between two individuals 
firstly depends on whether they have a “guanxi base” (Jacobs, 1979; Farh et al., 1998; 
Tsang, 1998). The guanxi bases are defined as the commonalities that the two persons 
                                               
28 According to the resource-based view, the specialised assets of a firm refer to the intangible resources and tacit 
knowledge that shape the firm’s competitive advantages over other companies, thus being critical to the firm’s 
sustained profitability and development (Royer et al., 2008). The resource-based view proponents suggest that, in a 
family business, the specialised assets are mainly derived from the original owner-manager of the business, i.e. the 
founder (Cabrera-Suárez et al., 2001; Royer et al., 2008; Fan et al., 2012). 
 
29 As discussed before, being affected by the Confucian familism and guanxi culture, Chinese people typically 
have a high level of trust only towards their “in-group” members, i.e. their family and guanxi-connected nonfamily 
members.  
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share in terms of their origins or identities, such as being relatives, being clan 
members, sharing the same natal or ancestral origin, being neighbours, colleagues, 
classmates, alumni, teacher and student, having the same hobbies, and so on (Farh et 
al., 1998; Chen et al., 2013b). The first three commonalities are often categorised as 
blood bases, as they are predetermined by blood or birth; the others are usually 
defined as social bases, as they are developed later in life and through social 
interaction or experience (Tsang, 1998; Fan, 2002a, 2002b; Chen et al., 2013b). It is 
notable that the natures of some bases can be quite elastic, and thus the definitions of 
them can be contracted or expanded (Jacobs, 1979). For example, the definition of 
relatives can stretch to the furthest horizons, ranging from the members in the nuclear 
family to distant relatives who are remotely connected to someone in the family. 
Similarly, the same natal or ancestral origin can mean a small village, a county, a city, 
a province, or even a regional grouping of provinces (Jacobs, 1979). In addition, it is 
also noteworthy that most of the guanxi bases are different from the demographic 
traits prevalently studied in the Western context, such as age, gender, race, and 
educational level (Tsui & Farh, 1997). More specifically, the common identities 
which can be viewed as guanxi bases are generally anchored in specific social settings 
with clear social or even physical boundaries, such as a city, a community, a school, 
or a workplace. However, demographic commonalities are anchored in demographic 
criteria, which can cut across organisational and institutional boundaries (Chen & 
Chen, 2004).  
Based on the previous literature (e.g. Jacobs, 1979; Fan, 2002b; Chen & Chen, 2004), 
the most prevalent guanxi bases in Chinese society refer to kinship, clanship (sharing 
the same surname), origin (from the same birthplace or native place), alumni, 
neighbours, colleagues, and the teacher-student relationship. To be more specific, 
kinship is typically the most important guanxi for the Chinese, as China is a family-
oriented country (Tsang, 1998). Sharing the same surname is also a common base for 
a guanxi, because Chinese people believe that individuals having the same family 
name are descended from the same ancestor, and thus are kinsmen (Langenberg, 
2007). As to the preceding other bases, researchers contend that those commonalities 
can cause potential guanxi parties’ reminiscence of the past. As a result, the parties 
may recall and discover some common events, similar experiences, common interests, 
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or mutual acquaintances (e.g., Chen & Chen, 2004). This helps expand and enrich the 
parties’ sharedness, enhance their communication, and increase their level of 
intimacy, and thus contributes to the development of an informal and personal guanxi 
between them (Tsui & Farh, 1997; Law et al., 2000; Chen et al., 2013b).  
In other words, in Chinese family businesses, if the founder and an employee have a 
pre-existing guanxi base, they have more reasons and opportunities to develop an 
informal and personal connection outside the work setting (Law et al., 2000; Chen et 
al., 2013b). In addition, through the private interactions, their relationship should 
become more intimate, fraternal, or even quasi-familial, thus becoming a guanxi. 
Based on the above discussion, a pre-existing guanxi base is a condition to identify a 
guanxi between a family business founder and his or her successor.  
However, it is also worth noting that a guanxi base should not be the only criterion for 
identifying whether the founder and the successor have a guanxi. In many Chinese 
family firms, there are some senior nonfamily employees who have worked in the 
company since its startup. Considering Chinese people’s low trust towards general 
nonfamily members (Redding, 1993; Fukuyama, 1995; Zhang & Ma, 2009), those 
who entered in the business at that early stage should be either the founder’s good 
friends or recommended by the founder’s relatives or friends (Yan & Sorenson, 
2006). For those persons, even if they may not share any obvious common identities 
with the founder, they should still be deemed as having a guanxi with the founder 
(Yan & Sorenson, 2006). Moreover, the start-up stage has been widely recognised as 
the most difficult and uncertain period for an enterprise (e.g., Churchill & Lewis, 
1983; Adizes, 1988; Li, 2000). During this period, entrepreneurs have numerous 
arduous tasks to finish, such as seeking investments and clients, building reputation 
and business networks, and setting up a qualified top management team. In addition, 
the start-up phase is also the riskiest stage, as any mistakes made in this stage may 
directly threaten the survival of the business (Li, 2000). Therefore, nonfamily 
employees joining the family firm at its start-up stage are those who accompany the 
founder to get over the most difficult time and help the founder to set up the business 
from scratch to success. In this case, the founder should have a special affection and a 
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very high level of trust towards those persons. Hence, their guanxi should be very 
intimate and family-like.  
Finally, nonfamily members who are appointed as directors or top managers in more 
than one company controlled by the founder should also be seen as having a guanxi 
with the founder. As discussed before, Chinese family business founders have a low 
level of trust towards general nonfamily members and a strong stewardship sense 
towards the firm. Moreover, the founder’s family wealth is normally highly correlated 
with the firm’s interests (Villalonga & Amit, 2006). Therefore, if the founder is 
willing to appoint a nonfamily member as a top executive in more than one family 
company, the founder should have great trust in that person, in terms of not only his 
or her capability but also allegiance to the founder’s family. Such trust, given China’s 
cultural background, is very unlikely to be established without a long-term and close 
guanxi. Therefore, nonfamily successors who have been board members or top 
managers in more than one company owned by the founder should also be categorised 
as the guanxi-connected successors.  
In light of the above discussion and considering the availability of founders’ and 
successors’ background information, in the following investigations in this thesis, a 
nonfamily successor will be defined as having a guanxi with the founder if the 
successor has one of the following six identities:  
(1) Sharing the same surname with the founder; 
(2) Sharing the same birthplace or native place (the same province) with the founder; 
(3) Graduating from the same college or university as the founder; 
(4) Being the founder’s former colleague before the startup of the family firm; 
(5) Acting as a director or a top manager in more than one company controlled by the 
founder before the succession; 
(6) Joining the family firm at its start-up stage, i.e. the first three years after the 
setting-up of the company.30 
                                               
30 In China, the first three years of an enterprise seem to be widely regarded as the most difficult and uncertain 
stage by policy-makers and researchers. Firstly, this notion is clearly embodied in a number of policies. For 
example, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (2015) strictly requires that companies applying for listing 
on the Chinese stock exchanges must be operated for at least three years. Additionally, to support the self-
employment of unemployed individuals, disabled persons, retired soldiers, and college graduates, the State 
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2.5 Data and methods  
2.5.1 Data collection 
Most data are collected from the China Stock Market & Accounting Research 
(CSMAR) over the period from 2003 to 2014. The year 2003 is used as the start 
because it is the first year in which CSMAR began to track the information on 
controlling shareholders in Chinese listed firms. In light of the extant literature 
regarding Chinese family businesses (e.g., Su & Zhu, 2003; He & Lian, 2009; Amit et 
al., 2010; Xu et al., 2015), family firms are defined as non-state-owned enterprises 
whose ultimate owner, which at the same time holds the largest ownership stake, is 
either an individual or a family. This chapter focuses on successions to the Chairman 
of the Board and the CEO positions, with the business founder as the predecessor. If a 
family firm has the transitions of both the Chairman and the CEO at the same time, 
they are counted as two cases. The final sample in this chapter consists of 348 
Chairman of the Board or CEO succession cases in Chinese family firms listed on the 
Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock Exchanges.31 
Family and nonfamily successors are identified through reading their biographies in 
CSMAR and cross-checking with the firms’ prospectuses, annual reports, and Baidu, 
i.e. the most popular search engine in China. Data regarding the founders’ and 
successors’ backgrounds are either obtained from CSMAR or manually collected, also 
by reading the biographies and cross-checking with Baidu.com and 
Finance.sina.com.cn. Firms’ financial data and variables capturing firm-, 
                                               
Council of the People’s Republic of China (2005a, 2005b, 2008) stipulates that if these persons would like to set 
up their own business, they will be exempted from relevant administrative charges for the first three years after the 
startup of their companies. Moreover, the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security of the People’s 
Republic of China (2017) states that if technicians from public institutions would like to leave their job to start a 
business, they can have their original positions and rights to be retained for three years.  
 
The government’s special concern about the “first three years” is not groundless. The State Administration for 
Industry and Commerce of the People's Republic of China provided an official report about the survival time of 
Chinese domestic enterprises in 2013. The statistics clearly show that in the 12 years’ observation period, the year 
with the highest mortality rate is the third year after the startup of the companies. This figure should imply that the 
first three years are indeed the riskiest period for most Chinese enterprises. 
 
Finally, some Chinese researchers also employ the first three-year period of a business as its start-up stage in their 
studies (e.g., Yang, 2001; Li, 2005; Shi & Huang, 2006).   
 
In light of the above support, the first three years after the setting-up of the business should be an appropriate cut-
off point to distinguish between successors who joined the family firm in its start-up period and those who did not.  
 
31 However, in later analyses, the number of observations varies due to missing values for different variables. 
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governance-, and environment-level characteristics are all from different databases of 
CSMAR. 
2.5.2 Research design 
This chapter aims at investigating the impacts of five factors, i.e. foreign ownership, 
Confucianism, clan culture, the founders’ overseas experience, and the founders’ 
political connections, on the firm’s successor decision. For this purpose, the following 
probit regression models are applied: 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑡(𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝑖,𝑡) =∝ +𝛽1𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑛 𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑖 +
𝛽3𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 +
𝛽6𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡              (1)   
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑡(𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝑂𝑟𝐺𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑡) =∝ +𝛽1𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑛 𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖 +
𝛽5𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽6𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖,𝑡 +
𝜀𝑖,𝑡    (2)   
In the above models, t indicates the succession year. In Model (1), the dependent 
variable, Family, is a dichotomous variable. It equals one if the successor is the 
founder’s descendant, by blood or marriage, and equals zero if the successor is a 
nonfamily member. In Model (2), the dependent variable, FamilyOrGuanxi, is also a 
dummy. It equals one if the successor is a descendant or a nonfamily member having 
a guanxi with the founder, and equals zero if the successor is a nonfamily member 
without a guanxi. As discussed in Section 2.4, a nonfamily successor is defined as 
having a guanxi with the founder if the successor has one of the aforementioned six 
identities.  
In addition, the independent variables of interest in the models are the same, which 
are the measures for the five hypothesised determinants of the successor. More 
specifically, Foreign ownership is a dummy equal to one if the firm has shares owned 
by foreign investors32 one year before the succession and zero otherwise. Confucian 
                                               
32 The shares include A-shares held by Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors, B-shares, H-shares, and other 
overseas shares if applicable (Gul et al., 2010; Huang & Zhu, 2015). 
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centre is a proxy for the extent to which the founder is affected by Confucianism. It is 
an indicator equal to one if the firm is headquartered in a city with a Confucian 
centre; and zero otherwise. Same surname is a proxy for the level of the founder being 
impacted by the Chinese clan culture and is calculated as the percentage of directors 
and top managers sharing the same surname with the founder for the year prior to the 
succession. Returnee founder is a dummy variable equal to one if the founder has 
studied or worked overseas before the succession; and zero otherwise. Political 
connection measures the number of political identities that the founder has before the 
succession. Following the extant literature (e.g., Fan et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2011; 
Yu et al., 2012; Xu et al., 2015), the political identities include a current or former 
officer of either the central government or a local government; currently or formerly 
serving in any other institutions or organisations directly affiliated with the central or 
a local government; a current or former representative of the National People’s 
Congress (NPC); a current or former member of the Chinese People’s Political 
Consultative Conference (CPPCC); and a current or former representative of the 
National Congress of Communist Party of China (NCCPC).  
Control variables in the preceding models represent a series of firm-, governance-, 
and family-level factors, including Firm age, Firm size, Long-debt level, Sales 
growth, Business risk, Board ownership, Board independence, Family ownership, 
Family control, and Family divergence. All these factors are well argued or 
documented to have an impact on family firms’ succession decisions by the existing 
literature. More specifically, Firm age is shown to be positively related to 
management succession (Fan et al., 2015) and is measured by the year since the firm 
has been founded.  
Firm size is the natural logarithm of total assets and is considered because a small 
company may find it harder than other companies to hire competent outside 
professionals (e.g., Pérez-González, 2006).  
The inclusion of Long-debt level follows Ansari et al. (2014), who argue that greater 
debt can alleviate the firm’s free cash flow problem. This, in turn, may reduce the 
private benefits that the controlling family can expropriate from the company, and 
thus may reduce the family’s incentives to appoint a family successor. Long-debt level 
Chapter 2 - Determinants of the successor choice 
 41 
is measured as the long-term debt scaled by total assets (Anderson & Reeb, 2003b; 
Chu, 2009).  
Sales growth is a proxy for the firm’s growth opportunities and is calculated as the 
difference in total sales between year t-1 and year t-2 divided by total sales in year t-2 
(Chen & Strange, 2005; Cao et al., 2015; Liu & Xue, 2015). According to Ansari et 
al. (2014), the larger the firm’s growth opportunities, the higher is the likelihood that 
the successor will be a family member.  
Business risk is considered because management turnover is often a strategy for risk 
reduction (May, 1995). Following the previous literature, the volatility of firm 
earnings is used as the proxy for business risk and is calculated as the standard 
deviation of ROA over the three years prior to the succession (Crutchley & Hansen, 
1989; Chen & Strange, 2005; Su & Sun, 2011). 
Board ownership and Board independence are controlled for because they are 
documented to have an impact on firms’ hiring and firing decisions (e.g., Pérez-
González, 2006; Bocatto et al., 2010; Ansari et al., 2014). Based on the literature, 
Board ownership is defined as the ownership held by directors as a percentage of total 
shares outstanding (Pérez-González, 2006), and Board independence is the proportion 
of independent directors among the board members (Bocatto et al., 2010; Xu et al., 
2015).  
The incorporation of Family ownership, Family control, and Family divergence 
follows Ansari et al. (2014), who posits that these factors are positively related to the 
likelihood of a family successor. Family ownership is the percentage of all shares 
outstanding owned by the family in the firm.33 Family control denotes the family’s 
voting control of the firm and is measured by the family’s votes as a percentage of 
total votes outstanding in the firm.34 Family divergence captures the family’s 
                                               
33 If the family controls the firm indirectly through a pyramid structure, Family ownership is calculated as the 
product of the family’s ownership stakes along the chain of control (La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2000). 
For example, if a family owns 30% of all shares in Firm A, which in turn owns 20% of all stocks in Firm B, the 
family owns 6% (30%*20%) of Firm B. 
 
34 Again, if the family controls the firm indirectly through a pyramid structure, Family control is measured by the 
minimum voting stake (i.e., the “weakest link”) along the control chain. For example, if a family holds 30% of the 
votes in Firm A, which in turn holds 20% of the votes in Firm B, the family controls 20% of the votes in Firm B. 
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excessive control over ownership and is measured by the difference between Family 
control and Family ownership. 
In addition, to control for industrial and temporal fixed effects, Industry denotes a set 
of industry dummies based on the industrial classification guide proposed by China 
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC)35, and Year is a vector of year dummies 
from 2003 to 2014.  
Finally, to make sure that empirical results are not driven by outliers, all continuous 
variables in this chapter (and this thesis) are winsorised at the 1% and 99% 
percentiles. Furthermore, considering the potential arbitrary heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation within-groups, the clustering of standard errors at the firm level is 
applied to all regressions in this thesis (Petersen, 2009; Amore et al., 2011; Xu et al., 
2015).  
2.6 Empirical results and discussion 
2.6.1 Descriptive statistics 
2.6.1.1 Industry and annual distributions of different successions 
Table 1.1 reports the distribution of succession cases by industry (Panel A) and by 
year (Panel B). In line with my research focus, successions are divided into three 
categories: family successions, guanxi successions, and non-guanxi successions. 
Family successions are those whose successors are the founders’ descendants by 
blood or marriage. Guanxi successions are those whose successors are nonfamily 
members having a guanxi with the founder before the succession, i.e. nonfamily 
successors occupying at least one of the preceding six identities. Non-guanxi 
successors are nonfamily members who do not have a guanxi with the founder. Panel 
                                               
35 The sample is distributed across 14 out of 16 industries classified by CSRC. However, because manufacturing 
is the largest industry in China and makes up the vast majority of the Chinese listed companies, to balance the 
distribution of the sample across industries, firms operating in the manufacturing sector are grouped based on their 
second level industry codes, while other firms are classified according to their first level codes. Additionally, there 
are some industries with very few observations in the sample. Hence, also for the purpose of balanced sample 
distribution, industries with less than 10 observations are classified as Other industry and denoted by one dummy 
in the following regression tests. Based on these adjustments, the final Industry variables include nine dummies.  
However, in a previous version of this study, the original 14 industry dummies were applied. The results were 
qualitatively the same as those presented in this version.  
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A shows that the vast majority of successions are distributed in the manufacturing 
sector, amounting to 86.52% (77 cases) of family successions, 70% (105 cases) of 
guanxi successions, and 72.48% (79 cases) of non-guanxi successions. This is not 
surprising, as manufacturing is the largest industry in China. Successions are much 
less prevalent in other industries. For example, family successions range from zero 
cases (in seven industries) to four cases at most (in the agriculture industry) across the 
other industries. Similarly, guanxi successions vary from zero cases (in three sectors) 
to only seven cases (in the real estate industry) across the rest of industries, except for 
the information technology sector having 10 cases of guanxi successions. The 
information technology also possesses the second largest concentration of non-guanxi 
successions and occupies 11.93% of the total in the group. However, similar to the 
case of guanxi successions, non-guanxi successions are rarely distributed across the 
other industries, with zero cases minimum (in four industries) and five cases 
maximum (in the real estate industry). 
Panel B indicates that the number of successions increases smoothly as time goes on, 
from only four cases in 2003 to 74 cases in 2013, which is also the peak during the 
whole sample period. In addition, the number decreases slightly in the next year, 
arriving at 49 successions in 2014. As to the prevalence of each type of successors, 
the figures show that most of the time nonfamily members having a guanxi with the 
founder are more favourable than their family and non-guanxi counterparts. 
Moreover, the total number of guanxi successions is much higher than that of family 
and non-guanxi successions, with 150, 89 and 109 cases respectively. These figures 
may imply that compared with nonfamily members without a guanxi, Chinese family 
business founders prefer to hand over their leadership position to those having a 
guanxi with them, if their descendants are unqualified, unwilling, or not ready to take 
over the business.  
The statistics in Panel B, in turn, are plotted in Figure 1 to show the trend of the 
succession cases over the sample period.  
[Insert Table 2.1 and Figure 1 about here] 
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2.6.1.2 Summary statistics  
Table 1.2 reports the summary statistics of variables applied to the preceding models, 
including the five hypothesised determinants of the successor as well as the firm-, 
governance-, and family-level control variables. As indicated by the table, only 13% 
of the sample firms have foreign ownership one year prior to the succession. In 
addition, only 12% of the firms are headquartered in cities with a Confucian centre. 
Moreover, the average percentage of board members and top managers sharing the 
founder’s surname is 13.2% for the year before the succession. Furthermore, only 6% 
of the founders have studied or worked overseas before the succession. Finally, the 
average number of political identities that the founders have is 0.78.  
[Insert Table 2.2 about here] 
2.6.1.3 Comparison between family and nonfamily successions 
Table 1.3 compares family successions with nonfamily successions in terms of the 
aforementioned pre-succession characteristics. The results indicate that three of the 
hypothesised determinants, i.e. Confucian centre, Same surname, and Returnee 
founder, are significantly different between the two succession groups. Specifically, 
the family succession group has a significantly higher percentage of firms located in 
cities having a Confucian centre. This is consistent with H2. Additionally, firms with 
family successions have a significantly higher percentage of top executives sharing 
the founder’s surname. This accords with H3. Moreover, firms with family successors 
have a significantly lower percentage of returnee founders. This is in line with H4. 
Furthermore, all the control variables are shown to be insignificantly different 
between the two groups.  
[Insert Table 2.3 about here] 
2.6.1.4 Comparison between guanxi and non-guanxi successions 
Table 1.4 reports the comparison results between the successions with a guanxi-
connected nonfamily successor and those having a nonfamily successor without a 
guanxi. The results show that the majority of the variables are insignificantly different 
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across the two groups, except the average percentage of the returnee founders. 
Specifically, the percentage is significantly lower in the guanxi succession group, 
suggesting that returnee founders are more likely to choose a successor without a 
guanxi. This further confirms H4.  
 [Insert Table 2.4 about here] 
2.6.1.5 Correlation among variables  
Table 2.5 presents the correlation matrix for the aforementioned variables. It shows 
that Confucian centre and Same surname are significantly and positively correlated 
with Family, and Returnee founder is significantly and negatively correlated with 
Family. This is consistent with my H2, H3, and H4. Moreover, Returnee founder is 
also significantly and negatively related to FamilyOrGuanxi, which further confirms 
my H4. Furthermore, most variables in the table do not have a high pairwise 
correlation, except that Board ownership is highly correlated with Family ownership 
and Family divergence as well as Family ownership is highly correlated with Family 
control. Given such a result, in the following tests, Family ownership and Family 
divergence will be excluded from the regressions.36  
 [Insert Table 2.5 about here]  
2.6.2 Baseline regression results  
Table 2.6 reports the results from the preceding two multivariate probit models. 
Columns (1) and (2) present the results for Model (1), whose dependent variable, 
Family, equals one if the successor is the founder’s descendant by blood or marriage 
and zero otherwise. Columns (3) and (4) report the results for Model (2) with the 
dependent variable, FamiyOrGuanxi, equalling one if the successor is a descendant or 
a guanxi-connected nonfamily member and zero otherwise. The independent variables 
of interest in the columns are the measures for the five hypothesised determinants, i.e. 
foreign ownership, Confucianism, clan culture, the founders’ overseas experience, 
and the founders’ political connections. Columns (1) and (3) provide the coefficients 
                                               
36 Board ownership is shown to be significantly related to Family in the following tests, and thus should be 
included in the regressions.  
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and their standard errors, with the corresponding marginal effects and the standard 
errors of the effects presented in the adjacent column, i.e. Columns (2) and (4). 
As to the regression results, Column (1) shows that Foreign ownership37 is  
significantly and negatively related to Family at the 1% significance level. More 
specifically, as shown in Column (2), firms with foreign ownership are 36.1% less 
likely to appoint a family successor, in comparison to their counterparts without 
foreign investors. This confirms my H1. In addition, Confucian centre is significant 
and positive at the 5% level or better in all the columns, suggesting that Confucianism 
has a significant and positive impact on the likelihood of a family or guanxi-
connected successor. To be more specific, Column (4) indicates that firms located in 
cities with a Confucian centre are 25.1% more likely to choose a family or guanxi-
connected successor, relative to those whose headquartered cities do not have a 
Confucian centre. This provides support for my H2. Moreover, Columns (1) and (2) 
document that the percentage of top executives sharing the founder’s surname is 
significantly and positively associated with the probability of a family successor at the 
1% level, which verifies H3. Furthermore, Columns (3) and (4) indicate that returnee 
founders are much less likely to choose a descendant or a guanxi-connected member 
as the successor, which supports H4. Finally, similar to Confucian centre, the 
coefficients on Political connection38 are also significant and positive in all the 
columns. This confirms H5, that is, the greater the political connections of the 
founder, the more likely it is that the successor is the founder’s descendant or a 
nonfamily member having a guanxi with the founder.  
Overall, the findings in Table 2.6 support H1 and H3, as the successor is more likely 
to be a descendant of the founder if the firm does not have foreign investors and have 
a larger percentage of directors and top managers having the same surname as the 
founder. Moreover, the findings also confirm H2, H4, and H5, as the successor is 
more likely to be a descendant or guanxi-connected if the firm is headquartered in a 
                                               
37 I have attempted to substitute the Foreign ownership dummy with the percentage of shares owned by foreign 
investors in the firm. The result is qualitatively similar to the above.  
 
38 Substituting a Political connection dummy, i.e. equaling one if the founder has political identities and zero 
otherwise, for the above variable, i.e. the number of the founder’s political identities, would not affect the validity 
of the finding.  
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city with a Confucian centre, if the founder does not have overseas experience, and if 
the founder has more political connections.  
[Insert Table 2.6 about here] 
2.6.3 Robustness checks 
Two checks are conducted to examine the robustness of the above results. Firstly, 
another array of firm-level, environmental, and succession-specific factors, which are 
seldom controlled for in the previous literature but may play important roles in the 
successor decision, is incorporated in the baseline probit models. In addition, the 
instrumental variables approach is employed to alleviate endogeneity issues.  
2.6.3.1 The extension of the baseline models   
The preceding regression models have included a number of firm-, governance-, and 
family-level factors widely considered in the previous research. However, there also 
exist some factors much less prevalent in the literature but may also play a role in the 
successor selection process. Therefore, in this section, the baseline models are 
extended by another vector of pre-succession firm-level, environmental, and 
succession-specific variables, to explore whether the above findings are de facto due 
to the overlook of those factors.  
The firm-level factors include Prior average performance, Dividend payout, Interest 
coverage, Nonfamily ownership, and State ownership. Specifically, Prior average 
performance denotes the firm’s performance before the succession. As previously 
discussed, a number of researchers have documented that past firm performance is not 
a determinant of the successor choice in family businesses (e.g., Smith & Amoako-
Adu, 1999; Bocatto et al., 2010; Ansari et al., 2014). However, it is worth noting that 
those researchers’ original prediction is that prior firm performance is positively 
related to the likelihood of a family successor. In other words, in theory, it is possible 
that past firm performance has an impact on the successor decision in family firms, 
and such a possibility should be controlled for in this study. To this end, Prior 
average performance is measured as average ROA during the three years prior to the 
succession. Focusing on the three years’ average firm performance is because family 
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business founders tend to be more concerned about long-term firm performance 
(Pérez-González, 2006; Villalonga & Amit, 2010). Thus, the founders are less likely 
to base the successor decision on the firm’s one or two years’ short-term performance. 
In addition, the consideration of Dividend payout and Interest coverage is because, 
apart from higher debt levels39, greater dividend and interest payments also contribute 
to the alleviation of the free cash flow problem (Ansari et al., 2014). This, in turn, as I 
discussed before, helps to reduce the private benefits the controlling family can 
extract from the firm, and thus may decrease the family’s incentives to appoint a 
family successor. In other words, instead of merely allowing for the high leverage 
situation, the control of Long-debt level, Dividend payout, and Interest coverage 
together can more efficiently mitigate the potential confounding impact of the free 
cash flow issue on the successor selection.  
Following Ansari et al. (2014), Dividend payout is measured as dividend per share as 
a percentage of earnings per share. Interest coverage denotes the firm’s ability to 
generate enough earnings to pay interest on its outstanding debt. It is a dummy equal 
to one if the firm’s interest coverage ratio, i.e. earnings before interest and tax divided 
by total interest payable on bonds and other contractual debt, is greater than two; 
otherwise, it equals zero (Ansari et al., 2014).40   
Nonfamily ownership is the ratio of the number of shares held by all nonfamily block-
holders41 to the total shares outstanding (Villalonga & Amit, 2006). The control for 
this variable stems from the perspective that large nonfamily shareholders can restrict 
the controlling family’s voice and control, and thus may have an impact on the 
successor choice (Villalonga & Amit, 2006).  
State ownership is the percentage of the number of shares held by the state to the total 
shares outstanding (Zou & Xiao, 2006). The incorporation of this variable is derived 
from the fact that in China, it is the government who controls the majority of 
                                               
39 This factor has been controlled for by Long-debt level in the baseline regression models. 
 
40 This measure follows Goergen and Renneboog’s (2001) perspective that interest coverage of less than two is 
typically a sign that the firm faces severe financial needs or financial constraints. 
 
41 Block-holders are individuals or institutions holding at least 5% ownership of the firm (Villalonga & Amit, 
2006).  
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economic resources (Cao et al., 2017). In this background, the state should have a 
strong voice in the family firms it has invested in, as the firms normally have a strong 
desire to build a good relationship with the state. In this case, the potential impact of 
the state ownership on the successor decision should not be neglected.  
In addition to the above firm-level characteristics, two contextual factors are also 
considered, i.e. Institutional environment and Industrial competition. The 
consideration of Institutional environment is in light of Burkart et al. (2003), who 
argue that a high level of the institutional environment increases the likelihood of a 
nonfamily successor. The measure of the factor is based upon Fan et al.’s (2011b) 
index regarding the market development levels of Chinese provinces and is denoted 
by the market development level of the province where the firm is headquartered.42 
The higher the value of the index, the better is the institutional environment for the 
firm.43 
The control for Industrial competition follows Ansari et al.’s (2014) argument that 
firms operating in more competitive industries are more likely to appoint a nonfamily 
successor. As to the measurement, the Herfindahl index of the industry where the firm 
operates is used as the proxy for the competitiveness in the industry. The index is 
calculated as 𝐻 = ∑ 𝑆𝑖
2𝑛
𝑖=1 , where Si is the market share of firm i (the firm’s sales as 
a percentage of the sales for the same industry), and n is the number of firms in the 
industry. The lower the H index, the greater is the competition in the industry. 
Finally, some succession-specific features, such as the reason of the succession, the 
age at which the founder retires, or whether the founder retires too early, may reveal 
information about the state of affairs of the firm that is not captured by the above 
factors (Pérez-González, 2006). Thus, those features may also play a role in 
determining the successor. Considering this possibility, three succession-specific 
                                               
42 Fan et al.’s (2011b) index considers the following perspectives: (1) the relationship between government and 
market; (2) the development of the private sector; (3) the development of product markets; (4) the development of 
factor markets (i.e. the labor market, the financial market and the foreign direct investment market); (5) the 
development of market intermediaries and legal environment. This index has been widely used to measure the 
institutional environment of Chinese provinces in the extant literature focusing on China (e.g., Chen & Chen, 
2014; Liu & Wu, 2014).  
 
43 Fan et al.’s (2011b) index ends up to the year 2009. Therefore, for those years later than 2009, the index values 
in 2009 are used as the substitutions (Liu & Wu, 2014). 
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factors are also controlled for, including Founder age, Early succession, and Retire. 
More specifically, Founder age is the age of the founder in the succession year 
(Ansari et al., 2014). Early succession is an indicator variable equal to one if the 
founder leaves the leadership position before 65 and zero otherwise. Retire44 equals 
one if the founder is reported to leave due to “retirement” and zero otherwise (Pérez-
González, 2006).  
Table 2.7 reports the regression results after incorporating the above variables into the 
preceding baseline probit models. More specifically, Columns (1) and (2) indicate that 
a family successor is less likely to be appointed if the firm has foreign ownership and 
a lower proportion of top executives sharing the founder’s surname. In addition, 
Columns (3) and (4) show that the successor is more likely to be either a descendant 
or a guanxi-connected nonfamily member if the firm is headquartered in a city with a 
Confucian centre, if the founder is not a returnee, and if the founder has more political 
connections. These findings are statistically similar to the previous results drawn from 
the baseline models, and thus further support my hypotheses.  
Moreover, it is worth noting that Columns (1) and (2) also document that prior 
average firm performance is significantly and negatively related to the likelihood of a 
family successor.45 An appropriate interpretation for this finding is that the founders 
tend to have the strongest emotional attachment to the business,46 and thus poor firm 
performance may make them more conservative, cautious, and risk-averse. As a 
result, to be on the safe side, the founders are more likely to choose a family 
successor, who should be more trustworthy, and whose personality and capability are 
sufficiently familiar to the founder, compared with nonfamily agents. This finding, 
                                               
44 However, in most of the following tests, Retire is excluded from the regressions because this variable has a 
perfect prediction correlation with the dependent variables. More specifically, in a logistic regression, perfect 
prediction occurs if there is a level of a categorical explanatory variable for which the observed values of the 
outcome are all one (or all zero) (White et al., 2010). In that case, the explanatory variable, i.e. the perfect 
predictor of the outcome, should be excluded from the regression. This is because, dropping the variable does not 
affect the estimates of the remaining coefficients in the regression, but the retention of the variable may produce 
instabilities in the estimation process (StataCorp, 2013).  
 
45 The pre-succession three-year average Tobin’s q is also attempted to be used as an alternative measure of Prior 
average performance, and the result shows that this measure is also significantly and negatively associated with 
the probability of a family succession.  
 
46 This is because the founders are those people who set up the company and are responsible for its early growth 
and development, and they devote most of their wealth, time, and energy to run the business from scratch to 
success (Villalonga & Amit, 2010).  
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based on my previous discussion, is different from the extant evidence obtained in 
developed economies, i.e. prior firm performance has no significant impact on the 
successor decision in family firms. A possible reason for the different findings is that 
China’s transitional economy, weak legal system, and traditional culture make the 
Chinese family firms’ business environment, governance characteristics, and 
corporate behaviour very different from their counterparts in developed contexts (Fan 
et al., 2011a; Xu et al., 2015; Bennedsen et al., 2015). Moreover, it may also be 
because that I use the pre-succession long-term average performance (i.e. the three 
years’ average ROA) as the measure, whereas the prior research focuses on one-year 
short-term performance (e.g., Pérez-González, 2006; Bennedsen et al., 2007; Ansari 
et al., 2014).47 
      [Insert Table 2.7 about here] 
2.6.3.2 Endogeneity 
There exists a concern that the above results are de facto driven by some variables not 
captured by the models yet affecting both the independent and dependent variables. 
For example, those firm-level hypothesised determinants, i.e. foreign ownership and 
the percentage of the firm’s top executives sharing the founder’s surname, may be 
influenced by some other unspecified firm-level factors, such as the firm’s corporate 
culture. This factor may also be related to the dependent variable, i.e. whether the 
successor is the founder’s descendant or not. Likewise, the hypothesised individual 
factors, such as the founder’s overseas experience and political connections, may be 
affected by some omitted individual factors such as the founder’s ability, which may 
also have an impact on the founder’s successor decision.  
To mitigate the above concern, the instrumental variables approach is employed, and 
several instruments are applied to the hypothesised determinants. More specifically, 
for Foreign ownership, the instrument is Industry-province foreign firm, i.e. the 
percentage of firms having foreign ownership in the family firm’s industry and 
province for the year before the succession. The rationale for this instrument is that it 
                                               
47 The pre-succession one-year ROA is also tested, yet the relevant results are insignificant, which are consistent 
with the previous literature. 
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should reflect the trends in foreign investment flows to China’s different industries 
and under Chinese provinces’ different markets and policies for foreign investment. 
In other words, it indicates what industries and provinces are favoured by or out of 
favour with foreign investors, and such different investment priorities should have an 
effect on the foreign investment in the individual firms operated in those industries 
and provinces. Based on this discussion, I posit that the more prevalent are foreign 
investors in the family firm’s industry and province, the more likely it is that the 
family firm has foreign ownership. Therefore, Industry-province foreign firm is 
expected to be positively related to Foreign ownership. However, whether foreign 
ownership is popular in the industry and province seems to be unlikely to directly 
affect the family firm’s decision of a family or nonfamily successor.  
As to the second hypothesised factor, Confucian centre, i.e. a dummy equal to one if 
the family firm is located in a city with a Confucian centre and zero otherwise, should 
be an exogenous variable in this study. This is because the value of the dummy is 
determined by two factors, i.e. the cities that have a Confucian centre and whether the 
family firm is located in one of those cities. The first factor, i.e. the locations of 
Confucian centres, is determined by Confucius and thousands of years’ influence, 
spread, and evolution of Confucianism in China (Du, 2015). The second factor, the 
location of the firm, based on the previous literature, is usually determined by the 
labour costs, populations, tax, and transport in the city or the province (e.g., Loughran 
& Schultz, 2005; Loughran, 2007; John et al., 2011; El Ghoul et al., 2012). However, 
none of the factors seems to have a significant effect on the firm founder’s choice of a 
family or guanxi-connected nonfamily successor. In other words, it is unlikely for a 
factor to have a significant impact on the locations of the Confucian centres, whether 
the family firm is headquartered right in one of those locations, and the founder’s 
successor selection simultaneously.  
For the third hypothesised determinant, Same surname, the instrumental variable is 
Rare surname, a dummy equal to one if the founder’s surname is not ranked among 
the top 20 Chinese surnames and zero otherwise.48 This variable indicates whether 
the founder has a rare surname, and if the surname is rare, the percentage of top 
                                               
48 The ranking is in the most recent survey by the Chinese Ministry of Public Security (CMPS).  
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executives in the firm having that surname should be lower. Thus, this variable is 
expected to be negatively related to Same surname. However, whether the founder’s 
surname is out of the top 20 is unlikely to have a direct effect on the founder’s 
decision of a family or nonfamily successor.  
For the fourth hypothesised factor, Returnee founder, the instrument is Industry-
province returnee and is calculated as the mean of the percentages of returnee 
entrepreneurs, i.e. Chairpersons and CEOs, in the family firm’s industry and province 
for the years before the succession. The rationale for this instrument is that it should 
reflect the popularity of returnee entrepreneurs in that industry and that province. 
More specifically, if the industry has a large proportion of returnee entrepreneurs, it 
may imply that a number of entrepreneurial opportunities suitable for returnees, who 
are characterised by distinctive knowledge and skills, overseas experience, and 
international network resources, exist in the industry. In addition, if the province is 
featured with a large proportion of returnee entrepreneurs, it may imply that the 
province has good business opportunities and favourable policies for returnees. These 
factors, in turn, should attract many returnees to enter the industry and the province to 
start their own business, i.e. to become a family business founder. The above factors 
may also motivate many family business founders in the industry and the province to 
go abroad, in the hope of obtaining foreign technologies and expertise as well as 
building international networks. In other words, for a family business, the prevalence 
of returnees in its industry and province should reflect the industry’ and province’s 
demand for and attractiveness to returnees, and thus may have an impact on the 
family business founder’s likelihood of being a returnee. Therefore, Industry-province 
returnee is expected to be positively associated with Returnee founder. However, the 
industry- and province-level proportion of returnee entrepreneurs is unlikely to 
directly affect an individual family business founder’s choice of a family or guanxi-
connected successor.  
As to the final hypothesised determinant, Political connection, the instrumental 
variable is Industry-province SOE, i.e. the mean of the percentages of state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) in the family firm’s industry and province for the years before the 
succession. This is because in China, as previously, private enterprises often suffer 
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discrimination in various aspects relative to their state-owned counterparts. In such a 
context, a larger percentage of SOEs in the family firm’s industry and province may 
stimulate the founder to seek for more political connections to make the firm more 
competitive and less likely to be discriminated against due to lack of political support. 
Thus, Industry-province SOE should be positively associated with Political 
connection. However, as an industrial and provincial level factor, Industry-province 
SOE is unlikely to have a direct impact on the founder’s likelihood of appointing a 
descendant or guanxi-connected member as the successor. 
The relevant results are presented in Table 2.8. Panel A of the table provides the 
results for Foreign ownership and Same surname, where Family is the dependent 
variable in the second-stage regression. Panel B of the table reports the results for 
Returnee founder and Political connection, thus having FamilyOrGuanxi as the 
dependent variable in the second-stage regression.49 More specifically, in Panel A, 
Columns (1) and (2) show that Industry-province foreign firm is significantly and 
positively related to Foreign ownership, and Rare surname is significantly and 
negatively related to Same surname. This result is consistent with my predictions. In 
addition, the panel indicates that the first-stage F-statistics are highly significant as 
well as greater than both Staiger and Stock’s (1997) rule of thumb, ten, and the 
maximum critical value for the F-statistics provided by Stock and Yogo (2005).50 
Moreover, the Cragg and Donald’s (1993) Wald F weak-instrument statistic is also 
larger than the corresponding maximum critical value from Stock and Yogo (2005). 
These results suggest that none of my instruments is weak (Cragg & Donald, 1993; 
Stock & Yogo, 2005; Sanderson & Windmeijer, 2016).  
More importantly, in the second-stage analysis (Columns (3) of Panel A), Predicted 
(Foreign ownership), the variable with the predicted values of Foreign ownership 
                                               
49 I have attempted to treat all the four variables, i.e. Foreign ownership, Same surname, Returnee founder, and 
Political connection, as endogenous variables for both Family and FamilyOrGuanxi to conduct the two-stage 
regressions. In other words, for either Family or FamilyOrGuanxi as the dependent variable in the second-stage 
regression, there are four endogenous regressors and thus four instruments in each of the four first-stage 
regressions. However, probably because in that case, there are too many endogenous regressors, instruments, and 
control variables simultaneously, and yet my sample is quite small, the relevant Stata command cannot be 
executed due to “convergence not achieved”. 
 
50 It is worth noting that according to Wooldridge (2010), maximum-likelihood estimation, compared with 2SLS 
estimation, is more appropriate for a small sample and logistic regressions with a binary endogenous variable. 
Therefore, the Stock-Yogo critical value is for the maximum-likelihood estimation. 
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from the first-stage regression, is significantly and negatively related to Family. In 
addition, the corresponding variable for Same surname, i.e. Predicted (Same 
surname), is significantly and positively related to Family.51 These results are in line 
with my prior relevant results, thus suggesting that the results are not due to the 
potential endogeneity of Foreign ownership or Same surname.  
Moreover, in Panel B, Columns (1) and (2) show that Industry-province returnee and 
Industry-province SOE are significantly and positively associated with the relevant 
hypothesised determinant. This is also in line with my predictions. Furthermore, both 
the first-stage F-statistics and the Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic are greater than the 
corresponding critical values, suggesting that my instrumental variables in this panel 
are also not weak.  
More importantly, Column (3) of Panel B indicates that Predicted (Returnee founder) 
is significantly and negatively associated with FamilyOrGuanxi, and Predicted 
(Political connection) is significantly and positively associated with 
FamilyOrGuanxi.52 This result is also qualitatively similar to those reported in the 
                                               
51 It is worth noting that in Panel A, Confucian centre and Political connection, i.e. the hypothesised determinants 
of FamilyOrGuanxi, are used as control variables. This is because my previous baseline regression results indicate 
that these two variables are also significantly related to Family. However, another determinant of 
FamilyOrGuanxi, i.e. Returnee founder, is not included in Panel A. This is because, firstly, the preceding results 
show that Returnee founder is not significantly related to Family. Secondly, the Stata results show that there is a 
perfect prediction correlation between Returnee founder equal to one and Foreign ownership equal to zero in the 
first-stage regression. In this case, as previously mentioned (in Footnote 44), Returnee founder should be excluded 
from the regressions. This is because dropping the perfect predictor variable does not affect the estimates of the 
remaining coefficients in the regressions, yet retaining it would cause numerical instabilities in the estimation 
process (StataCorp, 2013).  
 
It is also worth mentioning that industry and year dummies are also not included in the regressions. This is because 
most of the dummies are either having the collinearity issues or perfect predictor variables of Foreign ownership. 
However, based on the above discussion, the exclusion of the dummies has no effect on the validity of the 
regression results for other variables. Moreover, the industry and year fixed effects have been controlled for in the 
preceding analysis, which generates qualitatively similar results as those from the two-stage regressions.  
 
52 In Panel B, the hypothesised determinants of Family, i.e. Foreign ownership and Same surname, are not 
included. For Foreign ownership, this is because, firstly, it is not significantly related to FamilyOrGuanxi, as 
indicated in my prior results. Secondly, as discussed in the above footnote, Foreign ownership has a perfect 
prediction correlation with Returnee founder. As to Same surname, its exclusion from Panel B is also because it is 
not significantly associated with FamilyOrGuanxi, as shown in the previous results.  
 
It is also worth noting that, in Panel B, Confucian centre is also not included. Similar to the second reason for 
Foreign ownership, this is because Confucian centre is also a perfect predictor variable of Returnee founder in the 
first-stage regression. However, again, in light of StataCorp (2013), the exclusion of Confucian centre does not 
affect the validity of the results for the other variables in the regressions.  
 
Moreover, industry and year dummies, again, are not included in the regressions. The reason is similar to that 
mentioned in Footnote 51, i.e. most of the dummies either have the collinearity issues or have a perfect prediction 
correlation with Returnee founder. However, again, as discussed in Footnote 51, the exclusion of the dummies 
does not affect the reliability of the results of the two-stage regressions.  
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previous sections, thus suggesting that my findings are also not driven by the potential 
endogeneity of Returnee founder or Political connection. 
Finally, Panels A and B also report the p-values for the Durbin-Wu-Hausman 
endogeneity test for the two-stage regressions. The results indicate that all of the four 
potential endogenous variables, i.e. Foreign ownership, Same surname, Returnee 
founder, and Political connection, in fact, are exogenous in the regressions (Durbin, 
1954; Wu, 1973; Hausman, 1978). This finding further confirms the validity and 
reliability of the results presented in the previous sections.  
 [Insert Table 2.8 about here]  
2.6.4 Additional analysis 
This section provides several additional analyses for the preceding results. The 
analyses include the investigation of the role of regional institutional environment and 
marketisation level, alternative measures of the determinants, and a multinomial 
logistic regression to further test the validity of the findings.  
2.6.4.1 Does regional institutional environment play a role in the foreign 
ownership-successor decision relationship?  
The above results indicate that family firms with foreign ownership are more likely to 
appoint a nonfamily successor. One of the underlying reasons, as discussed in the 
hypothesis development section, is that the PP agency problem53 typically prevails in 
family firms, and the appointment of a family successor may exacerbate the problem. 
Therefore, foreign investors, as minority shareholders in family firms, have a strong 
motivation to pressure the firm to choose a nonfamily successor. In this case, it is 
reasonable to posit that the impact of foreign ownership on the successor decision 
may be contingent upon the institutional environment of the family business. This is 
because the agency problem tends to be less serious in family firms in a strong 
institutional environment (Peng & Jiang, 2010). In this case, foreign shareholders in 
those firms may have fewer incentives to force the firm to choose a nonfamily 
                                               
 
53 Controlling shareholders expropriate minority shareholders’ interests to satisfy their own private benefits.  
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successor. To test this posit, an interaction term between Foreign ownership and 
Strong institutional environment, i.e. Foreign ownership*Strong institution, is 
employed. Here, Strong institutional environment is a dummy equal to one if the firm 
is headquartered in a strong (above-median) institutional environment and equal to 
zero if the firm is headquartered in a weak (below-median) institutional 
environment.54 
Table 2.9 presents the relevant result. More specifically, Column (1) of the table 
shows that the above interaction term is significantly and positively related to Family. 
This suggests that a strong institutional environment can moderate the aforementioned 
significant and negative impact that foreign ownership has on the probability of a 
family successor. This, in turn, supports the above conjecture, i.e. a strong legal 
environment can alleviate the PP agency problem in family firms, and thus can lower 
foreign investors’ preference for a nonfamily leader in those firms.   
2.6.4.2 Confucius temples 
In the previous tests, Confucian centre, a dummy equal to one if the family firm is 
headquartered in a city with a Confucian centre and zero otherwise, is used as a proxy 
for whether the firm founder is strongly affected by Confucianism. It is worth noting 
that, apart from the Confucian centres, there also exist 52 nationally famous 
Confucius temples located in different provinces in China (Du, 2015). In this case, it 
is also likely that family firms in provinces with more Confucius temples are 
surrounded by stronger Confucianism atmosphere (Du, 2015). As a result, the 
founders of those firms, compared with their counterparts in provinces with less 
Confucius temples, are also more likely to be strongly affected by the Confucian 
familism and guanxi cultures, and thus more likely to choose a family or guanxi-
connected successor. To test this conjecture, another proxy for the founder’s degree of 
being influenced by Confucianism is used. More specifically, the variable is 
Confucius temple, calculated as the number of the nationally well-known Confucius 
temples in the firm’s headquartered province.  
                                               
54 The measure of Institutional environment, as previously discussed, is based on Fan et al.’s (2011b) index 
regarding the market development levels of Chinese provinces. More specifically, the higher the value of the index 
for the firm’s headquartered province, the better is the institutional environment for the firm.  
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The relevant results are provided by Columns (2) to (4) of Table 2.9, showing that 
Confucius temple is significantly and positively associated with FamilyOrGuanxi. 
This finding is qualitatively similar to those based on the Confucian centre dummy, 
and thus further supports the relevant hypothesis.  
2.6.4.3 Clan culture or familism? 
In the previous sections, Same surname, i.e. the percentage of top executives in the 
firm having the same surname with the founder one year before the succession, is 
used as a proxy for the founder’s extent of being affected by clan culture. The 
relevant results show that Same surname is significantly and positively related to 
Family, thus providing support for my hypothesis that the founders deeply affected by 
the clan culture are more likely to prefer a family successor.  
However, for the above finding, there exists a possibility that the top executives 
having the founder’s surname are de facto the founder’s family members. In other 
words, the above result is de facto driven by the familism culture rather than the clan 
culture. To test this possibility, an additional variable is used: Nonfamily same 
surname, measured as the percentage of nonfamily board members and top managers 
in the firm sharing the founder’s surname one year before the succession.  
The relevant result is reported in Column (1) of Table 2.9, indicating that Nonfamily 
same surname is significantly and positively associated with Family. This result rules 
out the above possibility, and thus further confirms my hypothesis.  
2.6.4.4 The length of overseas experience 
My existing results also document that the founders with overseas experience are 
more likely to choose a successor who is not a family member and without a guanxi. 
As discussed in the hypothesis development section, this is because those founders are 
less likely to be deeply affected by Chinese familism and guanxi cultures, compared 
with their counterparts without any experience abroad. In this case, it should be 
reasonable to posit that the founders with longer overseas experience are much less 
influenced by the above cultures, relative to those with shorter or no overseas 
experience. As a result, the former is much more likely to choose a nonfamily 
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successor without a guanxi, compared with the latter. In other words, the length of the 
founders’ overseas experience may also play a role in determining the identity of the 
successor. To test this conjecture, a new variable, Overseas length, is employed. More 
specifically, this is an ordinal variable, equal to two if the founder has overseas work 
experience; equal to one if the founder’s overseas experience is pure study 
experience; and equal to zero if the founder does not have any work or study 
experience abroad. The rationale for this variable is that, due to visa issue, study used 
to be the major route for Chinese people to live abroad (Duan & Hou, 2015). After 
finishing the study, some Chinese choose to return to China immediately, and some 
choose to work abroad for a number of years. In other words, the founders with 
overseas work experience tend to have stayed abroad longer than those with study 
experience only (Duan & Hou, 2015).  
The relevant results are presented in Columns (2) to (4) of Table 2.9, documenting 
that Overseas length is significantly and negatively related to the likelihood of a 
family or guanxi-connected successor. This confirms the above posit.  
2.6.4.5 Does regional marketisation level play a role in the political 
connection-successor decision relationship? 
It has been demonstrated that the founders with more political connections are more 
likely to choose a family or guanxi-connected successor. I attribute this finding to the 
fact that the Chinese government’s dominant role in economic resource allocation 
makes the founders’ political connections become one of the most important 
specialised assets for family firms in China (Xu et al., 2015). As a result, the founders 
with more political connections should have a stronger intention of appointing a 
family or guanxi-connected successor, as the founders are normally only willing to 
transfer the specialised assets to those persons. Based on this discussion, a possibility 
exists, i.e. the relationship between the founders’ political connections and the 
succession decision may be contingent on the marketisation level of the province 
where the firm is located. More specifically, there exists a great heterogeneity in the 
degree of marketisation of Chinese provinces, which causes the controlling power of 
the local government in allocating economic resources varies across different 
provinces (Fan et al., 2009). For example, the government intervention in resource 
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allocation typically is much heavier in provinces with a low marketisation level. As a 
result, for family firms located in those provinces, their founders’ political 
connections can generate great benefits, such as better access to financial resources, 
more tax benefits, and more privileges (Li, 2008). On the contrary, for firms in 
provinces where resource allocation is less dominated by the government but more 
market-oriented, the economic value of political connections should be much less 
significant. This, in turn, may mitigate the founders’ intention of transferring their 
political connections to successors, thus making the founders have fewer incentives to 
appoint a descendant or a guanxi-connected member as the successor.  
To test the above conjecture, an interaction term between Political connection and 
High marketisation, i.e. Political connection*High market, is adopted. Here, High 
marketisation is a dummy equal to one if the firm’s headquartered province has a high 
(above-median) level of marketisation in terms of economic resource allocation for 
the year before the succession; otherwise, it equals zero. The measure of this variable 
is based on Fan et al.’s (2011b) index, “the importance of the market in economic 
resource allocation”, for each province in China. Whether the firm’s headquartered 
province has a high marketisation level regarding resource allocation, therefore, is 
defined as whether the index value of the province is above the sample median.  
The relevant result is reported in Column (2) of Table 2.9, showing that the above 
interaction term is significantly and negatively related to FamilyOrGuanxi. This 
supports the above conjecture.  
2.6.4.6 Does the type of the political identity matter? 
Chinese private entrepreneurs’ political identities can generally be classified into two 
types, i.e. government officials and representatives of different congresses. 
Government officials normally have rights to allocate resources and offer privileges, 
and yet representatives of congresses can only participate in the discussion of political 
affairs (Du et al., 2010). As a result, the political connections and resources that the 
entrepreneurs can obtain from “government official” identities tend to be much more 
valuable than those from “representative” identities. In this case, family business 
founders with the former identities should have a much stronger desire to preserve 
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their political connections in the firm. Such a desire, in turn, may strengthen the 
founders’ intention of appointing a family or guanxi-connected successor.  
To test the above conjecture, an ordinal variable, Political type, is applied. It equals 
two if the founder has worked as a government official; one if the founder’s political 
identities are all about representatives of the NPC, CPPCC, or NCCPC; and zero if 
the founder does not have any political identities. Column (3) of Table 2.9 provides 
the relevant result, indicating that Political type has a significant and positive 
relationship with FamilyOrGuanxi. This provides support for the above conjecture. It, 
in turn, suggests that the more valuable are the founder’s political identities, the 
stronger is the founder’s intention of appointing a family successor or a guanxi-
connected nonfamily successor.  
2.6.4.7 Does the rank of the political identity matter? 
The political system in China is featured with a strict hierarchy of rankings. In such a 
system, officials at higher rankings typically possess more political power than their 
lower-ranking counterparts (Chen et al., 2017). In other words, higher-level political 
identities should be more valuable than lower-level identities in China’s context. 
Given such a background, it should be reasonable to hypothesise that the founders 
with higher-ranking political identities have a stronger desire for preserving their 
political resources and connections in the firm. Such a desire, in turn, may make the 
founders more likely to choose a family or guanxi-connected successor. To test this 
hypothesis, another ordinal variable, Political rank, is employed. It equals five, four, 
three, two, and one if the founder’s highest-ranking political identity is at the national 
level, the sub-national level, the provincial level, the sub-provincial level, and the 
city-level, respectively. The variable equals zero if the founder does not have any 
political identities.  
The relevant result is shown in Column (4) of Table 2.9. Specifically, Political rank 
has a significant and positive relationship with FamilyOrGuanxi. This is consistent 
with the above hypothesis, and thus further confirms the above perspective, i.e. the 
more valuable are the founders’ political identities, the higher is the likelihood that 
the successor is a family or guanxi-connected nonfamily member.   
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[Insert Table 2.9 about here] 
2.6.4.8 The decomposition of FamilyOrGuanxi 
It has been demonstrated that the founder’s extent of being affected by Confucianism, 
the founder’s overseas experience, and the founder’s political connections have 
significant effects on the likelihood of a family or guanxi-connected successor. In this 
case, this section aims at exploring whether the significant results are de facto derived 
from only one type of the successors. To this end, a multinomial logistic regression is 
employed, where the dependent variable is defined as 3 if the successor is the 
founder’s descendant, 2 if the successor is a nonfamily member having a guanxi with 
the founder, and 1 if the successor is a nonfamily member without a guanxi. The 
independent variables include the five hypothesised determinants and the preceding 
control variables.   
Table 2.10 reports the regression result. In the table, the base case is always the 
successions with a successor who is a nonfamily member without a guanxi. In 
Column (1), the comparison is between family successions and non-guanxi 
successions, whereas in Column (2), it is between nonfamily successions with a 
guanxi-connected successor and those without. The result, as expected, shows that 
Confucian centre and Political connection are significantly positive, while Returnee 
founder is significantly negative in both columns. This suggests that firms 
headquartered in cities with a Confucian centre, whose founder does not have oversea 
experience, and whose founder has more political connections are indeed more likely 
to appoint not only a family successor but also a nonfamily successor having a guanxi 
with the founder. This finding further supports the relevant hypotheses.  
[Insert Table 2.10 about here] 
2.7 Conclusion 
This chapter explores the determinants of the leadership successor decision in family 
firms in China. Specifically, five factors are examined, i.e. foreign ownership, 
Confucianism, clan culture, the founders’ overseas experience, and the founders’ 
political connections. 
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For the first factor, foreign ownership, its importance in China and effect on Chinese 
enterprises have been largely explored by the previous researchers, yet its role in 
driving family firms’ successor decisions has never been noticed. This chapter fills 
this void and documents that family firms with foreign ownership are more likely to 
choose a nonfamily successor. This finding supports my H1, and thus suggests that 
foreign shareholders can exert influence on the family firm’s successor decision and 
prefer a nonfamily successor.  
The second hypothesised determinant, Confucianism, has been widely regarded as the 
most ancient and predominant philosophy in Chinese society (Fung, 1952; Tu, 1998a, 
1998b; Du, 2015, 2016). Its role in family firms’ successor decision-making has been 
theoretically emphasised by some researchers (e.g., Yan & Sorenson, 2006), yet the 
relevant empirical support is lacking. This study uses whether the firm is 
headquartered in a city with a Confucian centre as a proxy for the founder’s level of 
being affected by Confucianism and shows that this proxy is positively related to the 
likelihood of a family successor or a nonfamily successor having a guanxi with the 
founder. This evidence confirms my H2, thus proving that familism and guanxi 
culture, the two most influential Confucian values, have a pronounced impact on 
Chinese family business founders’ successor preference.  
In addition to Confucianism, clan culture is also an important component of China’s 
traditional culture. However, compared to the extant focus on the former, that on the 
latter is very scarce. This study fills this gap by using the percentage of the board 
members and top managers sharing the founder’s surname as a proxy for the 
founder’s extent of being influenced by the clan culture, and finds that this proxy has 
a significant and positive effect on the probability of a family successor. This finding 
is consistent with my H3, and in turn supports the underlying argument that because a 
clan in China is often viewed as a large family and the clan culture is very similar to 
Confucian familism, the founders who are deeply affected by the clan culture are 
more likely to prefer a family successor. Moreover, a larger proportion of the 
founder’s clan members on the board and in the top management team may facilitate 
the approval of the founder’s family succession decision.  
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The fourth hypothesised factor is the founders’ overseas experience. Chinese 
entrepreneurs’ experience abroad has been largely explored in various aspects, yet its 
effect exclusively on family businesses, and in particular, on the businesses’ successor 
selections, has never been considered theoretically and empirically. This chapter fills 
the gap and documents that the founders with overseas experience have a greater 
likelihood of appointing a nonfamily successor without a guanxi. This result confirms 
my H4. It, in turn, suggests that the founders who have worked or studied in western 
and developed countries are less likely to be deeply affected by Chinese culture but 
more likely to be influenced by individualist cultures, and thus are more likely to 
choose a successor who is not a family member and does not have a guanxi.  
The final factor is the founders’ political connections. This factor has been 
investigated as a determinant of the successor decision by one research (Xu et al., 
2015), which indicates that politically connected founders have a greater probability 
of choosing a family successor. My study provides further evidence, which 
demonstrates that the founders’ political connections have a positive impact on not 
only the likelihood of a family successor but also that of a guanxi-connected 
nonfamily successor. This finding is in line with my H5, and thus confirms that 
Chinese family business founders’ personal specialised assets are accessible to not 
only their family members but also nonfamily members having a guanxi with them.  
In general, the above findings have several major contributions. For example, for 
some of the hypothesised determinants, including foreign ownership, clan culture, and 
the founders’ overseas experience, their roles in family businesses have never been 
noticed in theoretical and empirical analyses. In this case, this study may provide 
some new research channels for researchers interested in either the above factors or 
family businesses, such as the investigations of the former’s effect on the latter’s 
various behaviours, decisions, and financial consequences.  
Additionally, different from the prior research focusing on family or nonfamily 
successions, this study sheds initial light on the existence of the successors who are 
nonfamily members but having a guanxi with the founder. This should offer a novel 
research direction for future studies regarding family firms in China or other Asian 
countries affected by Confucianism, i.e. focusing more on the founders’ guanxi-
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connected nonfamily members. This direction should apply to any topics as long as 
they are related to the identities of family firms’ stakeholders, such as managers, 
employees, or shareholders.  
Furthermore, this study contributes to a much complete understanding of the driving 
force of the successor decision in China’s family firms.55 This, in practice, can have 
important implications for (potential) investors of Chinese family businesses, such as 
helping the investors to figure out the identity of the firm’s next leader more 
accurately by using publicly available information. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
55 As previously discussed, there are only two studies hitherto focusing on the determinants of the successor in 
China’s setting (Cao et al., 2015, Xu et al., 2015), and thus only two factors have been empirically investigated, 
i.e. China’s one-child policy and the founders’ political connections. 
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Chapter 2 Tables 
Table 2.1—Industry and annual distributions of different successions 
This table illustrates the distribution of succession cases across industries in Panel A and 
years in Panel B. The classification of industries is based on the guide provided by CSRC. 
Successions are classified into three types, family successions, i.e. successors who are the 
founder’s descendants; guanxi successions, i.e. nonfamily successors having a guanxi with 
the founder before the succession; non-guanxi successions, i.e. nonfamily successors who do 
not have a guanxi with the founder before the succession. The numbers of each type of 
successions in each industry and each year are respectively presented in Panels A and B, with 
the proportions (%) in each group shown in the parentheses.  
 
Panel A: Successions distributed by industry     
Industry 
Family 
successions 
Guanxi 
successions 
Non-guanxi 
successions 
All 
successions 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
1. Agriculture  4 6 0 10 
 (4.49) (4.00) (0.00) (2.87) 
2. Mining 0 5 2 7 
 (0.00) (3.33) (1.83) (2.01) 
3.Manufacturing 77 105 79 261 
 (86.52) (70.00) (72.48) (75.00) 
4. Energy 0 1 0 1 
 (0.00) (0.67) (0.00) (0.29) 
5. Construction 2 6 4 12 
 (2.25) (4.00) (3.67) (3.45) 
6. Wholesale and retail 0 4 2 6 
 (0.00) (2.67) (1.83) (1.72) 
7. Transport, storage and postal service 1 1 0 2 
 (1.12) (0.67) (0.00) (0.57) 
8. Information technology 0 10 13 23 
 (0.00) (6.67) (11.93) (6.61) 
9. Real estate 3 7 5 15 
 (3.37) (4.67) (4.59) (4.31) 
10. Leasing and commercial service 1 0 1 2 
 (1.12) (0.00) (0.92) (0.57) 
11. Scientific research service 0 0 1 1 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.92) (0.29) 
12. Environment and public facility 0 0 1 1 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.92) (0.29) 
13. Culture, sports and entertainment 0 1 0 1 
 (0.00) (0.67) (0.00) (0.29) 
14. Comprehensive industry 1 4 1 6 
 (1.12) (2.67) (0.92) (1.72) 
Total 89 150 109 348 
  (100.00) (100.00) (100.00) (100.00) 
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Panel B: Successions distributed by year 
Year 
Family 
successions 
Guanxi 
successions 
Non-guanxi 
successions 
All 
successions 
        (1) (2) (3) (4) 
2003 1 2 1 4 
 (1.12) (1.33) (0.92) (1.15) 
2004 1 3 1 5 
 (1.12) (2) (0.92) (1.44) 
2005 2 5 6 13 
 (2.25) (3.33) (5.50) (3.74) 
2006 1 4 5 10 
 (1.12) (2.67) (4.59) (2.87) 
2007 2 12 5 19 
 (2.25) (8.00) (4.59) (5.46) 
2008 12 8 3 23 
 (13.48) (5.33) (2.75) (6.61) 
2009 4 9 4 17 
 (4.49) (6.00) (3.67) (4.89) 
2010 7 11 12 30 
 (7.87) (7.33) (11.01) (8.62) 
2011 12 22 17 51 
 (13.48) (14.67) (15.60) (14.66) 
2012 16 19 18 53 
 (17.98) (12.67) (16.51) (15.23) 
2013 19 32 23 74 
 (21.35) (21.33) (21.10) (21.26) 
2014 12 23 14 49 
 (13.48) (15.33) (12.84) (14.08) 
Total 89 150 109 348 
  (100.00) (100.00) (100.00) (100.00) 
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Figure 1—Trend of successions 
This figure illustrates the trend of the succession cases over the period 2003-2014.  
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Table 2.2—Summary statistics 
This table provides summary statistics of variables, including the five hypothesised 
determinants of the successor selection and a series of control factors. The hypothesised 
determinants are Foreign ownership, Confucian centre, Same surname, Returnee founder, and 
Political connection. Specifically, Foreign ownership is a dummy equal to one if the firm has 
shares owned by foreign investors one year before the succession, and zero otherwise. 
Confucian centre is also a dummy equal to one if the firm is headquartered in a city with a 
Confucian centre and zero otherwise. Same surname is the percentage of top executives in the 
firm sharing the founder’s surname one year prior to the succession. Returnee founder is a 
dummy equal to one if the founder has worked or studied overseas before the succession and 
zero otherwise. Political connection is the number of political identities of the founder before 
the succession. The statistics in the table are provided after winsorising all continuous 
variables at the 1% and 99% percentiles.   
 
Variables N Mean Std Median Min Max 
Foreign ownership t-1 348 0.13 0.33 0 0 1 
Confucian centre 348 0.12 0.33 0 0 1 
Same surname t-1 (%) 348 13.2 8.43 11.76 0 46.67 
Returnee founder 348 0.06 0.24 0 0 1 
Political connection  348 0.78 0.96 0 0 3 
Firm age t-1 348 11.35 5.06 11 3 25 
Ln(total assets) t-1 348 21.14 0.89 21.12 19.29 23.83 
Long-debt level t-1 (%) 348 2.89 5.43 0 0 31.01 
Sales growth t-1 (%) 295 34.85 165.59 14.68 -67.75 1609.59 
Business risk t-1 183 0.04 0.07 0.02 0 0.52 
Board ownership t-1 (%) 335 22.04 23.9 11.31 0 69.82 
Board independence t-1 (%) 342 36.8 5.09 33.33 33.33 57.14 
Family ownership t-1 (%) 343 33.96 17.39 30 7.43 75 
Family control t-1 (%) 343 40.94 16.27 39.04 14.46 80.6 
Family divergence t-1 (%) 343 6.92 8.24 3.33 0 28.35 
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Table 2.3—Comparison between family and nonfamily successions  
This table reports the mean comparisons between firms with a family successor and those 
with a nonfamily one in terms of the variables in the previous table. Column (1) reports the 
means of the variables for family succession firms, and Column (0) lists the means for the 
nonfamily succession group. Column “Mean difference” reports the results of the difference 
in means t-test for each variable. 
 
 
 
Variables 
Family 
successions 
(1) 
Nonfamily 
successions 
(0) 
Mean 
difference 
(1-0) 
Foreign ownership t-1 0.1 0.14 -0.03 
Confucian centre 0.18 0.1 0.08* 
Same surname t-1 (%) 16.66 12.01 4.65*** 
Returnee founder 0.02 0.07 -0.05* 
Political connection  0.87 0.75 0.11 
Firm age t-1 11.63 11.25 0.37 
Ln(total assets) t-1 21.28 21.1 0.18 
Long-debt level t-1 (%) 3.52 2.67 0.85 
Sales growth t-1 (%) 35.82 34.5 1.32 
Business risk t-1 0.03 0.04 -0.01 
Board ownership t-1 (%) 19.65 22.88 -3.22 
Board independence t-1 (%) 36.82 36.79 0.02 
Family ownership t-1 (%) 34.23 33.86 0.37 
Family control t-1 (%) 42.42 40.44 1.98 
Family divergence t-1 (%) 7.94 6.58 1.36 
***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level (two-tailed test), respectively. 
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Table 2.4—Comparison between guanxi successions and non-guanxi successions  
This table presents the results of the difference in means t-test between nonfamily successions 
with a guanxi-connected successor and those without. 
 
 
 
Variables 
Guanxi 
successions 
(1) 
Non-guanxi 
successions 
(0) 
Mean 
difference 
(1-0) 
Foreign ownership t-1 0.15 0.12 0.03 
Confucian centre 0.11 0.1 0.01 
Same surname t-1 (%) 11.69 12.44 -0.75 
Returnee founder 0.05 0.11 -0.06* 
Political connection  0.8 0.69 0.11 
Firm age t-1 11.23 11.28 -0.05 
Ln(total assets) t-1 21.2 20.95 0.25 
Long-debt level t-1 (%) 3.08 2.11 0.97 
Sales growth t-1 (%) 23.52 50.17 -26.65 
Business risk t-1 0.04 0.05 0 
Board ownership t-1 (%) 21.22 25.24 -4.02 
Board independence t-1 (%) 36.5 37.2 -0.7 
Family ownership t-1 (%) 33.56 34.27 -0.71 
Family control t-1 (%) 40.87 39.84 1.03 
Family divergence t-1 (%) 7.37 5.49 1.88 
***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level (two-tailed test), respectively. 
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Table 2.5—Correlation matrix  
This matrix reports the Pearson correlation coefficients for the dependent and independent variables. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) 
Family (1) 1                 
FamilyOrGuanxi (2) 0.40*** 1                
Foreign ownership (3) -0.04 0.01 1               
Same surname (4) 0.24*** 0.06 0.03 1              
Confucian centre (5) 0.10* 0.05 0.07 0.15*** 1             
Returnee founder (6) -0.09* -0.14*** 0.09 0.02 -0.06 1            
Political connection (7) 0.05 0.07 0.01 0.03 -0.02 0.02 1           
Firm age (8) 0.03 0.01 -0.11** 0.07 0 -0.06 0.03 1          
Firm size (9) 0.09 0.15*** 0.09* 0.01 -0.09 -0.01 0.24*** 0.22*** 1         
Long-debt level (10) 0.07 0.10* -0.01 -0.03 0.03 -0.09 0.01 0.19*** 0.30*** 1        
Sales growth (11) 0 0.01 -0.04 0.02 -0.04 0.03 -0.01 0.20*** -0.03 0.03 1       
Business risk (12) -0.09 -0.05 -0.04 -0.14* 0.01 0.05 -0.05 0.16** -0.24*** -0.05 0.18** 1      
Board ownership (13) -0.06 -0.09 -0.12** 0.05 -0.06 0.08 -0.08 -0.38*** -0.21*** -0.20*** -0.11* -0.18** 1     
Independence (14) 0 -0.05 -0.08 0.09* 0.02 -0.04 -0.07 0.06 -0.14*** -0.12** 0.01 -0.04 0.13** 1    
Family ownership (15) 0.01 -0.01 -0.07 0.10* 0.02 0.06 0.04 -0.24*** -0.02 -0.18*** 0.01 -0.04 0.52*** 0.07 1   
Family control (16) 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.08 0.04 0.02 0.07 -0.17*** 0.11** -0.10* 0.04 -0.02 0.25*** 0.04 0.88*** 1  
Family divergence (17) 0.07 0.12** 0.19*** -0.05 0.05 -0.09* 0.05 0.17*** 0.24*** 0.18*** 0.06 0.05 -0.60*** -0.08 -0.37*** 0.11** 1 
***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level (two-tailed test), respectively. 
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Table 2.6—Determinants of the successor 
This table reports the results of the probit regressions for the five hypothesised determinants 
of the successor decision and the control variables. The dependent variable in Columns (1) 
and (2) is Family, equal to one if the successor is the founder’s descendant and zero 
otherwise. The dependent variable in Columns (3) and (4) is FamilyOrGuanxi, equal to one if 
the successor is the founder’s descendant or a guanxi-connected nonfamily member and zero 
otherwise. The hypothesised determinants are Foreign ownership, Confucian centre, Same 
surname, Returnee founder, and Political connection. The control variables are a series of 
pre-succession firm-, governance-, and family-level characteristics, as well as a set of 
industry and year dummies. ME stands for marginal effects. The definitions of all variables 
are described in Table 2.11. 
 
 Family FamilyOrGuanxi 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables Coef. ME Coef. ME 
Foreign ownership t-1 -1.475*** -0.361*** 0.488 0.124 
 (0.553) (0.127) (0.486) (0.124) 
Confucian centre 0.988*** 0.242*** 0.986** 0.251** 
 (0.362) (0.083) (0.470) (0.115) 
Same surname t-1 0.066*** 0.016*** 0.010 0.003 
 (0.019) (0.004) (0.016) (0.004) 
Returnee founder  -0.255 -0.062 -1.233* -0.314* 
 (0.751) (0.184) (0.702) (0.175) 
Political connection 0.351** 0.086** 0.376** 0.096** 
 (0.153) (0.036) (0.192) (0.048) 
Firm age t-1 -0.026 -0.006 0.040 0.010 
 (0.034) (0.008) (0.033) (0.008) 
Firm size t-1 -0.009 -0.002 0.368** 0.094** 
 (0.163) (0.040) (0.173) (0.043) 
Long-debt level t-1 0.018 0.004 0.018 0.005 
 (0.018) (0.005) (0.025) (0.006) 
Sales growth t-1 0.001 0.000 -0.001** -0.000*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Business risk t-1 -4.888 -1.197 4.663** 1.188** 
 (3.731) (0.901) (2.376) (0.594) 
Board ownership t-1 -0.016* -0.004* 0.009 0.002 
 (0.010) (0.002) (0.009) (0.002) 
Board independence t-1 0.012 0.003 -0.013 -0.003 
 (0.026) (0.006) (0.026) (0.006) 
Family control t-1 -0.015 -0.004 0.003 0.001 
 (0.009) (0.002) (0.011) (0.003) 
Industry & year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 171 171 171 171 
Pseudo R2 0.267  0.252  
Firm-level clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level (two-tailed test), respectively. 
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   Table 2.7—The consideration of other firm-, environment-, and succession-
specific characteristics 
This table reports the results after controlling for another set of pre-succession firm-level, 
environmental, and succession-specific factors in the baseline regression models.  
 Family FamilyOrGuanxi 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables Coef. ME Coef. ME 
Foreign ownership t-1 -1.452** -0.264** 0.352 0.083 
 (0.776) (0.136) (0.487) (0.114) 
Same surname t-1 0.049*** 0.009*** -0.009 -0.002 
 (0.021) (0.004) (0.018) (0.004) 
Confucian centre 1.347** 0.245** 1.327** 0.311** 
 (0.547) (0.095) (0.546) (0.121) 
Returnee founder  -0.810 -0.147 -1.599** -0.375** 
 (0.888) (0.161) (0.764) (0.176) 
Political connection 0.620** 0.113** 0.607** 0.142** 
 (0.233) (0.043) (0.251) (0.056) 
Firm age t-1 -0.038 -0.007 0.052 0.012 
 (0.046) (0.008) (0.038) (0.009) 
Firm size t-1 0.002 0.000 0.186 0.044 
 (0.254) (0.046) (0.234) (0.055) 
Long-debt level t-1 -0.011 -0.002 -0.012 -0.003 
 (0.024) (0.004) (0.026) (0.006) 
Sales growth t-1 0.005*** 0.001*** -0.002** -0.000*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Business risk t-1 -10.192** -1.855** 8.572** 2.011** 
 (4.652) (0.856) (3.901) (0.864) 
Board ownership t-1 -0.030** -0.006** 0.014 0.003 
 (0.012) (0.002) (0.010) (0.002) 
Board independence t-1 0.060 0.011 -0.016 -0.004 
 (0.038) (0.007) (0.027) (0.006) 
Family control t-1 0.006 0.001 -0.003 -0.001 
 (0.011) (0.002) (0.012) (0.003) 
Prior average performance -0.135*** -0.025*** -0.073* -0.017* 
 (0.046) (0.008) (0.040) (0.009) 
Dividend payout t-1 -0.001 -0.000 -0.002 -0.000 
 (0.005) (0.001) (0.007) (0.002) 
Interest coverage t-1 0.969** 0.176*** 0.359 0.084 
 (0.386) (0.067) (0.343) (0.078) 
Nonfamily ownership t-1 0.048** 0.009** -0.037** -0.009** 
 (0.023) (0.004) (0.017) (0.004) 
State ownership t-1 1.023* 0.186** -0.594 -0.139 
 (0.522) (0.089) (0.466) (0.110) 
Institutional environment t-1 0.028 0.005 -0.087 -0.020 
 (0.090) (0.016) (0.098) (0.023) 
Industrial competition t-1 4.016 0.731 -2.183 -0.512 
 (3.437) (0.617) (2.769) (0.638) 
Founder age t 0.139*** 0.025*** 0.005 0.001 
 (0.040) (0.006) (0.023) (0.005) 
Early succession -1.038* -0.189* - - 
 (0.603) (0.114) - - 
Industry & year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 163 163 163 163 
Pseudo R2 0.459  0.330  
Firm-level clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level (two-tailed test), respectively. 
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Table 2.8—Two-stage regression analysis 
This table provides the results for the hypotheses via two-stage regressions. Panel A reports 
the results regarding the impact of Foreign ownership and Same surname on Family. In the 
panel, Columns (1) and (2) present the first-stage regression results with Foreign ownership 
and Same surname as the dependent variable, respectively. The instrument for Foreign 
ownership is Industry-province foreign firm, and that for Same surname is Rare surname. 
Column (3) presents the results for the second-stage regression, where Family is the dependent 
variable. The independent variables of interest in the column are Predicted (Foreign 
ownership) and Predicted (Same surname), i.e. the predicted values of the corresponding 
variables from the first-stage regressions. Panel B provides the results for the effect of 
Returnee founder and Political connection on FamilyOrGuanxi. Similar to the structure of 
Panel A, Returnee founder and Political connection are the dependent variables in Columns 
(1) and (2) of Panel B, respectively. Each of the variables has a corresponding instrument, i.e. 
Industry-province returnee and Industry-province SOE, respectively. FamilyOrGuanxi is the 
dependent variable in Column (3), where Predicted (Returnee founder) and Predicted 
(Returnee founder) are the predicted values of the corresponding variables from the first-stage 
regressions. All other control variables are the same as those in the baseline regression models. 
Panel A: Results for Foreign ownership and Same surname 
 Foreign ownership Same surname Family 
 1st Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Coef. Coef. Coef. 
Industry-province foreign firm t-1 0.079
*** 0.001  
 (0.017) (0.001)  
Rare surname -0.433 -0.048***  
 (0.325) (0.018)  
Predicted (Foreign ownership)   -1.882*** 
   (0.329) 
Predicted (Same surname)   0.080*** 
   (0.012) 
Confucian centre 0.886* 0.042** 0.538* 
 (0.470) (0.019) (0.305) 
Political connection 0.173 0.009 0.201 
 (0.127) (0.015) (0.132) 
Firm age t-1 -0.083
* 0.002 -0.049* 
 (0.049) (0.001) (0.025) 
Firm size t-1 0.427
* -0.004 0.190 
 (0.220) (0.009) (0.137) 
Long-debt level t-1 -0.024 -0.001 0.002 
 (0.031) (0.001) (0.016) 
Sales growth t-1 0.001 0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
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Table 2.8 continued 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Business risk t-1 1.427 -0.243
** -3.090 
 (2.638) (0.110) (2.862) 
Board ownership t-1 0.002 0.000 -0.007 
 (0.013) (0.000) (0.007) 
Board independence t-1 0.043 -0.001 0.010 
 (0.041) (0.001) (0.022) 
Family control t-1 -0.027
* 0.000 -0.015* 
 (0.015) (0.001) (0.008) 
Observations 171 171 171 
1st Stage F-statistics                    29.46***          16.26*** 
Stock-Yogo critical value for F-stat        8.68 (10% maximal size) 
Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic              15.56 
Stock-Yogo critical value for CD F-stat     7.03 (10% maximal size) 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test p-value      0.769   
 
Panel B: Results for Returnee founder and Political connection 
 Returnee founder Political 
connection 
FamilyOr
Guanxi 
 1st Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Coef. Coef. Coef. 
Industry-province returnee  0.380** 
(0.160) 
0.017 
(0.032) 
 
Industry-province SOE 0.021 
(0.029) 
0.008* 
(0.004) 
 
Predicted (Returnee founder)   -2.508***   
   (0.280)   
Predicted (Political connection)   0.486*** 
   (0.144) 
Firm age t-1 0.009 0.001 0.007 
 (0.079) (0.016) (0.024) 
Firm size t-1 0.214 0.302
*** 0.100 
 (0.483) (0.088) (0.141) 
Long-debt level t-1 -0.044 -0.017 0.018 
 (0.085) (0.011) (0.019) 
Sales growth t-1 -0.016 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.011) (0.000) (0.001) 
Business risk t-1 -12.171 0.062 0.306 
 (11.908) (1.083) (1.636) 
Board ownership t-1 -0.027 -0.004 0.002 
 (0.031) (0.004) (0.007) 
Board independence t-1 0.076 -0.009 -0.017 
 (0.068) (0.014) (0.021) 
Family control t-1 0.014 0.008 0.001 
 (0.018) (0.005) (0.009) 
Observations 171 171 171 
1st Stage F-statistics                    14.85***          14.58*** 
Stock-Yogo critical value for F-stat        8.68 (10% maximal size) 
Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic               7.15 
Stock-Yogo critical value for CD F-stat     7.03 (10% maximal size) 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test p-value           0.315    
***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level (two-tailed test), respectively. 
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Table 2.9—Additional analysis 
This table presents the results of the additional analyses. Strong institutional environment is a 
dummy equal to one if the firm’s headquartered province has an above-median value of 
Institutional environment one year before the succession and zero otherwise. Foreign 
ownership*Strong institution is the interaction term between Foreign ownership and Strong 
institutional environment. Nonfamily same surname is the percentage of nonfamily top 
executives in the firm sharing the founder’s surname for the year before the succession. 
Confucius temple is the number of the nationally famous Confucius temples in the firm’s 
headquartered province. Overseas length equals two if the founder has overseas work 
experience, one if the founder’s overseas experience is pure study experience, and zero if the 
founder does not have any overseas work or study experience. High marketisation is a 
dummy equal to one if the firm’s headquartered province has a high (above-median) degree 
of marketisation in terms of economic resource allocation for the year before the succession; 
otherwise, it equals zero. Political connection*High market is the interaction term between 
Political connection and High marketisation. Political type equals two if the founder has 
worked as a government official, one if the founder’s political identities are all about 
representatives of the NPC, CPPCC, or NCCPC, and zero if the founder does not have any 
political identities. Political rank equals five, four, three, two, and one if the founder’s 
highest-level political identity is at the national level, the sub-national level, the provincial 
level, the sub-provincial level, and the city-level, respectively. It equals zero if the founder 
does not have any political identities.  
 
 Family FamilyOrGuanxi 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
Foreign ownership t-1 -6.402
*** 0.143 0.771 0.646 
 (1.159) (0.574) (0.616) (0.585) 
Strong institutional environment t-1 -0.283    
 (0.347)    
Foreign ownership*Strong institution 5.251***    
 (1.245)    
Nonfamily same surname t-1 0.059
*** 0.012 0.018 0.017 
 (0.022) (0.023) (0.019) (0.022) 
Confucius temple  0.460*** 0.257** 0.310*** 
  (0.129) (0.115) (0.118) 
Overseas length  -1.922*** -1.134** -1.530*** 
  (0.532) (0.544) (0.512) 
Political connection 0.499** 1.549***   
 (0.223) (0.412)   
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Table 2.9 continued 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
High marketisation t-1  0.097 -0.410 -0.600
* 
  (0.419) (0.327) (0.322) 
Political connection*High market  -1.371***   
  (0.484)   
Political type   1.905**  
   (0.762)  
Political rank    0.212** 
    (0.101) 
Confucian centre 1.333***    
 (0.508)    
Returnee founder  -0.829    
 (0.848)    
Firm age t-1 -0.055 0.045 0.070 0.059 
 (0.044) (0.043) (0.042) (0.038) 
Firm size t-1 -0.030 0.397 0.387 0.248 
 (0.248) (0.311) (0.242) (0.245) 
Long-debt level t-1 -0.001 -0.002 -0.011 0.007 
 (0.023) (0.028) (0.028) (0.026) 
Sales growth t-1 0.004
*** -0.001 -0.002*** -0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Business risk t-1 -9.272
** 7.940** 9.978** 6.899** 
 (4.519) (3.953) (4.123) (3.472) 
Board ownership t-1 -0.031
** 0.019 0.024** 0.016 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) 
Board independence t-1 0.057 -0.005 -0.032 -0.031 
 (0.039) (0.029) (0.028) (0.027) 
Family control t-1 0.006 -0.014 -0.008 -0.006 
 (0.010) (0.013) (0.014) (0.012) 
Prior average performance -0.132*** -0.089** -0.082* -0.068* 
 (0.047) (0.044) (0.042) (0.037) 
Dividend payout t-1 -0.001 -0.003 -0.007 -0.003 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) 
Interest coverage t-1 1.016
*** 0.729* 0.516 0.481 
 (0.360) (0.389) (0.402) (0.352) 
Nonfamily ownership t-1 0.049
** -0.058*** -0.049*** -0.044** 
 (0.022) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) 
State ownership t-1 0.910
* -0.316 0.619 0.060 
 (0.503) (0.528) (0.496) (0.492) 
Industrial competition t-1 3.298 -1.693 -3.021 -1.501 
 (3.150) (2.917) (2.451) (2.675) 
Founder age t 0.155
*** 0.042* 0.035 0.035 
 (0.037) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Early succession -0.390 - - - 
 (0.556) - - - 
Industry & year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 163 163 163 163 
Pseudo R2 0.491 0.459 0.440 0.417 
Firm-level clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level (two-tailed test), respectively. 
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Table 2.10—The decomposition of FamilyOrGuanxi 
This table provides the result of a multinomial logistic regression. The base case is the 
nonfamily successors without a guanxi. In Column (1), the comparison is between family 
successors and non-guanxi successors, whilst in Columns (2), it is guanxi-connected 
successors compared with non-guanxi successors.  
 
 Family successors  Guanxi successors 
 Compared with non-guanxi successors 
 (1)  (2) 
Variables Coef.  Coef. 
Foreign ownership t-1 -1.629  1.646 
 (1.851)  (1.113) 
Same surname t-1 0.029  -0.058 
 (0.042)  (0.043) 
Confucian centre 4.176**  2.174* 
 (1.732)  (1.135) 
Returnee founder  -3.792**  -3.582* 
 (1.591)  (2.021) 
Political connection 2.087***  1.005** 
 (0.652)  (0.440) 
Firm age t-1 -0.047  0.069 
 (0.127)  (0.088) 
Firm size t-1 0.492  0.616 
 (0.572)  (0.507) 
Long-debt level t-1 -0.068  -0.032 
 (0.066)  (0.049) 
Sales growth t-1 0.006**  -0.009 
 (0.003)  (0.007) 
Business risk t-1 -2.260  18.098** 
 (10.916)  (7.528) 
Board ownership t-1 -0.034  0.045** 
 (0.027)  (0.021) 
Board independence t-1 0.087  -0.081 
 (0.071)  (0.054) 
Family control t-1 0.009  -0.012 
 (0.026)  (0.026) 
Prior average performance -0.409***  -0.120 
 (0.122)  (0.077) 
Dividend payout t-1 -0.004  -0.026 
 (0.013)  (0.018) 
Interest coverage t-1 2.144**  0.456 
 (0.940)  (0.742) 
Nonfamily ownership t-1 0.063  -0.097*** 
 (0.052)  (0.036) 
State ownership t-1 0.636  -1.647 
 (1.345)  (1.098) 
Institutional environment t-1 -0.153  -0.169 
 (0.263)  (0.243) 
Industrial competition t-1 4.841  -5.013 
 (7.924)  (4.722) 
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Table 2.10 continued 
 (1)  (2) 
Founder age t 0.276***  -0.047 
 (0.102)  (0.058) 
Early succession -18.060***  -16.945*** 
 (1.541)  (1.702) 
Retire 35.488***  0.633 
 (2.862)  (1.555) 
Industry & year dummies Yes  Yes 
Observations 163  163 
Pseudo R2 0.499  0.499 
Firm-level clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level (two-tailed test), respectively. 
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Table 2.11—Definitions of variables 
 
Variable Definition 
Family 
 
An indicator equal to 1 if the successor is the founder’s descendant, by 
blood or marriage, and 0 otherwise 
FamilyOrGuanxi 
 
 
An indicator equal to 1 if the successor is the founder’s descendant or 
a nonfamily member having a guanxi with the founder, and 0 
otherwise 
Foreign ownership t-1 
 
An indicator equal to 1 if the firm has foreign ownership in year t-1, 
and 0 otherwise 
Confucian centre 
 
An indicator equal to 1 if the firm is headquartered in a city with a 
Confucian centre, and 0 otherwise 
Confucius temple 
 
The number of Confucius temples in the firm’s headquartered 
province 
Same surname t-1 
 
The percentage of directors and top managers sharing the founder’s 
surname in the firm in year t-1 
Nonfamily same surname t-1 
 
The percentage of nonfamily directors and top managers sharing the 
founder’s surname in the firm in year t-1 
Returnee founder 
 
An indicator equal to 1 if the founder has studied or worked overseas 
before the succession, and 0 otherwise 
Overseas length 
 
 
 
An ordinal variable equal to 2 if the founder has overseas work 
experience, 1 if the founder’s overseas experience is pure study 
experience, and 0 if the founder does not have any overseas work or 
study experience 
Political connection The number of the founder’s political identities before the succession 
Political type 
 
 
 
An ordinal variable equal to 2 if the founder has worked as a 
government official, 1 if the founder’s political identities are all about 
representatives of the NPC, CPPCC, or NCCPC, and 0 if the founder 
does not have any political identities before the succession 
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Political rank 
 
 
 
An ordinal variable equal to 5, 4, 3, 2, and 1 if the founder’s highest-
level political identity is at the national level, the sub-national level, 
the provincial level, the sub-provincial level, and the city-level, 
respectively. It equals 0 if the founder does not have any political 
identities before the succession.  
Firm age t-1 The number of years since the firm's founding year to year t-1 
Firm size t-1 The natural logarithm of total assets in year t-1 
Long-debt level t-1 
 
Long-term debt / total assets in year t-1, where long-term debt is the 
borrowing with a maturity of more than 1 year 
Sales growth t-1 
 
The difference in total sales between year t-1 and year t-2 divided by 
total sales in year t-2 
Business risk t-1 
 
The standard deviation of ROA over the three years prior to the 
succession 
Board ownership t-1 Directors' ownership / total shares outstanding in year t-1 
Board independence t-1 
 
The proportion of independent directors among the board directors in 
year t-1 
Family ownership t-1 
 
 
 
The number of shares held by the family as a percentage of total shares 
outstanding in year t-1. If the family controls the firm indirectly 
through a pyramid structure, it is calculated as the product of the 
family’s ownership stakes along the control chain. 
Family control t-1 
 
 
The family’s votes as a percentage of total votes outstanding in year t-
1. If the family controls the firm through a pyramid structure, it is 
measured by the minimum voting stake along the control chain. 
Family divergence t-1 The difference between Family control t-1 and Family ownership t-1 
Prior average performance Pre-succession three years’ average ROA 
Dividend payout t-1 The dividend per share as a percentage of earning per share in year t-1 
Interest coverage t-1 
 
 
 
An indicator equals to 1 if the interest coverage ratio, calculated as 
earnings before interest and tax divided by the total interest payable on 
bonds and other contractual debt, is greater than 2 in year t-1, and 0 
otherwise 
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Nonfamily ownership t-1 
 
 
The number of shares held by nonfamily block-holders / total shares 
outstanding in year t-1, where block-holders are individuals or 
institutions holding at least 5% ownership 
State ownership t-1 State-owned shares／total shares outstanding in year t-1 
Institutional development t-1 
 
Fan et al.’s (2011) index of the market development levels of Chinese 
provinces in year t-1 
Strong institutional environment t-1 
 
An indicator equal to 1 if the firm’s headquartered province has an 
above-median value of Institutional environment t-1, and 0 otherwise 
Foreign ownership*Strong 
institution 
The interaction term between Foreign ownership t-1 and Strong 
institutional environment t-1 
High marketisation t-1 
 
 
 
 
An indicator equal to 1 if the firm’s headquartered province has an 
above-median marketisation level in terms of economic resource 
allocation in year t-1, and 0 otherwise. The measure of the 
marketisation degree is based on Fan et al.’s (2011) index, “the 
importance of the market in economic resource allocation”. 
Political connection*High market 
 
The interaction term between Political connection and High 
marketisation t-1 
Industrial competition t-1 
 
 
𝐻 = ∑ 𝑆𝑖
2𝑛
𝑖=1 , where Si is the market share of firm i (firm’s sales as a 
percentage of sales for the same industry), n is the number of firms in 
the industry 
Founder age t The age of the founder in year t 
Early succession 
 
An indicator equal to 1 if the founder leaves the leadership position 
before 65, and 0 otherwise 
Retire 
 
An indicator equal to 1 if the founder is reported to leave due to 
“retirement”, and 0 otherwise 
Industry-province foreign firm t-1 
 
The percentage of firms having foreign ownership in the family firm’s 
industry and province in year t-1 
Rare surname 
 
An indicator equal to 1 if the founder’s surname is not ranked among 
the top 20 Chinese surnames, and 0 otherwise 
Industry-province returnee 
 
The mean of the percentages of returnee Chairpersons and CEOs in the 
family firm’s industry and province for the years before the succession 
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Industry-province SOE 
 
The mean of the percentages of SOEs in the firm’s industry and 
province for the years before the succession 
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Chapter 3  Leadership succession and firm 
performance 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 has explored the determinants of the leadership successor in Chinese family 
firms. An important issue, in turn, arises: whether the leadership succession event and 
the choice of the successor have an impact on the firm’s financial performance. This 
is the research objective of this chapter.  
To understand the above issue thoroughly, the first research question I am interested 
in is what effect that leadership successions have on the family firms’ performance 
variation, compared with their counterparts which have always been managed by the 
founder and never experienced a succession. Some researchers have compared the 
performance of family firms under the founder’s management with that of firms under 
successors’ management (e.g., McConaughy et al., 1998; Anderson & Reeb; 2003a; 
Villalonga & Amit, 2006). Most of them find that the founders are generally more 
valuable than successors. My exploration is different from theirs in terms of the 
methodology and the research focus. Most of the above literature rely on purely cross-
sectional comparisons. However, this method may suffer from many endogeneity 
issues, which may adversely affect the validity of the results (Pérez-González, 2006; 
Bennedsen et al., 2007). Given this concern, in this chapter, I attempt to apply the 
nearest-neighbour propensity score matching (PSM) method together with a 
difference-in-differences (DID) analysis to explore the above issue. Apart from the 
alleviation of the endogeneity concern, another advantage of my approach is that it is 
more in line with my research interest. More specifically, the previous literature 
demonstrates that the founders averagely perform better than their successors. Yet I 
am interested in the performance change that a family firm may experience if its 
leadership is transferred from the founder to the successor, especially compared with 
their counterparts without a leadership transition. The extant cross-sectional studies 
should provide some clues on this issue, but the gap still needs to be empirically filled 
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for a thorough and accurate understanding of the dynamics of leadership succession in 
family firms.  
When facing the leadership transition issue, family business founders often struggle 
between appointing their descendants and unrelated agents as the successors. This is 
the second research issue dealt with in this chapter, i.e. whether family successors 
cause a significant change in firm performance, compared with their nonfamily 
counterparts. Most researchers interested in this issue find that firms with family 
successions experience a significant performance decline, compared with those 
appointing nonfamily successors. An obvious limitation is that those researchers limit 
their arguments to the impact of agency costs, stewardship (e.g., Pérez-González, 
2006; Bennedsen et al., 2007), or the transfer of specialised assets (e.g., Bennedsen et 
al., 2015), none of which pay any significant attention to the role of outside 
environment. However, based on the institution-based view, for all the explanations 
employed in the previous literature, their validity may vary across different contexts. 
In other words, those conjectures that have been widely proved in the prior research 
may not apply to China’s background. Therefore, to understand the above issue more 
accurately, in this chapter, I provide an in-depth theoretical analysis of how the 
effectiveness of the three prevailing theories in the literature, i.e. agency theory, 
stewardship theory, and the resource-based view, varies when embedding them into 
China’s unique institutional, cultural, and social context.  
As will be detailed later, agency and stewardship theorists hold contradicting 
perspectives on the family succession-firm performance relationship. However, the 
proponents of the resource-based view insist that the founders’ family members and 
highly trusted agents are appropriate successors, as only they have access to the 
founders’ specialised assets (Cabrera-Suárez et al., 2001; Lee et al., 2003). The 
specialised assets, as mentioned in the previous chapters, are viewed as the key source 
of family firms’ competitive advantages, and thus are critical to the firms’ sustained 
good performance and development (Bracci & Vagnoni, 2011; Bennedsen et al., 
2015; Xu et al., 2015). This motivates me to consider the impact that successors’ 
acquisition of the founders’ specialised assets may have on firm performance after the 
succession. A number of researchers have theoretically stressed the role of the 
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specialised assets in successions. However, they focus on either the relationship 
between the specialised assets and the successor decision (e.g., Lee et al., 2003; Royer 
et al., 2008; Xu et al., 2015) or the transfer process of the assets (e.g., Cabrera-Suárez 
et al., 2001; Steier, 2001). An obvious research void is that empirical evidence on the 
financial outcomes of the transfer of the assets is still lacking. A possible reason is 
that the founders’ specialised assets, i.e. their tacit knowledge and personal 
connections, are typically very private, informal, and intangible, and thus are difficult 
to observe by researchers. Given such a situation, in this chapter, I attempt to use one 
observable demographic characteristic of successors, i.e. their pre-succession internal 
work experience, as a proxy for their acquisition of the founders’ specialised assets. 
However, because the assets are private, distinctive, and very valuable, they are 
accessible only to the founder’s highly trusted members (Lee et al., 2003; Bracci & 
Vagnoni, 2011). In this case, I posit that, in China, the above proxy is applicable only 
to successors who are the founder’s family members or nonfamily members having a 
guanxi with the founder. Furthermore, because the specialised assets are critical to the 
firm’s sustained good performance, I hypothesise that family or guanxi-connected 
successors’ pre-succession internal work experience is significantly and positively 
related to firm performance, compared with other successors’ corresponding 
experience. 
At the same time, I also allow for the possibility that family or guanxi-connected 
successors’ pre-succession internal experience is not truly related to their acquisition 
of the specialised assets. I conjecture that, in this case, it should be those nonfamily 
successors, i.e. who do not have a guanxi with the founder, whose internal experience 
has a better impact on firm performance. This is because, the internal experience can 
also bring some general benefits, such as the obtainment of firm-specific resources 
and the familiarity with the business, which are available to all types of successors. 
Moreover, unlike family or guanxi-connected successors whose appointments are 
very likely due to nepotism or guanxi, the appointments of the successors who do not 
have a guanxi are very likely purely driven by their superior management or 
leadership skills. In this case, the latter should be more capable of efficiently utilising 
the preceding general benefits, which are associated with pre-succession internal 
experience, to improve firm performance.  
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As to my empirical results, firstly, I find that family firms having leadership 
successions do not experience a significant change in firm performance around the 
succession, compared with their counterparts without a succession during the same 
period. An appropriate explanation for this finding is that the positive impact of 
leadership successions in family businesses is cancelled out by the negative impact in 
China’s setting. It is worth noting that this finding is different from those observed in 
the cross-sectional comparisons between the founders and successors in western and 
developed contexts, as most of them find that the founders are related to higher firm 
value. According to my preceding discussion, this difference may be due to the 
differences in research focus and choice of the sample, or the potential endogeneity 
issues suffered by purely cross-sectional studies. In fact, my descriptive analysis 
shows that the pre-succession firm performance in the succession group is 
significantly lower than that in the non-succession group. This, to some extent, should 
imply that successors may take the blame for their lower performing predecessor if 
they are compared with the founders in non-succession firms through a cross-
sectional analysis. In this regard, the PSM method coupled with the DID analysis, 
which are used in this chapter, should be more appropriate for the comparison 
between the founders and successors, at least in China’s context.     
Moreover, I find that there is no significant difference in firm performance between 
family and nonfamily succession firms. This result suggests that the benefits of 
having a family successor may also be offset by the costs in the context of China. I 
contend this is because all the competing perspectives suggested by the relevant 
theories are sufficiently valid in China’s institutional, cultural, and social background. 
The result, again, is inconsistent with the previous literature conducted on developed 
economies.   
In addition, I demonstrate that family and guanxi-connected successors’ pre-
succession internal work experience has a significant and positive impact on firm 
performance after the succession, compared with other successors’ corresponding 
experience. This finding supports my posit that the above two types of successors’ 
internal work experience before the succession is highly related to their acquisition of 
the specialised assets, and thus greatly increases firm performance after the 
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succession. However, for the successors who do not have a guanxi with the founder, 
their corresponding experience may not be much helpful for the acquisition of the 
specialised assets, due to the founder’s lower trust towards them. This, in turn, also 
confirms that the founders’ personal specialised assets are indeed accessible only to 
their family members and highly trusted nonfamily members and are indeed critical to 
the firm’s sustained good performance. These perspectives have been widely accepted 
at the theoretical level (e.g., Lee et al., 2003; Royer et al., 2008; Bracci & Vagnoni, 
2011), yet never empirically tested in the extant literature.   
Moreover, after exploring family and guanxi-connected successors separately, I find 
that the positive impact of guanxi-connected successors’ pre-succession internal 
experience is larger and more significant. This is interesting, as the founders’ 
descendants have always been viewed as the most appropriate candidates to inherit 
the specialised assets (e.g., Cabrera-Suárez et al., 2001; Bennedsen et al., 2015; Xu et 
al., 2015). I contend this is because the descendants in China tend to have fewer 
incentives to acquire the specialised assets. More specifically, Chinese parents 
typically have very strong unidirectional altruism to their children, which may cause 
the descendants’ immoderate reliance on the founder. In addition, China’s one-child 
policy means that many family successors do not have competition with their siblings, 
which may aggregate the successors’ free-riding consciousness. As a result, 
descendants may have fewer motivations to actively learn the founder’s tacit 
knowledge or transfer the founder’s personal connections to themselves. This is 
because the transfer process is usually long, arduous, and costly (Bracci & Vagnoni, 
2011). However, nonfamily successors should have much stronger incentives to 
acquire the specialised assets. This is because, for the successors, the assets should 
contribute to the increase in their compensation, the consolidation of their position in 
the family business, and their future career if they leave the family firm.  
Furthermore, I find that the preceding result, i.e. family and guanxi-connected 
successors’ pre-succession internal experience has a significant and positive effect on 
firm performance, is still valid when the successors have a similar learning ability to 
nonfamily successors without a guanxi. This confirms that these successors’ 
differences in the obtainment of the specialised assets are not caused by the potential 
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difference in their learning ability. Moreover, after decomposing successors’ internal 
work experience into the managerial and non-managerial experience, the results 
indicate that the positive effect of family and guanxi-connected successors’ pre-
succession internal experience is mainly derived from the managerial experience 
rather than non-managerial working time. This suggests that it is the experience of 
being directors or top managers in the firm that helps the successor to acquire the 
specialised assets before the succession. I contend that this is because the internal 
managerial experience provides successors with the opportunities crucial for their 
final assimilation of the specialised assets. Specifically, through the internal 
managerial experience, the successors can directly and gradually practise the 
management and leadership skills observed from the founder, personally build 
relationships with the founder’s important business connections, as well as keep in 
continuous and direct touch with the founder. However, all these opportunities are 
much less attainable via plain non-managerial experience in the family business.  
Finally, I find that the more guanxi identities that a successor possesses, the larger 
positive impact that the successor’s pre-succession internal experience has on firm 
performance. This finding supports my conjecture that the closer the guanxi between 
the founder and the successor, the more trustworthy is the successor for the founder, 
and the more specialised assets the successor can get access to and acquire through 
the pre-succession internal experience. In other words, successors’ acquisition of the 
specialised assets not only is contingent on whether the successors are trustworthy for 
the founder but also is contingent upon how strong they are trusted by the founder.  
This chapter makes several contributions to the literature. Firstly, it complements the 
literature on the leadership succession-firm performance relationship by exploring the 
potential difference in performance change between family firms experiencing 
leadership successions and those remaining under the leadership of the founder. The 
previous research has investigated the difference in the average performance between 
successor-managed and founder-managed firms (e.g., Anderson & Reeb, 2003a; 
Villalonga & Amit, 2006). However, a dynamic comparison between these two types 
of firms, i.e. whether the former’s leadership transitions cause a significant 
performance change, compared with the latter’s usual performance variation during 
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the same period, appears to be overlooked. My study fills this empirical research gap, 
and thus helps the readers to understand the dynamics of leadership successions more 
comprehensively and more accurately.  
In addition, this chapter sheds light on the role of institutions and culture in the 
investigation of family firms’ leadership succession issues. Specifically, I elaborately 
analyse how China’s institutional and cultural characteristics affect the efficacy of 
agency theory, stewardship theory, and the resource-based view in exploring the 
family management/succession-firm performance relationship. My evidence indicates 
that family and nonfamily successors do not have a significantly different impact on 
firm performance in China, which is different from the finding widely observed in 
developed economies. This provides support for the institution-based view, which 
suggests that evidence in one context is not replicable in other contexts. The evidence 
also shows the importance for researchers to consider the applicability of their 
theoretical arguments when applying them to different contexts, especially applying 
the arguments that have been widely proved for the case of developed countries to 
solve questions in emerging or developing economies. This implication is not limited 
to studies on family businesses, but also research in other areas. It also lends support 
to the call for the exploration of family businesses’ succession issues in emerging and 
developing countries, as the findings may be different from those obtained in western 
and developed contexts.   
Moreover, to the best of my knowledge, this chapter is the first study attempting to 
apply successors’ pre-succession internal experience as a proxy for their acquisition 
of the founders’ specialised assets and explore the impact of the acquisition on firm 
performance. There is some research regarding the relationship between managers’ 
work experience and firm performance (e.g., Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Goll et al., 
2001; Peni, 2014). However, none of the research focuses on family business 
successors, let alone linking their internal experience to their acquisition of the 
founders’ specialised assets. In this regard, my study provides a novel and interesting 
viewpoint to look at managers’ tenures in the firm, especially for researchers 
interested in managers in family businesses, i.e. the tenures may be related to the 
managers’ acquisition of the founder’s specialised assets. Moreover, by using the 
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above proxy, this study provides initial evidence on issues such as whether the 
founders’ specialised assets are accessible only to family and highly trusted nonfamily 
successors, and whether the successors’ acquisition of the assets contributes to firm 
performance. These issues have been widely discussed in theory in the extant 
literature (e.g., Cabrera-Suárez et al., 2001; Lee et al., 2003; Bracci & Vagnoni, 
2011), yet have never been empirically examined. As a result, my study enriches the 
literature on both the specialised assets in family businesses and the manager 
demographics-firm performance relationship.  
Furthermore, following Chapter 2, this chapter sheds new light on the role of 
nonfamily successors having a guanxi with the founder. I posit that in China’s cultural 
context, these successors are often viewed as friends or even quasi-family members 
by the founder. Therefore, their role in family businesses, especially in terms of the 
acquisition of the founder’s specialised assets, may be similar to family successors. 
My evidence supports this posit by showing that both family and guanxi-connected 
successors can acquire the founders’ specialised assets and can use the assets to 
improve firm performance after the succession. This, in practice, should provide some 
suggestions to family business founders regarding their successor selections. For 
example, if the founders intend to preserve their specialised assets in the business 
after their retirement, but their descendants are not willing to inherit the business, 
those senior top executives having a guanxi with them may be appropriate choices. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the relevant 
theories and their appropriateness in China’s setting. Section 3.3 provides the 
literature review. Section 3.4 develops the hypotheses. Section 3.5 describes the data 
collection and research design, Section 3.6 provides the empirical results, and Section 
3.7 concludes. 
3.2 Theories on family management issues 
This section introduces the main theories employed in the prior literature, i.e. agency 
theory, stewardship theory, the resource-based view, and the institution-based view, 
regarding their perspectives on the family management-firm performance relationship 
and the appropriateness of the perspectives in China’s setting. This helps to provide 
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the theoretical foundations for the hypothesis development and the discussion of 
empirical results in subsequent chapters.  
3.2.1 Agency theory  
Among mainstream management researchers, agency theory is the dominant 
theoretical framework for explaining and understanding the relationship between 
owners and managers. According to Chua et al. (2003), this theory is based on the 
assumption that managers who are not owners may not watch over the affairs of a 
firm as diligently as owners managing the firm themselves. Ross (1973) formalises 
such a conflict of interests between owners and managers, arising from the separation 
of ownership and management, as the Principal-Agent (PA) problem. Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) coin the phrase “agency costs” to represent the costs of all activities 
and operating systems designed to align the interests and actions of the managers 
(agents) with the interests of the owners (principals).  
Agency theorists argue that the agency costs can be greatly mitigated in family firms, 
where the key manager is the owner or a family member of the owner. In that case, 
the interest of owners and that of managers should be highly congruent (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Chua et al., 2003). As a result, family 
managers have more incentives to dutifully manage the firm, reduce excessive perks, 
and thus improve firm performance (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Anderson & Reeb, 
2003a; Jiang & Peng, 2011).  
Apart from the misalignment of personal interests, there also exists information 
asymmetry problem in the general PA relationship. This problem may also generate 
large agency costs of the firm owners if they would like to effectively monitor and 
discipline the agents (Cai et al., 2012). However, this issue can also be largely 
moderated in family firms, if the manager is the owner per se or the family member of 
the owner (Jiang & Peng, 2011; Liu et al., 2012).  
Based on the above discussion, it can be argued that from the perspective of agency 
theory, family managers are beneficial to firm performance, as they tend to have 
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highly aligned interests and low information asymmetry problems with the firm 
owner. 
However, Schulze et al. (2001, 2003) cast doubts on whether the above will always be 
the case. They contend that the situation may be different if the family manager is a 
descendant of the business founder. This is because the benefit of having family 
managers in reducing the agency costs may be offset by certain countering factors. 
More specifically, altruism pervades most families (Dyer, 2006) and parents are often 
asymmetrically altruistic to their children (Schulze et al., 2001, 2003). As a result, 
family business founders are likely to appoint their descendants as the managers in the 
firm, even if the descendants may be unqualified or incompetent compared with 
nonfamily agents (Schulze et al., 2003). In this case, once the descendants are on the 
job, the firm value may be destroyed (Jiang & Peng, 2011). Even worse, the founders’ 
unidirectional altruism may result in their inability to effectively monitor and 
discipline underperforming descendants, which will further harm firm performance 
(Schulze et al., 2003). Moreover, for the descendant-managers, the founders’ 
unreciprocated altruism may encourage their free-riding, shirking, and other forms of 
opportunistic behaviours (Schulze et al., 2003), as their positions will not be 
threatened even if they are unqualified or underperformed. The opportunistic 
behaviours, in turn, may undermine firm performance. Consequently, the higher the 
level of family business founders’ altruism, the higher the risk that they may spoil 
their descendants (Jiang & Peng, 2011). As a result, if the founders appoint their 
descendants as the key managers of the firm, the benefit from having family managers 
in terms of agency costs reduction may be offset by the founders’ unidirectional 
altruism to the offspring.  
In conclusion, based on agency theory, the classic PA problem should be reduced 
greatly if the business founders own and manage the firm, yet the advantages of 
having family managers may decrease largely if the managers are the founders’ 
descendants.  
However and also in line with agency theory, there is another type of agency problem 
prevalent in family firms, i.e. the Principal-Principal (PP) problem (Dharwadkar et al., 
2000; Yoshikawa et al., 2005; Su et al., 2008; Young et al., 2008; Jiang & Peng, 
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2011; Cai et al., 2012). This problem refers to the conflict of interests between the 
large and minority shareholders. More specifically, in family firms, especially those 
in emerging economies, family owners often control the firm with relatively low 
ownership through control-enhancing mechanisms such as pyramid structures, cross-
holdings, and dual-class shares (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Claessens et al., 2000; 
Mork et al., 2005; Adams & Ferreira, 2008; Peng & Jiang, 2010; Jiang & Peng, 
2011). In other words, family owners commonly hold control in excess of their 
ownership in the firm. Agency theorists argue that such a divergence between family 
control and family ownership increases the incentives and ability of the controlling 
family to extract private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1997; La Porta et al., 2000; Su et al., 2008; Jiang & Peng, 2011). This is 
because control in excess of ownership rights enables the family to carry out the 
expropriation with enough control but at the same time reduces the costs of the 
expropriation due to the family’s relatively low ownership (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; 
Lemmon & Lins, 2003; Morck et al., 2005; Young et al., 2008; Peng & Jiang, 2010; 
Luo et al., 2012a). In this regard, family managers are very likely to help the 
controlling family carry out the expropriation (Cai et al., 2012). With family 
managers in charge, family owners are also more likely to undertake unfair 
transactions or investment, which can privately benefit the family but reduce the 
payout to nonfamily shareholders (McConnell & Servaes, 1990; Villalonga & Amit, 
2006; Jiang & Peng, 2011). In addition, family managers may aggravate information 
asymmetry problems between the controlling family and nonfamily minority 
shareholders, which may also facilitate the family to extract private benefits at the 
expense of the minority shareholders (Lemmon & Lins, 2003; Peng & Jiang, 2010; 
Liu et al., 2012).  
Generally speaking, drawing on the PP perspective of agency theory, a conflict of 
interests exists between family and nonfamily shareholders in family businesses. 
Additionally, family management may exacerbate such a conflict and damage the 
firm performance as a whole. Moreover, compared with the business founders, the 
descendants of the founders may be more concerned about their private welfare, thus 
being more likely to expropriate minority shareholders (Villalonga & Amit, 2006). 
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Given the above discussion, there may not be a consistent answer as to family 
managers’ effects, especially descendant-managers’ effects, on firm performance, if 
researchers view the issue on the basis of agency theory.  
3.2.2 Stewardship theory  
Stewardship theory is often discussed together with agency theory in the exploration 
of the family management-performance relationship. Different from agency theory 
with the premise that owners and managers are self-interested, stewardship theory 
advocates that owners and managers are driven by more than economic self-interest 
(Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2006). Specifically, stewardship proponents contend that 
many firm owners and managers actually wish to make a contribution to the firm’s 
mission, longevity, and stakeholders (Davis et al., 1997, 2000). This stewardship 
attitude is prominently reflected by family business owners and family managers 
(Bubolz, 2001). Researchers contend that managers who are “insiders”- whose names 
are closely linked with the business and whose personal satisfaction, family fortune, 
and public reputation are tied to the business, may act as especially solicitous 
stewards of the business (Bubolz, 2001; Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2005). In this 
case, family owners and managers should identify strongly with the firm and view the 
firm performance as an extension of their well-being (Davis et al., 1997). This 
attitude, in turn, may motivate their lifelong commitment to the firm, assiduous 
management of organisational resources, and a host of competency creating 
investments (Davis et al., 1997). In addition, family stewards are more likely to have 
long-term and non-monetary rewards associated with the firm’s success, compared 
with nonfamily managers (Davis et al., 1997). All these factors can engender far-
sighted contributions and superior financial returns to the business.  
However, strong stewardship attitude may also negatively affect firm performance 
(Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996). Specifically, family owners and managers may view 
their firms as personal fiefdoms. Because of their strong controlling power, they have 
the discretion to act or to resist acting, without board or top team intervention. This 
may lead to risky decisions, lengthy tenures and strategic stagnation, all of which may 
be hazardous to the firm performance.  
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In addition, as Liu et al. (2012) argue, the sense of stewardship to the business may be 
different between family business founders and their descendants. According to 
Villalonga and Amit (2010), the founders are those people who set up the company 
and are responsible for its early growth and development. They devote most of their 
wealth, time, and energy to run the business from scratch to success. In this case, the 
founders tend to have the deepest and most considerable emotional attachment to the 
business. Their long tenure and central positions in the firm also encourage them to 
exert great commitment and motivation to the firm’s operations (McConaughy, 2000). 
Thus, the founders’ stewardship sense should be the strongest, and their management 
should aim at the wealth and success of the whole company. However, the founders’ 
descendants neither invest most of their personal wealth in the business nor 
participate in the earliest setting up and operations of the firm which should be the 
hardest phase for a business. In this case, the descendants’ emotional attachment to 
the firm should be much less than that of the founders, and thus is their stewardship 
awareness. As Anderson et al. (2002) argue, descendant-CEOs tend to have less sense 
of stewardship to the business and lack the motivation, commitment, and incentive to 
sustain it. 
Drawing on the above discussion, the impact of family management on firm 
performance should also be inconclusive from the viewpoint of stewardship theory, 
and the answer should be more complicated if the family manager is a descendant of 
the founder.   
3.2.3 The resource-based view 
Unlike agency and stewardship theorists framing the relationship between family 
management and firm performance from the angle of managers’ personal incentives, 
the resource-based view advocates a different perspective.  
The resource-based view was originally developed in the strategic management field 
and often used to study the competitive advantages of a firm (Huybrechts et al., 
2011). According to the resource-based theorists (e.g., Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt, 
1984; Barney, 1991; Grant, 1991; Peteraf, 1993), every firm can be seen as a unique 
bundle of resources. The resources can normally be classified into three categories, 
Chapter 3 - Leadership succession and firm performance 
 98 
i.e. physical capital resources, human capital resources, and organisational capital 
resources. The first category corresponds to tangible resources, while the latter two 
are intangible by nature (Michalisin et al., 1997). Tangible resources are concrete and 
usually include resources such as materials and land (Haanes & Fjeldstad, 2000). 
Intangible resources, however, are immaterial and mostly tacit (Villalonga, 2000; 
Carmeli, 2004). Barney (1991) argues that resources are often asymmetrically 
distributed among competing firms and are not perfectly mobile. Valuable resources 
for a firm are often those resources that can enhance the firm’s financial performance 
and at the same time are not used by other firms. Such resources shape a firm’s 
competitive advantages. Moreover, for the sustainability of the competitive 
advantages, valuable resources should be imperfectly imitable, i.e. they cannot be 
copied by other firms. In this sense, a firm’s intangible resources are usually the so-
called valuable resources and lie at the heart of the firm’s competitive advantages, as 
the resources are immaterial, distinctive, and hard-to-duplicate (Penrose, 1959; 
Prahalad & Hamel, 1990; Barney, 1991; Michalisin et al., 1997). 
Moreover, to perform well, a firm needs more than its bundle of resources (Cabrera-
Suárez et al., 2001). The knowledge to efficiently deploy, coordinate, and utilise those 
resources, and in turn, lead them to the final profits of the firm, is also important. A 
firm’s knowledge is often divided into two categories, i.e. explicit and tacit 
knowledge (Polanyi, 1966; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995; Tsoukas, 1996; Nonaka & 
Konno, 1998). The explicit knowledge is that which can be formalised and transferred 
by way of a systematised language or code, and there is no need to link the knowledge 
to a very specific context for it to be meaningful. In this sense, firms’ certain 
information, such as internal and external statistics, product descriptions, and so on, 
can be seen as explicit knowledge due to the easy transferability of the information. 
However, tacit knowledge refers to the kind of knowledge that can hardly be 
expressed or formalised – as Teece (1998) remarks, “we know more than we can tell.” 
In addition, tacit knowledge appears and develops through the interaction of 
individuals with situations, thus being context specific. Moreover, similar to 
intangible resources, tacit knowledge is often viewed as scarce, idiosyncratic, hard to 
imitate and transfer through individual or organisation boundary, thus being specific 
to the firm (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995; Bierly & Chakrabarti, 1996; Spender, 1996; 
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Teece, 1998). Furthermore, tacit knowledge is that which can transfer a firm’s 
valuable resources to real profits, thus also being a key source of the firm’s 
competitive advantages and critical to its sustained good performance.    
In family businesses, as many researchers agree, the valuable resources and 
knowledge are often individual specific rather than firm specific. Moreover, most of 
the resources and knowledge are derived from the owner-manager of the business, i.e. 
the founder (Cabrera-Suárez et al., 2001; Lee et al., 2003; Royer et al., 2008; Bracci 
& Vagnoni, 2011; Huybrechts et al., 2011; Fan et al., 2012). Different researchers 
have different ideas about the components of the founders’ tacit knowledge. For 
example, Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) contend that the tacit knowledge includes the 
founders’ mental schemes, beliefs, and insights, which are crucial to perceiving and 
defining the environment, as well as their ability, know-how, and skills to perform 
tasks. Lee et al. (2003) suggest that the founders’ tacit knowledge consists of their 
ability to motivate employees to cooperate and the knowledge about local conditions 
and internal processes in the firm. Bracci and Vagnoni (2011) define the knowledge 
as work-related competencies, owner-managerial spirit, and values. Fan et al. (2008), 
Fan et al. (2012), and Bennedsen et al. (2015) contend that the founders’ specialised 
assets refer to their values, reputation, and abilities to lower transaction costs with 
various stakeholders. As to the valuable resources, most researchers define them as 
the founders’ personal social networks with business partners, employees, suppliers, 
customers, lenders, and investors, as well as political connections with regulators and 
governments (Steier, 2001; Lee et al., 2003; Fan et al., 2008; Bracci & Vagnoni, 
2011; Fan et al., 2012; Bennedsen et al., 2015; Xu et al., 2015). No matter which 
definition they employ, the researchers have reached a consensus, that the founders’ 
personal valuable resources and knowledge, termed as specialised assets, shape the 
firm’s competitive advantages and are critical to its success. Therefore, for family 
firms experiencing or about to experience a leadership succession, one of the key 
issues is whether the founders’ specialised assets can be successfully transferred to 
successors, as those assets are the key for the firm to sustain its competitive 
distinctiveness, longevity and development after the succession.  
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Researchers suggest the time spent together and the quality of the relationship 
between the source of the specialised assets and the recipient are the two main 
antecedents in the transfer of the assets (e.g., Hansen, 1999; Bracci & Vagnoni, 2011). 
More specifically, the longer time that the recipient (the successor) spent with the 
source (the founder), the longer time and more opportunities that the former can have 
to get exposed to, learn, and ultimately acquire the assets. In addition, the stronger 
and more intimate is the relationship between the founder and the successor, the more 
likely it is that the founder will be willing to expose his or her specialised assets to the 
successor, and thus the more effective will be the transfer process. Considering these 
conditions, the proponents of the resource-based view widely accept that family 
business founders’ personal specialised assets are accessible only to their family 
members and nonfamily members who are highly trusted by them (Cabrera-Suárez et 
al., 2001; Steier, 2001; Lee et al., 2003; Fan et al., 2008; Royer et al., 2008; Bracci & 
Vagnoni, 2011; Fan et al., 2012; Bennedsen et al., 2015; Xu et al., 2015). As a result, 
family successors and nonfamily successors who are highly trustworthy for the 
founder are deemed to be conducive to firm performance from the resource-based of 
view.   
To summarise, the resource-based view suggests that the most valuable resources and 
knowledge in family businesses are their founders’ individual tacit knowledge and 
social connections. These specialised assets are the basis of the firm’s competitive 
advantages, and thus are vital to its financial performance. Moreover, successors who 
are the founder’s family members or highly trusted nonfamily members should be 
beneficial to firm performance, as only they have access to the specialised assets. 
Furthermore, successors’ acquisition of the assets is crucial to the firm’s survival and 
development after the succession.  
3.2.4 The institution-based view 
As discussed above, agency theory, stewardship theory and the resource-based view 
are three predominant theories used to interpret the family management-firm 
performance relationship. However, some researchers argue that, all these prevalent 
perspectives limit their focus to the effects of agency costs, stewardship sense or 
specialised resources, while paying little attention to the role of external institutions in 
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conditioning managers’ behaviour (Miller & Shamsie, 1996; Oliver, 1997; Priem & 
Butler, 2001; Meyer & Peng, 2005; Liu et al., 2012). These researchers are called 
institution-based view theorists, as they emphasise the embeddedness of family 
business in its institutional environment. As they argue, institutions are the rules of 
the game in a society, or more formally, the devised constraints that shape human 
interaction (North, 1990). Specifically, it is the institutional arrangements or a set of 
fundamental political, social, and legal rules shaping the strategic behaviours and 
outcomes of firms across institutions (North, 1990).56 In this sense, family business 
managers’ behaviour and impact on firm performance may vary across different 
institutional environments (Steier, 2009). In this case, the validity of the 
aforementioned perspectives, i.e. those from agency theory, stewardship theory, and 
the resource-based view, may vary across different institutional settings.  
For example, in emerging economies without effective investor protection, nonfamily 
managers should have more opportunities to engage in self-interested behaviours 
(Burkart et al., 2003), while family managers are also more likely to expropriate 
minority shareholders’ interests (Peng & Jiang, 2010). Additionally, without strong 
institutions, the appointment of family successors due to altruism and nepotism is 
more likely to happen, and family owners’ monitoring of the successors may be much 
less effective. This, in turn, may lead to the successors’ opportunistic and free-riding 
behaviours (Liu et al., 2012). In other words, both the PA and PP agency problems 
from agency theory may be more rampant in an inefficient institutional environment. 
However, for family firms in countries with efficient institutional systems, which can 
prevent managerial opportunism, nonfamily managers should be optimal (Burkart et 
al., 2003; Peng & Jiang, 2010).  
In addition, the validity of the resource-based view may also be subject to different 
institutional contexts. For example, in economies with developed institutions, such as 
the US and the UK, firms tend to have easy access to institutional resources (Klapper 
& Love, 2004; Carney et al., 2009). While in those countries with institutional 
                                               
56 For example, legal institutions, such as corporate laws, regulate the internal relationships of firms and their 
relationships with shareholders and provide legal and regulatory regimes for corporate operation. Economic 
institutions, such as the infrastructure for capital distribution, influence firms’ access to resources and their 
operational costs in the market. Political institutions help establish a stable social structure facilitating economic 
exchanges among firms (North, 1990).  
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deficiencies, such as many Asian countries, it should be very difficult for family firms 
to get resources through limited formal channels, such as labour markets and banks. 
As a result, family firms in those countries have to heavily rely on their informal and 
private networks to obtain resources, such as valuable information, financial capital 
and business opportunities (Sirmon & Hitt, 2003; Dyer, 2006; Arregle et al., 2007). 
Moreover, weak institutional environment usually comes along with inefficient 
external labour market, which may cause family firms to heavily lean upon their 
internal management skills and competencies, rather than resorting to outside 
professionals. In this case, family successors or the founders’ highly trusted 
nonfamily successors should be more beneficial to the business, as only they have 
access to the founders’ tacit knowledge and social network resources.  
To summarise, the preceding four theories discuss the family management-firm 
performance relationship from different angles. Specifically, agency theory and 
stewardship theory analyse the effect of family managers in terms of their personal 
incentives, the resource-based view focuses on the resource and knowledge 
inheritance, and the institution-based view emphasises the role of external institutions 
in affecting the validity of the above three theories. However, except for the resource-
based view explicitly identifying the positive impact of family successors and their 
nonfamily counterparts highly trusted by the founder, all the other theories reach no 
consensus on whether family successions are conclusively beneficial to firm 
performance relative to nonfamily successions. Moreover, the answer may become 
more ambiguous, when the comparison is between family and nonfamily successors 
and is embedded in different institutional contexts. Given such a situation, it should 
be important for researchers to reconcile the mixed perspectives in a specific context, 
if they would like to understand the relationship between family management, 
especially family successions, and firm performance accurately and thoroughly. This 
should be more important for researchers interested in family firms in emerging 
economies, as the findings may be inconsistent with the conjectures that have been 
verified in developed contexts.  
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Therefore, in the following section, I provide an in-depth analysis of the 
appropriateness of the preceding theories in China’s institutional, social, and cultural 
setting.  
3.2.5 Theories in China’s setting 
Even though China is one of the largest and fastest-growing emerging countries, its 
institutional environment, just like that of other emerging economies, is much weaker 
than that of developed countries (Allen et al., 2005; Cai et al., 2012). For example, 
China is generally below average by most measures of the rule of law, legal 
enforcement, and governance quality, and is one of the most corrupt countries in the 
world (Allen et al., 2005). In such a background, as previously discussed, nonfamily 
managers may be more deceptive, opportunistic, and self-interested (Burkart et al., 
2003; Zhang & Ma, 2009). In addition, China is featured with an underdeveloped 
managerial labour market and the culture of familism with a low degree of trust 
outside of kinship. These features, as Xu et al. (2015) argue, may exacerbate the 
conflicts between family business owners and nonfamily managers. 
However, given the absence of efficient shareholder protection, the controlling family 
may have strong incentives to extract private benefits at the sacrifice of minority 
shareholders’ interests. In this regard, the existence of family managers undoubtedly 
will aggravate the expropriation from the controlling family (Lemmon & Lins, 2003; 
Peng & Jiang, 2010; Liu et al., 2012).  
Therefore, both the PA and PP agency problems derived from agency theory may be 
severe in China. 
Moreover, as discussed before, if a family manager is the business founder’s 
descendant rather than the founder per se, the benefit associated with family 
management, i.e. the agency costs reduction, may be offset by the founder’s 
unidirectional altruism to the successor and the successor’s potential incapability. 
This problem may be more pronounced in China’s cultural and political context. 
Firstly, China is a family-based society, and the most important component of 
Chinese traditional culture is "familism" (Lee, 1996; Lu, 2003). In this background, 
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altruism, especially parents’ altruism to their children, prevails (Wei & Chen, 2015). 
As a result, Chinese family business founders are typically more likely to appoint 
their descendants as managers or successors, even if the descendants are unqualified 
and incompetent to get the position. Other issues coupled with the unidirectional 
altruism, such as the founders’ inability to effectively monitor and discipline 
descendants and descendants’ free-riding behaviours, should also be more serious in 
Chinese family firms. In addition, family successors are often less capable than 
nonfamily agents, as the former is selected from a small pool of talents within the 
family (Pérez-González, 2006). This situation should also be more prevalent in China, 
because the talent pool is largely restricted by China’s one-child policy. Specifically, 
unlike family business founders in other countries who typically have a relatively 
large pool of heirs for family successions, the founders in China often have little 
choice but to appoint their single child as the successor, if they prefer to keep the 
control over the firm within the family. In this regard, unqualified family successors 
should be more pervasive in Chinese family businesses. Moreover, family successors 
in China are more likely to behave opportunistically, as their positions will not be 
threatened by siblings even if they are underperformed. All these costs will 
unquestionably offset the benefits of having a family successor.  
In light of the above discussion, if embedding agency theory into China’s institutional 
and cultural environment, both the advantages and disadvantages of having a family 
successor will be significant.   
As previously discussed, stewardship theory is another popular perspective for 
understanding family managers’ behaviour. According to Davis et al. (1997), people 
in a collectivist culture are more likely to develop a principal-steward relationship 
than those in an individualistic culture. In this sense, family managers’ stewardship 
sense towards the business should be much stronger in China, where collectivism and 
familism have been deeply rooted in people’s cognitions and values (Yan & 
Sorenson, 2006). In this respect, having family managers should be more valuable in 
China.  
However, strong stewardship sense may also generate costs. For example, family 
managers in China are very likely to view the company as their family wealth or 
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personal fiefdom. As a result, they are easy to become the dictator in the company and 
make decisions without considering the board’s or top team’s suggestions. This may 
lead to risky decisions, lengthy tenures, and strategic stagnation, all of which may 
jeopardise firm performance.  
In summary, the effectiveness of stewardship theory should be stronger in China’s 
cultural context. However, the impact of family successors on firm performance is 
still inconclusive, as strong stewardship sense will generate both benefits and costs.  
Finally, China’s social and cultural context may also enhance the validity of the 
resource-based view. More specifically, despite the rapid growth and great 
contributions to the economy, family firms have long suffered political, financial, and 
social discrimination in China (Chen et al., 2013c). This is because, in China, the 
majority of economic resources, such as materials, land, and financial capital, are 
dominated by the government. As a consequence, most of the resources have flowed 
into SOEs rather than private enterprises such as family firms (Allen et al., 2005; Fan 
et al., 2008; Li et al., 2008). In addition, as family firms are usually smaller, younger 
and lack political support relative to SOEs, they are much riskier in the eyes of most 
investors. Therefore, Chinese family firms often suffer discrimination not only 
regarding policy and resource distribution but also regarding financing, investments, 
business cooperation and operations. Under these circumstances, Chinese family 
firms have to primarily rely on their specialised assets, such as reputation and social 
network resources, to obtain external finance, investment, and business opportunities 
(Allen et al., 2005).57 In other words, being affected by the preceding political, 
financial, and social discrimination, firms’ specialised assets are much more 
important for family businesses in China.  
As mentioned above, the resource-based view proponents suggest that the specialised 
assets are mainly derived from the business founders and accessible only to the 
founders’ family members or highly trustworthy agents. This perspective should also 
apply to China’s setting. This is because, as discussed in the previous chapter, the 
                                               
57 For example, reputation can help family firms win trust from various stakeholders and obtain lower transaction 
costs (Klein & Leffier, 1981). Social network resources, such as political connections, contribute to better access 
to financing (Li et al., 2008), the obtainment of government subsidies, the reduction of charges (Chen et al., 2011), 
and gaining government contracts as well as favourable legislation (Bertrand & Schoar, 2006). 
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Confucian familism makes Chinese people generally have a low level of social trust 
outside of kinship (Zhang & Ma, 2009; Xu et al., 2015). In this background, the 
founders are much more likely to transfer their personal specialised assets to family 
members rather than nonfamily agents.  
However, apart from familism, the Confucian guanxi culture has also long affected 
Chinese people’s cognitions and behaviour (Jacobs et al., 1995; Luo et al., 2012b). As 
a result, even though Chinese people are low in general trust in persons who are not 
their families, they tend to be high in particular trust in those who are guanxi-
connected with them (Redding, 1993; Fukuyama, 1995; Gudykunst et al., 1996). 
Moreover, the trust in a guanxi usually involves strongly affective factors, i.e. the 
guanxi parties trust in each other like friends or even family members (Tan & Chee, 
2005; Bedford, 2011). Such a culture has also exerted a prominent influence on  
Chinese family business founders’ ways of thinking and behaving. Specifically, they 
are very likely to positively view, favourably treat, and deeply trust in nonfamily 
employees who have a guanxi with them (Jacobs, 1979; Tsui & Farh, 1997). 
Moreover, the founders may regard those persons as more than subordinates but 
friends or even family members. As a consequence, the founders should be willing to 
share their specialised assets with those persons, as the traditional Chinese culture 
advocates that individuals have an obligation to take good care of and take favourable 
actions towards their family members and friends (Tsui & Farh, 1997; Yan & 
Sorenson, 2006). However, for those only having the official superior-subordinate 
relationship with the founder, the founder may have a lower level of trust towards 
them and may hold conservative views on them. As a result, those persons are less 
likely to have access to the founder’s specialised assets.  
Based on the above discussion, it can be concluded China’s institutional, political, and 
social context makes family business founders’ specialised assets particularly 
important for the firm. In addition, affected by the familism and guanxi culture, it is 
very likely that only the founders’ highly trusted successors, i.e. their family members 
and guanxi-connected nonfamily members, have access to the specialised assets. In 
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other words, the perspectives advocated by the resource-based view are effectively 
applicable to Chinese family businesses.58 
To summarise, for all the three prevalent theories, i.e. agency theory, stewardship 
theory, and the resource-based view, their perspectives become more effective in 
China’s institutional, political, social, and cultural background. However, because 
most of the viewpoints are contradictory, it is difficult to reach a conclusive answer as 
to the form of the family succession-firm performance relationship in the context of 
China. Instead, a balanced perspective between the optimistic view (family successors 
are beneficial) and the pessimistic view (family successors are detrimental) seems to 
be reasonable, i.e. family successors may perform insignificantly different from their 
nonfamily counterparts in China’s setting. 
It is also worth noting that even if both agency and stewardship theories hold 
contradictory perspectives on family successors’ effect on firm performance, the 
                                               
58 However, the founders’ different attitudes towards nonfamily members with and without a guanxi may arouse a 
question: if the founders have a low level of trust in those who do not have a guanxi with them, why would they 
appoint those people as the successor? An appropriate interpretation is that the founders may be attracted by those 
persons’ talents and distinctive resources. More specifically, based upon the previous literature, trust is often 
divided into cognition- and affect-based trust (e.g., Rempel et al., 1985; McAllister, 1995; Jiang et al., 2011). 
Cognition-based trust is rational. It is based on the interacting party’s “track record”, and is usually inspired by the 
party’s capability, experience, professionality, personality or past performance (McAllister, 1995). In contrast, 
affect-based trust often depends on the emotional bond with and the feelings towards the interacting party, and 
usually goes beyond a regular professional relationship and any rational assessment. Affect-based trust makes one 
care about the other party’s interest, welfare and well-being, and believe this kind of care is reciprocal (Rempel et 
al., 1985). According to Tan and Chee (2005), in Chinese society, there is normally heavy reliance on affective 
factors in the decision to trust. And in the aforementioned particular trust built by a guanxi, based on its definition, 
the affective factors undoubtedly carry a much heavier weight than the cognitive factors.  
 
However, there may still be some founders who are more rational and more based on the cognitions to choose the 
successor, rather than emotion-oriented. Hence, it is still possible that a nonfamily member is affectively untrusted 
or affectively less trusted by the founder, but would still be appointed as the successor because of talents, distinctive 
skills, professional expertise, rich experience, good reputation, or new and valuable knowledge and network 
resources that the founder, the founder’s family members, and the founder’s guanxi-connected persons do not have. 
In fact, my sample shows some evidence of this possibility. Specifically, based on my sampled successors, I find 
that those without a guanxi have a significantly higher education level than family successors and nonfamily 
successors with a guanxi. I also find that the percentage of non-guanxi connected successors with external work or 
managerial experience is significantly higher, compared with that of family successors, and that of guanxi-connected 
nonfamily successors. These findings, to some extent, should imply that those successors whose appointments are 
not based on the founder’s personal affection are indeed appointed because of talents and rich experience.   
 
Another reason for the appointment of the affect-untrusted successors could be that the founders may not have any 
suitable descendants available, and thus they would like to apply a seat-warmer strategy to appoint an agent 
temporarily till a descendant is ready. However, they may feel inappropriate to let those who have a guanxi with 
them, i.e. who they see as friends or quasi-family members, to play this temporary role. Thus, the founders may 
choose an agent without a guanxi as the temporary leader and intend to pull the agent down from the position as 
soon as a descendant is available.  
 
The above may be the reasons why the founders would be willing to appoint a nonfamily member that they have 
low trust in, i.e. a member without a guanxi, as the successor. I would like to thank Marc Goergen, the convenor of 
my annual review meeting, for raising this valuable query. 
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proponents of the resource-based view insist that the founders’ family members and 
trusted agents are more valuable to the business, as only they have access to the 
founders’ specialised assets. Based on this viewpoint, it should be interesting to 
explore whether successors’ inheritance of the specialised assets plays a role in 
determining firm performance. Therefore, this chapter also attempts to solve two 
questions, i.e. whether the specialised assets are indeed accessible only to the 
successors who are highly trustworthy for the founder and whether the successors’ 
acquisition of the assets contributes to firm performance after the succession. These 
questions should be important not only to the success of the succession but also to the 
firm’s post-succession development.   
3.3 Literature review 
This section provides eight strands of the relevant literature, including studies on the 
relationship between family management and firm performance, the comparison of 
founder-, descendant- and nonfamily-managers regarding their influence on firm 
performance, the comparison between family and nonfamily successors in terms of 
their effects on firm performance, the transfer of the founder’s specialised assets, the 
relationship between managers’ work experience and firm performance, and of 
course, the investigations of all the above issues in the context of China.  
3.3.1 The family management-firm performance relationship 
The first stream of the relevant research focuses on the family management-firm 
performance relationship. As previously discussed, the mixed perspectives of the 
agency theory, the stewardship theory, the resource-based view and the institution-
based view lead to highly inconsistent findings regarding the impact of family 
management on firm performance. More specifically, compared with family firms 
managed by nonfamily CEOs, those managed by family CEOs are documented to be 
more productive (Durand & Vargas, 2003; Jiang & Peng, 2011; Cai et al., 2012), less 
productive (Barth et al., 2005; Westhead & Howorth, 2006; Jiang & Peng, 2011), or 
at least equally productive (Barontini & Caprio, 2006) in different research contexts. 
For example, Jiang and Peng (2011) find that, holding other things constant, the stock 
return is 48% (34%) higher for family-CEO firms than for nonfamily-CEO firms in 
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Indonesia (Taiwan). However, the stock return of Hong Kong companies with a 
family CEO is 28% lower than that of the companies with a nonfamily CEO. These 
findings support the authors’ posit that family CEOs are good for firm performance in 
regions having a weak legal system, i.e. Indonesia and Taiwan, but bad for firm 
performance in regions that have strong legal and regulatory institutions (Hong 
Kong). Cai et al. (2012) further confirm Jiang and Peng (2011) perspectives and find 
that family CEOs are more beneficial in China, which is featured with 
underdeveloped institutions and weak shareholder protection.  
3.3.2 Comparison of founder-, descendant- and nonfamily 
management in terms of firm performance  
Apart from the aforementioned inconclusive perspectives of multiple theories and 
different institutional environments, some researchers also cast the concern that the 
extant mixed empirical evidence may result from the researchers’ different definitions 
of a family CEO (e.g., Liu et al., 2012). Specifically, in the prior studies, family CEOs 
often include both the family business founders and their descendants. However, as 
previously discussed, large differences exist between the founders and their offspring, 
in terms of their emotional attachment to the firm, their capability and resources, and 
their managerial motivation and behaviour.  
Considering this fact, some researchers start to explore the differences between 
founder-, descendant- and nonfamily-CEOs in terms of their effects on firm 
performance (e.g., McConaughy et al., 1998; Anderson & Reeb, 2003a; Villalonga & 
Amit, 2006; Bennedsen et al., 2015) . For example, McConaughy et al. (1998) 
document that founding family controlled firms (FFCFs), i.e. firms whose CEO is 
either the founder or the founder’s descendant, are more efficiently run, indicated by 
higher sales growth and higher margins on sales, than non-FFCFs. In addition, FFCFs 
are also more valuable, i.e. having higher market-to-book equity ratios, than non-
FFCFs. Moreover, the authors also find that descendant-controlled firms generate 
higher sales growth and margins than founder-controlled companies.  
However, some researchers observe different findings. For example, Anderson and 
Reeb (2003a) demonstrate that family CEOs, including the founders and their 
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descendants, can improve firm profitability (measured by ROA) in S&P 500 firms. 
The authors also find that both the founders and nonfamily CEOs exhibit a significant 
and positive impact on firm value (Tobin’s q). However, descendants are proved to be 
unrelated to firm value. Villalonga and Amit (2006) observe similar results by using a 
similar sample. Specifically, they find that founder-CEO firms are the most valuable, 
i.e. having the highest average Tobin’s q, of all family and nonfamily firms. 
Moreover, the founders’ highest value is achieved when they serve as the Chairman 
of the Board but hire a nonfamily CEO. However, firm value is significantly 
destroyed if a descendant serves as the Chairman of the Board or the CEO.  
In summary, the above research shows that there indeed exist some gaps between the 
founders and their descendants, and the founders are generally more valuable than 
successors (except for McConaughy et al. discussed above). 
It is worth noting that all of the above studies rely on purely cross-sectional 
comparisons. However, cross-sectional studies may suffer from many endogeneity 
issues (Pérez-González, 2006; Bennedsen et al., 2007). Therefore, to mitigate this 
concern, as previously discussed, I attempt to use a different approach, i.e. the PSM 
method together with a DID analysis, to explore the possible changes that the 
leadership succession event may bring to firm performance. In light of the previous 
literature, this approach can significantly alleviate potential endogeneity issues 
(Pérez-González, 2006; Bennedsen et al., 2007; Amore et al., 2011). Specifically, the 
dependent variable in the DID analysis is the within-firm variation in performance, 
which helps to provide an estimate of the impact on performance that is not affected 
by possible time-invariant characteristics (Pérez-González, 2006; Bennedsen et al., 
2007). In addition, the PSM method reduces the likelihood that any potential 
differences in firm performance are caused by other pre-succession factors, such as 
firm profitability, firm size, or board ownership, thus helping to enhance the 
reliability of the empirical results.  
Another reason to apply the above approach, as previously mentioned, is that it is 
more in line with my research interest relative to the cross-sectional comparison 
method employed in the preceding studies. More specifically, the results in those 
studies suggest that founder-managed firms on average perform better than successor-
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managed firms. Yet what I would like to investigate is whether family firms 
experience a significant performance change when their leadership is handed over 
from the founder to the successor, relative to the usual performance variation in their 
counterparts without a leadership transition. The preceding cross-sectional difference 
between founder-, descendant- and nonfamily-managers undoubtedly can provide 
some clues on this issue, but this small gap still needs to be empirically filled, in order 
to help researchers more comprehensively understand the dynamics of the leadership 
succession in family firms.  
3.3.3 The family succession-firm performance relationship 
Apart from the comparison of different types of leaders, research exclusively focusing 
on the relationship between family successions and firm performance is also related to 
my research purpose. The empirical findings on this issue are overwhelmingly 
unidirectional, i.e. family successors are related to large declines in firm performance, 
compared with nonfamily successors (e.g., Smith & Amoako-Adu, 1999; Morck et 
al., 2000; Pérez-González, 2006; Bennedsen et al., 2007; Cucculelli & Micucci, 2008; 
Bertrand et al., 2008; Bennedsen et al., 2015). For example, Smith and Amoako-Adu 
(1999) find that the stock market reacts negatively to family successions in Canada. 
More specifically, the appointment of family successors results in significant and 
negative CARs around the announcement, which does not happen to nonfamily 
successions. The authors attribute this finding to family successors’ younger age, as it 
may be a signal of the successors’ inexperience in the eyes of investors. However, 
they also find that family succession firms are related to better long-term stock 
performance after the succession, compared with their nonfamily counterparts.  
Nevertheless, Pérez-González (2006) argues that the above research has some 
unresolved issues. For example, the research shows that the sign of the abnormal 
returns for family successions switches over time, and thus leaves an unclear reading 
on whether family or nonfamily successors are superior. Additionally, the 
investigation into stock returns does not control for firm-level characteristics, making 
it difficult to distinguish between firms’ or successors’ traits. Given these limitations, 
Pérez-González (2006) conducts a study on US family firms and documents that 
family succession firms experience a significant decline in operating profitability and 
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market-to-book ratios, relative to the firms appointing a nonfamily successor. 
Moreover, family successors who did not attend a selective undergraduate institution 
account for the entire decline in the firm performance. This supports Pérez-
González’s nepotism hypothesis for family successions. Furthermore, he also 
observes that nonfamily successions are related to positive stock reactions around the 
announcement and three years after the succession. This result is largely driven by the 
successors hired from outside of the firm. In brief, Pérez-González’s (2006) evidence 
shows that nepotism hurts firm performance, as the scope of labour market 
competition may be limited.  
Bennedsen et al. (2007) further confirm the above findings via a sample of Danish 
family firms and an instrumental variable to rule out endogeneity issues. More 
specifically, they employ the gender of the departing CEO’s firstborn child as the 
instrument and demonstrate that family successors are significantly and negatively 
associated with the firm’s operating profitability around the transition. In addition, 
such underperformance of family successors is particularly prominent in fast-growing 
industries, industries with a highly skilled labour force, and large firms. This result is 
also consistent with Cucculelli and Micucci’s (2008) evidence, which also shows that 
family successions reduce firm profitability, and the reduction is more pronounced in 
competitive sectors. 
The above studies provide abundant evidence on the family succession-firm 
performance relationship. However, it is worth noting that the studies all focus on 
mature market economies. Given the aforementioned institution-based view, further 
investigations are still needed if I intend to understand the succession issue in China, 
where the economy is still in a transition from a centrally-planned to a market-
oriented economy.  
3.3.4 The family management-firm performance relationship in 
China 
Considering the aforementioned rapid growth of Chinese family firms and their great 
contributions to China’s economy, family management in China’s context also 
receives some attention (e.g., Amit et al., 2010; Li et al., 2010; Cai et al., 2012; Zhou 
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et al., 2013). For example, based on the institution-based view, Amit et al. (2010) find 
that family management is beneficial to firm value (Tobin’s q) only in the provinces 
with low institutional efficiency. They attribute this finding to the internal markets 
perspective, i.e. family managers are the better choice when low institutional 
development leads to an inefficient external labour market with a lack of qualified 
professional managers. 
In addition, Li et al. (2010) focus on the relationship between family CEOs, firms’ 
innovation capability and firm performance. They document that family CEOs are 
positively related to both the firm’s innovation capability, i.e. the number of patents 
and the proportion of technicians, and firm profitability, i.e. ROA and ROS. 
Moreover, this finding is more pronounced among firms with a pyramidal structure, 
relative to those having a direct ownership structure.  
Cai et al. (2012) observe similar results to the above, finding that family CEOs are 
positively related to both firm profitability (ROA) and firm value (Tobin’s q), 
compared with nonfamily CEOs. Moreover, such a result becomes stronger in firms 
with higher family ownership and multiple large shareholders but weaker if the 
divergence between family ownership and control in the firm is high.  
Based on the above research, it can be concluded that family CEOs are generally 
more beneficial in China’s context. However, as previously mentioned, this finding 
may be driven by the mix of the founders and their descendants acting as CEOs. In 
other words, it is possible that the positive effect of family management de facto 
demonstrates the “founder impact” rather than the “family impact”. Zhou et al. (2013) 
verify this argument to some extent. Specifically, they find that the founders serving 
as the Chairman of the Board and the CEO or remaining as the Chairman with a 
relative as the CEO are the two most efficient combinations for Chinese family firms. 
The impact of these two combinations on firm performance (ROA) is much higher 
than that of a hired CEO, regardless of whether the Chairman is the founder, a 
relative, or an agent. However, if the Chairman is a family member but not the 
founder, the performance of the firm with a family CEO is indistinguishable from that 
with a hired CEO. Moreover, the total absence of the family from monitoring and 
management causes a significant loss in performance. In other words, the benefit of 
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having a family CEO exists if and only if the founder acts as the Chairman of the 
Board. This finding is in line with the aforementioned literature demonstrating that 
the founders are the most valuable leaders (e.g., Morck et al., 2000; Anderson & 
Reeb, 2003a; Villalonga & Amit, 2006). However, unlike Villalonga and Amit (2006) 
documenting that the combination of founder-Chairman and hired-CEO adds firm 
value, Zhou et al. (2013) find that the founder-Chairman is more valuable when the 
CEO position is also occupied by the family.    
In summary, the above studies document that family leaders tend to be more valuable 
in China’s context, and the value is mainly derived from the founders. However, 
similar to some of the preceding literature, these studies also focus on purely cross-
sectional comparisons of founder-, descendant-, and agent-managed firms in terms of 
the average firm performance. In this case, further investigations are still necessary if 
my research interest is the performance dynamics caused by the leadership succession 
in Chinese family firms. This shapes my first research purpose in this chapter. 
3.3.5 The family succession-firm performance relationship in China 
As reviewed in above, family firms’ leadership successions have been widely 
explored in western and developed economies. However, relevant studies are very 
limited in China’s setting. To the best of my knowledge, Xu et al.’s (2015) paper is 
the only study hitherto closely related to my research purpose. Specifically, by using 
694 Chinese family firms as the sample, the authors find that the profitability (OROA 
and OROS) in firms with a second-generation Chairman of the Board or CEO are 
3.1% and 6.9% higher than that in their peers, respectively. This finding is contrary to 
the aforementioned evidence observed in developed economies. Moreover, the 
authors also document that the positive impact of the second-generation on firm 
profitability is more salient in firms with less outside monitoring. This study sheds 
light on the impact of leadership successions on firm performance in family 
businesses in China’s context. However, this study may suffer from certain 
limitations. For example, they conduct a DID analysis as a part of their robustness 
checks. Because their research focuses not only on descendant-Chairmen of the 
Board/CEOs but also on descendant-directors, their control firms in the DID analysis 
are those not having any members from the controlling family serving as directors or 
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managers during the sample period. However, the problem is, if a Chinese enterprise 
has not had any family members of the founder (including the founder per se) acting 
as directors or managers during such a long period (the sample period of the study is 
2003-2011), that firm may not be qualified to be defined as a family firm. This is 
because, as previously discussed, the familism culture makes Chinese people tend to 
have a low degree of trust outside of kinship. Given such a background, the 
controlling family should act as solicitous steward and be very actively involved in 
the management of the firm, if they see the firm as a family property that will be 
bequeathed to the offspring (Yan & Sorenson, 2006). In other words, those firms that 
have not been managed by the controlling family from the year 2003 to 2011 may not 
accord with the essence of family firms in China’s cultural context. Therefore, the 
control firms in Xu et al.’s (2015) study may not be very appropriate if their research 
focus is the comparison between family and nonfamily successors both in family 
firms.  
Moreover, Xu et al. (2015) omitted to control for some important factors in both their 
main tests and robustness checks, such as the controlling right of the family, the 
wedge between family ownership and family control, and governance characteristics 
such as board ownership, all of which have been widely recognised to have an impact 
on not only successor decision but also firm performance. More importantly, the 
study does not consider the pre-succession firm profitability in its regression models, 
yet this factor has been proved to significantly affect firms’ change in performance 
during the succession period (e.g., Pérez-González, 2006; Bennedsen et al., 2007). 
Considering the above limitations, further explorations of the impact of different 
types of successors on firm performance exclusively for Chinese family businesses 
should still be necessary and worthwhile. This shapes my second research purpose in 
this chapter. 
3.3.6 The transfer of the specialised assets in succession 
Apart from the above literature, research about the transfer of the founders’ 
specialised assets during the succession process is also relevant to my study. As 
discussed before, a number of proponents of the resource-based view have noticed the 
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importance of the founders’ specialised assets and successors’ inheritance of the 
assets (e.g., Cabrera-Suárez et al., 2001; Bjuggren & Sund, 2002; Lee et al., 2003; 
Sharma & Irving, 2005; Royer et al., 2008; Xu et al., 2015). Based on their research 
interests, their studies can be further classified into two streams. Specifically, the first 
stream pays attention to the relationship between the specialised assets and the 
successor decision (e.g., Lee et al., 2003; Royer et al., 2008; Xu et al., 2015) and has 
been reviewed in the previous chapter.59 The second stream focuses on the transfer 
process of the assets from the founder to the successor. For example, based on the 
resource-based view, Cabrera-Suárez et al. (2001) create a theoretical framework with 
the factors facilitating the transfer and the successor’s development of the specialised 
assets. The factors include the founder’s overcome of the psychological fears about 
the succession, the successor’s adequate motivation to take over the business, early 
exposure to the business, and academic and experiential training, as well as the 
intimacy of the relationship between the founder and the successor. Moreover, the 
business context, such as the economic environment and cultural background, as well 
as the family context, such as the family’s cohesion and commitment to the business, 
should also affect successors’ inheritance of the specialised assets. 
In addition, Steier (2001) proposes several steps for successors to obtain and develop 
the founder’s social network resources via interviewing the second-generation 
entrepreneurs in 18 family firms. More specifically, successors should first identify 
the key players and connections in the network, what resources and benefits those 
connections can provide to the firm, and which connections are the most critical to the 
firm’s success. Secondly, they should attain legitimacy and clarify their optimal role 
in the firm, such as acting as good technicians, managers, or stewards. Finally, they 
should manage the network resources through delegation and division of labour and 
reconstitute the structure and content of the network.  
3.3.7 Specialised assets in Chinese family firms  
There are also some relevant studies specific for China (e.g., Zhu, 2007; Dou & Jia, 
2008; Dou et al., 2009; Dou & Li, 2013; Xu et al., 2015). For example, Dou and Jia 
                                               
59 Lee et al.’s (2003) study and Royer et al.’s (2008) study have been discussed in Section 2.2.1 of Chapter 2. Xu 
et al.’s (2015) research has been discussed in Section 2.2.4 of Chapter 2.  
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(2008) employ a content analysis of 41 media reports on and questionnaires from 60 
Chinese family firms and attempt to figure out what specialised assets are the most 
important in the succession process. They find that the founders’ entrepreneurship, 
tacit knowledge, and individual social connections are widely agreed as the vital 
specialised assets that should be inherited by successors. However, they also find that 
the founders and successors differ in their perceptions of not only the components of 
the above three assets but also the importance of the assets in the succession. Even 
just for successors, their evaluation of the assets varies when they are at the different 
stages of the succession process. 
Furthermore, a study conducted by Dou and Li (2013) is similar to the 
aforementioned Steier’s (2001) paper. It is a case study focusing on how to transfer 
the founders’ social network resources to the successor. Specifically, the authors 
divide the transfer process into six phases, i.e. the teaching and learning of the 
philosophy of the network, the deconstruction of the profile of the network, the 
introduction of the successor to the existing parties, the readjustment of the founder’s 
and the successor’s roles in the building and management of the network, the renewal 
of the network parties, and the rebuilding of the network structure. 
To summarise, researchers who are interested in the role of the founders’ specialised 
assets in the succession process focus on either the association between the assets and 
the successor selection or the transfer process of the assets. An obvious gap is that 
empirical evidence on the consequence of the transfer is still lacking. For example, no 
studies have investigated whether family successors and the founders’ highly trusted 
nonfamily successors are indeed more likely to obtain the assets relative to their 
counterparts who are less trustworthy for the founder. In addition, whether 
successors’ acquisition of the assets indeed contributes to firm performance after the 
succession. The lack of solutions to these issues may be because the founders’ 
specialised assets are more about cognition, tacit knowledge, skills or personal 
connections, which are typically very private, implicit, and abstract, and thus difficult 
for researchers to observe. Given such a situation, my final research purpose in this 
chapter is to solve the above issues by using successors’ internal experience before 
the succession as a proxy for their acquisition of the specialised assets. The above 
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issues should be especially important for family firms in China compared with those 
in other countries. This is because the various discrimination against Chinese family 
firms, as previously discussed, makes the specialised assets particularly crucial for the 
firms’ longevity and development.  
3.3.8 Managers’ work experience and firm performance 
There is some research focusing on the impact of managers’ work experience on firm 
performance (e.g., Hambrick & Mason 1984; Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990; Goll et 
al., 2001; Peni, 2014). For example, Baysinger and Hoskisson (1990) posit that top 
executives’ tenure is positively related to firm performance, as longer tenure implies 
more firm-specific knowledge and better ability to monitor and provide valuable 
resources. However, Goll et al. (2001) find that top managers’ tenure has a significant 
and negative impact on firm performance, which is contrary to Baysinger and 
Hoskisson’s posit. In addition, Peni (2014) focuses on the Chairman of the Board and 
the CEO and documents that their tenure is positively related to both ROA and 
Tobin’s q. This finding supports Baysinger and Hoskisson.  
There also are some studies specific for China. For example, Wei et al. (2005) find 
that top management team (TMT) members’ career experience heterogeneity has a 
negative impact on firm performance (ROA), and yet their occupational experience 
heterogeneity has a positive impact. Moreover, Zhang’s (2007) evidence shows that 
both the tenure heterogeneity and functional experience heterogeneity of the TMT 
have a significant and negative effect on firm performance, measured as the firm’s 
EVA. 
It is worth noting that all the above studies are based on upper echelon theory 
originated by Hambrick and Mason (1984). Specifically, the theory suggests that 
managers’ demographics, such as age, education, and experience, are good proxies for 
their cognitive base, values, and competencies, which, in turn, affect the managers’ 
strategic choice and ultimately firm performance. However, as managers exist in 
every firm and the tenet of upon echelon theory applies to every manager, none of the 
extant research focuses on family business successors’ internal experience, let alone 
linking the experience to the successors’ acquisition of the specialised assets.  
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3.4 Hypothesis development 
3.4.1 Leadership succession and firm performance 
Family business founders, on the one hand, should be more valuable than both their 
descendants and nonfamily agents. Based on the preceding discussion, the reasons are 
threefold. First, the founders’ stewardship sense towards the firm should be the 
strongest,60 which, based on the stewardship theory, can engender far-sighted 
contributions and superior financial returns to the firm (Davis et al., 1997).61 Second, 
the founders’ personal specialised assets have been widely agreed, by the resource-
based view theorists, as the key contributor of the firm’s competitive advantages (e.g., 
Cabrera-Suárez et al., 2001; Lee et al., 2003; Royer et al., 2008).62 Third, the 
institution-based view proponents suggest that in a weak institutional environment 
such as China, both family and nonfamily successors have strong incentives to behave 
opportunistically (e.g., Zhang & Ma, 2009).63  
On the other hand, the founders may also be disadvantageous to firm performance 
relative to successors. This is because, firstly, the strong stewardship awareness to the 
company may cause the founder to view the company as a personal fiefdom and to 
become the dictator in the company (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996). This, in turn, 
may lead to risky decisions, lengthy tenures and strategic stagnation, all of which may 
be hazardous to firm performance. Secondly, the founders are generally older than 
successors. Based on upper echelon theory (Hambrick & Mason, 1984), old managers 
may have less physical and mental stamina and be less able to grasp new ideas as well 
as learn new knowledge and skills. Moreover, older executives should have greater 
psychological commitments to the organisational status quo. Due to the lack of 
                                               
60 The founders are those who create the company, responsible for its early growth and development, and devoting 
most of their wealth, time, and energy to run the business from scratch to success (Villalonga & Amit, 2010). As a 
result, the founders’ emotional attachment to the business should be the strongest, and thus is their stewardship 
sense (Liu et al., 2012). However, successors neither invest most of their personal wealth in the firm nor take 
responsibility for the firm’s earliest operations, i.e. the hardest phase for the business, and hence their emotional 
attachment and stewardship awareness to the firm should be much weaker.  
 
61 Section 3.2.2 has provided an elaborated discussion of stewardship theory.  
 
62 As discussed in Section 3.2.3, the resource-based view theorists suggest that a firm’s specialised assets shape its 
competitive advantages over other companies and thus are crucial to its survival and development, and for a family 
business, the founder is the main source of the specialised assets.  
 
63 A detailed discussion of the institution-based view has been provided in Section 3.2.4.  
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stamina, the commitment to the status quo, and the strong emotional attachment to the 
firm, the founders should be very loss averse, and thus less likely to make innovative 
but risky decisions, such as investments in R&D or M&A. However, managers’ 
stamina, new ideas, and innovative behaviours are critical to the firm’s long-term 
success (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). In this regard, successors who are younger, more 
energetic, more adventurous, and more innovative should be more conducive to the 
firm’s development.  
The above discussion implies that the leadership successions in family firms may 
have both positive and negative effects on firm performance. However, it is difficult 
to conclude which direction will dominate. Therefore, it should be appropriate to 
hypothesise the succession-firm performance relationship as follows: 
H1: Leadership successions have a significant effect on firm performance.   
3.4.2 Family succession and firm performance 
Sections 3.2.1, 3.2.2, and 3.2.3 have elaborated the contradictory perspectives on the 
family successor-firm performance relationship from agency theory, stewardship 
theory, and the resource-based view, respectively. Section 3.2.5 has discussed how 
those perspectives all become sufficiently effective in China’s institutional, social, 
and cultural context. As a consequence, it is also difficult to reach a conclusive 
answer regarding the direction of the impact of family successors relative to their 
nonfamily counterparts. Thus, it is proper to develop the hypothesis as follows:  
H2: Family successors have a significantly different impact on firm performance, 
relative to nonfamily successors. 
3.4.3 Successors’ acquisition of the founder’s specialised assets and 
firm performance 
As stated in Section 3.2.3, the resource-based view proponents suggest that the 
founders’ personal specialised assets, i.e. their tacit knowledge and social 
connections, shape the firm’s competitive advantages over other companies and lead 
to the firm’s sustained good performance. Therefore, for family firms experiencing or 
Chapter 3 - Leadership succession and firm performance 
 121 
about to experience a leadership transition, whether the successor can acquire the 
founder’s specialised assets before the succession should be critical to firm 
performance after the succession. 
However, because the founders’ specialised assets can hardly be expressed or 
formalised, they are typically difficult to be transferred across individuals or firm 
boundaries (Fan et al., 2008; Xu et al., 2015). As previously discussed, one of the 
main antecedents in the transfer of the assets is the time spent together between the 
founder and the successor (e.g., Hansen, 1999; Bracci & Vagnoni, 2011). More 
specifically, the longer time that the successor spends with the founder, the longer 
time and more opportunities that the former can have to get exposed to the latter’s 
tacit knowledge and personal connections. As a result, successors can have more 
opportunities to learn the knowledge, to familiarise themselves and build good 
relationships with the connections, and finally transform the knowledge and 
connections into their own resources. In this regard, the role of successors’ pre-
succession internal work experience should be highlighted. Firstly, the founders 
should often spend a lot of time at work. Therefore, for successors, working in the 
family business before the succession should be a very efficient way to increase the 
time spent with the founder and obtain more opportunities to approach the founder’s 
specialised assets. In addition, the founders’ specialised assets typically are embedded 
in the situations in which the assets are appeared and developed, and thus are highly 
context specific (Cabrera-Suárez et al., 2001). In this respect, working in the same 
environment, i.e. the family firm, should greatly help successors to learn and capture 
the nuances of the assets in different circumstances. Finally, the only way to absorb 
tacit knowledge is through observation and practice (Bracci & Vagnoni, 2011). In this 
case, working with the founder should provide successors with sufficient 
opportunities to observe the founder, by tracking his or her work practices. This, in 
turn, can foster successors’ obtainment of the tacit knowledge, through a learning by 
doing process. Based on these arguments, successors’ pre-succession internal work 
experience should be a proper proxy for their acquisition of the founders’ specialised 
assets.  
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However, as highlighted before, the founders’ specialised assets are accessible only to 
their family members or highly trustworthy nonfamily agents. Therefore, the above 
proxy may only apply to these persons. For other successors who are less trusted by 
the founder, their internal work experience may not contribute much to their 
obtainment of the assets. This is because, for the persons not highly trustworthy, the 
founder may limit their access to his or her personal specialised assets or even prevent 
the assets from being exposed to them to avoid appropriation risk64 (Lee et al., 2003; 
Bracci & Vagnoni, 2011). Given this discussion and the aforementioned fact that 
Chinese family business founders tend to have a high level of particular trust towards 
family or guanxi-connected members yet a lower degree of trust towards other people, 
the following hypothesis is developed: 
H3a: Family or guanxi-connected successors’ pre-succession internal work 
experience is positively related to firm performance, compared with other successors’ 
corresponding experience. 
However, there also exists a possibility that family or guanxi-connected successors’ 
pre-transition internal experience is not truly related to their acquisition of the 
specialised assets. In this case, the benefits of having experience in the firm before the 
succession should be discussed from other perspectives. More specifically, even if the 
experience would not contribute to the obtainment of founder-specific assets, it may 
still help to obtain other firm-specific knowledge and resources65 (Baysinger & 
Hoskisson, 1990). In addition, pre-succession internal experience can help successors 
familiarise with the environment and the nature of the business, understand the culture 
and intricacies of the firm, build relationships within the firm, and gain credibility and 
acceptance in the firm (Lansberg & Astrachan, 1994; Cabrera-Suárez et al., 2001; 
Brockhaus, 2004). All these advantages should also facilitate successors to perform 
better after they take over the leadership position. Moreover, unlike the specialised 
assets accessible only to the founders’ highly trusted successors, the above general 
benefits linked with the intra-firm experience should be available to all types of 
                                               
64 The risk that those people may betray the family firm after the acquisition of the specialised assets or utilise the 
assets to ask for a much higher compensation (Lee et al., 2003).  
 
65 Those firm-specific assets, such as relevant internal and external statistics, product descriptions or certain 
expertise, are often formalised by systematised language or code, and thus are much easy to be transferred. 
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successors. Furthermore, in China’s context, those benefits should contribute more to 
firm performance if the successors are those nonfamily members who do not have a 
guanxi with the founder. This is because, for family or guanxi-connected successors, 
their appointment, undoubtedly, is very likely due to nepotism or guanxi. However, 
for those who do not have a guanxi with the founder, their appointment is more likely 
purely driven by their superior management or leadership skills. Therefore, those 
successors should be more capable of efficiently utilising the aforementioned general 
benefits, associated with pre-succession internal experience, to improve firm 
performance. Based on this discussion, the following hypothesis is formulated: 
H3b: Family or guanxi-connected successors’ pre-succession internal work 
experience is negatively related to firm performance, compared with other successors’ 
corresponding experience. 
3.5 Data and methods 
3.5.1 Data collection 
Section 2.5.1 of Chapter 2 has described the data for the sampled succession cases in 
this thesis. However, it is worth noting that this chapter also explores the impact of 
the succession event on firm performance. Therefore, another group of family firms 
which have never experienced a leadership succession during the sample period is 
also employed in this chapter as a control group for the succession cases. As a result, 
different from the sample used in the previous chapter, the final sample in this chapter 
consists of both the 348 succession cases66 and another 337 non-succession firms67.  
3.5.2 Research design 
3.5.2.1 PSM and DID analysis of H1 
                                               
66 As discussed in the previous chapter, these cases are about the successions to the Chairman of the Board and the 
CEO positions in Chinese family firms listed on the Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock Exchanges during 2003-2014, 
with the firm founder as the predecessor. 
 
67 These firms have the founder as both the Chairman of the Board and the CEO and do not have a leadership 
transition during the period 2003-2014.  
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H1 aims at investigating the influence of leadership successions on firm performance. 
To this end, the full sample of 348 succession cases and 337 non-succession firms are 
used. 
In light of the previous literature (e.g., Pérez-González, 2006; Amore et al., 2011; Xu 
et al., 2015), there is an endogeneity concern that a firm’s performance variation 
around a leadership succession is de facto driven by some factors other than the 
succession event.68 To mitigate this concern, the PSM method is applied. 
Specifically, every succession case is matched with a non-succession firm closely 
resembling the succession firm in terms of a set of characteristics in the year before 
the succession. In this case, for every matched pair, their possibility to receive the 
treatment, i.e. a leadership transition, should almost be the same, and yet only the 
succession firm experiences a transition. Therefore, if firm performance turns out to 
be significantly different between the post-matched succession and non-succession 
firms, the only reason driving the result should be the succession event. This process 
can effectively control for pre-transition confounding factors, and thus helps to 
separate the impact of the succession on firm performance.  
To estimate the probability (the propensity score) of experiencing a succession, the 
following probit regression model is applied, after randomly sorting the full sample of 
348 succession cases and 1641 observations from 337 non-succession firms: 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑡(𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡) =∝ +𝛽1𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡−1 +
𝛽3𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝛽6𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝛽9𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦  𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽10𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽11𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1                     
(1)                  
In the above model, i indicates the firm and t indicates the succession year. 
Succession is an indicator variable equal to one for succession cases and zero for non-
succession firms. The independent variables capture various firm-, governance-, and 
                                               
68 For example, any potential differences in firm performance change between firms experiencing a succession 
and those not experiencing one during the same period may merely stem from the firms’ different characteristics 
before the succession, such as the difference in pre-succession firm performance trend, rather than from the 
succession event per se.  
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family-level characteristics one year prior to the succession. Most of the variables are 
the controls in Chapter 2. The rationale for them as the matching factors in this 
chapter is that, firstly, as discussed in Chapter 2, they may have an impact on the 
firm’s successor decision. Secondly and also more importantly, they may affect firm 
performance. More specifically, Firm performance is used because a firm’s 
performance after the succession may merely be a reflection of the firm’s 
performance trend before the succession (Pérez-González, 2006). Based on the 
previous literature (e.g., Pérez-González, 2006; Bennedsen et al., 2007), Firm 
performance is measured by the industry-adjusted ROA and Tobin’s q. ROA is the 
net income as a percentage of total assets. Tobin’s q by definition is the ratio of the 
firm’s market value to the replacement cost of its assets. It is worth noting that most 
Chinese listed enterprises had both tradable and non-tradable shares before the launch 
of the “split-share structure” reform in 2005, and most non-tradable shares were still 
within the 1-2 years official lock-up period after the completion of the reform in 2007 
(Amit et al., 2010). Given this background, Tobin’s q here is calculated as the ratio of 
the market value of equity plus the book value of debt over the book value of total 
assets, where the non-tradable shares are valued at the same price as the publicly 
traded shares (Villalonga & Amit, 2006; Cai et al., 2012). The industry-adjusted ROA 
(Tobin’s q) is calculated by subtracting the median ROA (Tobin’s q) of the relevant 
industry and year.69 This, according to the literature (e.g., Pérez-González, 2006; 
Bennedsen et al., 2007), can control for aggregate changes in firm performance due to 
industry trends. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the industry classification is based on the 
guide proposed by CSRC.70  
                                               
69 All firms listed on the Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock Exchanges are adopted for the calculation of the medians.  
 
70 The sample is distributed across 14 out of 16 industries classified by CSRC. However, because manufacturing 
is the largest industry in China and makes up the vast majority of the Chinese listed companies, to balance the 
distribution of the sample across industries, firms operating in the manufacturing sector are grouped based on their 
second level industry codes, while other firms are classified according to their first level codes. Additionally, there 
are some industries with very few observations in the sample. Hence, also for the purpose of balanced sample 
distribution, industries with less than 10 observations are classified as Other industry and denoted by one dummy 
in the following regression tests. Based on these adjustments, the final Industry variables include nine dummies.  
However, in a previous version of this study, the original 14 industry dummies were applied. The results were 
qualitatively the same as those presented in this version.  
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In addition, Firm age is considered because older firms may have better information 
disclosure and corporate governance mechanisms, and thus may perform better 
(Claessens et al., 2002).  
Firm size is included because the economies of scale and better access to financial 
resources may allow larger firms to perform better (Cai et al., 2012). 
The use of Long-debt level is attributed to Ansari et al.’s (2014) viewpoint that the 
higher the debt level, the less are the controlling family’s incentives to expropriate 
firm wealth. This, in turn, should be beneficial to the overall firm performance  
The incorporation of Sales growth follows Yoshikawa and Rasheed’s (2010) 
perspective, i.e. a firm’s growth opportunities are pivotal to long-term firm 
performance.  
Board size71, Board ownership, and Board independence are included in the model 
because these three factors are often used as proxies for firms’ governance efficiency 
(e.g., Duan & Hou, 2015), and thus should have an impact on firm performance.   
Family ownership, Family control, and Family divergence are proxies for the family’s 
controlling power in the firm (Ansari et al., 2014). A strong family controlling power, 
on the one hand, can alleviate managerial opportunism and thus may be beneficial to 
firm performance; on the other hand, it increases the family’s ability to extract private 
benefits and thus may jeopardise firm performance (Amore et al., 2011; Jiang & 
Peng, 2011).  
The definitions of the above variables have been described in Section 2.5.2 of Chapter 
2 and are also obtainable in Table 3.16.  
                                               
71 Board size is defined as the number of directors on the board (Duan & Hou, 2015). It is worth noting that this 
factor is not a control variable in the previous chapter, as I cannot find any literature mentioning that Board size is 
a potential determinant of the firm’s family/nonfamily successor decision. However, including Board size in the 
regression models does not affect my findings in the previous chapter.  
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After obtaining the propensity score for each firm based on the above model, each 
succession case is attempted to be matched with a non-succession firm having the 
closest score for the year before the succession and from the same industry.72 
After the PSM procedure, a DID analysis is employed to the post-matched subsample 
to test the validity of H1 via the following regression model: 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =∝ +𝛽1𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                            
(2) 
According to Pérez-González (2006), who pioneers the DID analysis approach in the 
context of family businesses, the dependent variable in the above model, Performance 
difference, denotes the difference in firm performance between the post-succession 
and pre-succession period. This variable is calculated as the two-year average 
industry-adjusted ROA (Tobin’s q) after the succession minus the two-year average 
industry-adjusted ROA (Tobin’s q) before the succession (Amore et al., 2011).73  
As to the independent variables, Succession, as previously defined, is a dummy equal 
to one for succession cases and zero for non-succession firms. Control variables are 
the preceding matching factors in Model (1). Industry and Year denote a set of 
industry and year dummies to control for industrial and temporal fixed effects 
3.5.2.2 DID analysis of H2 
H2 examines the impact of family successors on firm performance relative to their 
nonfamily counterparts. For this purpose, a subsample of the 348 succession cases is 
used for the investigation. The following regression model is employed for the DID 
analysis: 
                                               
72 To ensure that the succession cases and their matched non-succession observations are sufficiently similar, I 
require that the maximum difference in the propensity score between these two groups does not exceed 0.01 in 
absolute value. 
73 Following prior literature (e.g., Pérez-González, 2006; Bennedsen et al., 2007), an alternative time window 
from three years before the succession to three years after the succession is also employed. The relevant results are 
qualitatively similar to those obtained based on the above “two years ex-ante to two years ex-post” period. The 
results based on the alternative window are available upon request. 
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𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =∝ +𝛽1𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                            (3)                                           
In the above model, Family is an indicator equal to one if the successor is the 
founder’s descendant, by blood or marriage; otherwise, it equals zero. All the other 
variables are defined as the same as in Model (2).  
It is worth noting that the PSM method cannot be applied for the comparison among 
different types of successors in this chapter, because the number of observations in 
the control group (nonfamily succession cases) is not significantly larger than that in 
the treatment group (family succession cases).  
3.5.2.3 DID analysis of H3 
H3 focuses on the relationship between successors’ acquisition of the founders’ 
specialised assets and firm performance, where successors’ pre-succession internal 
work experience is employed as a proxy for the acquisition. The following model is 
designed to test the hypotheses:                       
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =∝ +𝛽1𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝑂𝑟𝐺𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽2𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝑂𝑟𝐺𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑥𝑖 ∗ 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                   (4)                                                                                                                                                                                         
In the model, FamilyOrGuanxi is defined as the same as in Chapter 2, i.e. a dummy 
equal to one if the successor is a descendant or a guanxi-connected nonfamily 
member of the founder and zero otherwise. A nonfamily successor is defined as 
guanxi-connected if he or she has one of the following identities: 
(1) Sharing the same surname with the founder; 
(2) Sharing the same birthplace or native place (the same province) with the founder; 
(3) Graduating from the same college or university as the founder; 
(4) Being the founder’s former colleague before the startup of the family firm; 
(5) Acting as a director or a top manager in more than one company controlled by the 
founder before the succession; 
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(6) Joining the family firm at its start-up stage, i.e. the first three years after the 
setting-up of the company. 
Moreover, Successor work in the above model denotes successors’ pre-succession 
internal work experience and is calculated as the number of the years the successor 
has worked in the firm till the succession announcement year. 
FamilyOrGuanxi*Work, therefore, is the interaction term between FamilyOrGuanxi 
and Successor work. This variable, as previously mentioned, is a proxy for family or 
guanxi-connected successors’ acquisition of the founder’s specialised assets. 
3.6 Empirical results and discussion 
3.6.1 Descriptive statistics 
3.6.1.1 Industry distributions of firms 
Table 3.1 illustrates the distribution across industries for all sampled family firms 
with or without a leadership succession. It shows that the entire sample is unevenly 
distributed across 16 industries. Specifically, most of them are in the manufacturing 
industry, which occupies 76.56% of non-succession firms and 73.72% of succession 
firms. The information technology industry accounts for the second largest number of 
firms. As indicated, 9.5% of non-succession and 6.41% of succession firms specialise 
in information technology. The third largest industry of non-succession firms is the 
wholesale and retail sector, accounting for 3.26% of the total. Moreover, non-
succession firms are evenly distributed across the rest, with no more than six 
companies in each sector. For succession firms, the third largest number belongs to 
the real estate business (15 firms), followed by the construction business (12 firms). 
The remaining industries are not very prevalent, occupying about 2.56% of succession 
companies at most.  
[Insert Table 3.1 about here] 
3.6.1.2 Summary statistics 
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Table 3.2 reports the summary statistics of variables applied to the preceding models. 
The first two variables, Industry-adjusted ROA difference and Industry-adjusted 
Tobin q difference, are the dependent variables. They measure the firm performance 
change, i.e. the industry-adjusted ROA (Tobin’s q), of the sampled firms during the 
transition period of the succession firms. The statistics show that the means of the 
above two variables are -1.49% and -0.15, respectively. This indicates that the 
sampled firms, on average, undergo a decline in firm performance during the 
succession period. In addition, the means of Industry-adjusted ROA t-1 and Industry-
adjusted Tobin qt-1 are 1.66% and 0.73, respectively. This implies that the sampled 
firms outperform other firms in their industries before the succession.74 Moreover, 
the table shows that in the firms that have a succession, the successors’ average 
internal work experience before the succession is 6.39 years. However, the maximum 
value of Successor work t-1 implies that there is at least one successor who has worked 
for the firm for 37 years before being selected as the new leader.  
[Insert Table 3.2 about here] 
3.6.1.3 Comparison between non-succession and succession firms  
Table 3.3 compares non-succession firms with succession firms in terms of their firm 
performance change around the succession (the dependent variable in Model (2)) and 
various characteristics before the succession (the matching variables in Model (1)). 
The results show that these two groups of firms have significant differences in most 
variables, except for firm performance change and growth opportunities. Specifically, 
the table indicates that the firm performance change, i.e. Industry-adjusted ROA 
(Tobin q) difference, is insignificantly different between the two groups. This may 
imply that leadership successions do not produce a significant change in firm 
performance, which, however, is contrary to my H1. Moreover, the pre-succession 
firm performance, i.e. Industry-adjusted ROA (Tobin q)t-1, is significantly lower in the 
succession group. These two findings together75 imply that successors may take the 
                                               
74 The statistics for the sample’s performance in the post-succession years are untabulated but show that the 
sample also outperforms their counterparts in the same industry in those years. 
 
75 Firm performance variation between the succession and non-succession groups is insignificantly different, yet 
firm performance before the succession is significantly lower in the succession group.  
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blame for lower performing predecessor if the pre-succession firm performance 
cannot be controlled for efficiently. In this regard, the PSM approach coupled with a 
DID analysis should be more effective for exploring the effect of leadership 
successions, compared with the preceding cross-sectional comparisons between 
founder- and successor-managed firms, at least for family firms in China.  
In addition, the table shows that Firm size is significantly lower in the non-succession 
group. This is not surprising, as firms with successions should be older than those 
without76, and long-established firms normally have a large firm size.  
Long-debt level is also significantly lower in non-succession firms relative to their 
succession counterparts. This may be driven by the former’s smaller size, as smaller 
firms tend to have higher default risk and not much reputation, leading to an inferior 
debt capacity (Zou & Adams, 2008).  
Moreover, non-succession firms tend to have a much smaller board size but much 
larger board ownership and board independence. This finding is also attributable to 
the firms’ smaller size. More specifically, it is reasonable that a smaller firm has a 
smaller board of directors. In addition, a smaller firm may have a higher level of 
board ownership, as most board members in the firm should be the shareholders of the 
firm. Moreover, a smaller board may cause a higher level of board independence, as 
the same number of independent directors occupies a larger proportion in a smaller 
board relative to a larger one. 
Furthermore, Family ownership and Family control are greater in the non-succession 
group, and yet Family divergence is lower in the group. This may still be because that 
non-succession firms tend to be younger and smaller than succession firms, resulting 
in that most of the shares and voting rights in the former are still held by the founding 
family. Additionally, the level of pyramidal ownership structure should be lower in 
smaller firms, thus causing the smaller divergence between family ownership and 
family control in the non-succession group (Claessens et al., 2000).  
                                               
76 This is because one of the main reasons for leadership transitions in a family business should be that the 
business has been run for a long time, and thus the founder is very approaching his or her retirement.  
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To summarise, succession firms are significantly different from their non-succession 
counterparts in terms of various characteristics before the succession. Therefore, it 
becomes more necessary to apply the PSM method to control for those pre-succession 
differences, in order to separate the impact of the succession on firm performance.  
[Insert Table 3.3 about here] 
3.6.1.4 Comparison between family and nonfamily successions 
Table 3.4 focuses on the comparison between family succession and nonfamily 
succession firms regarding the aforementioned pre-succession characteristics. The 
results show that there is no significant difference between these two groups of firms 
in most of the characteristics, except for the pre-succession industry-adjusted Tobin’s 
q. More specifically, the pre-succession Tobin’s q is significantly lower in the family 
succession group. This is in line with one of my findings in Chapter 2, that past firm 
performance is negatively related to the likelihood of a family successor. However, 
the table also indicates that there is no significant difference across the groups in 
terms of firm performance change around the succession, which is inconsistent with 
my H2. 
[Insert Table 3.4 about here] 
3.6.1.5 Correlation among variables 
Table 3.5 presents the correlation matrix for the preceding variables. It shows that 
most of the variables do not have a high pairwise correlation, except that Board size is 
highly correlated with Board independence, Board ownership is highly correlated 
with Family divergence, and Family ownership is highly correlated with Family 
control. Given such a result, in the following tests, Board size, Board ownership, and  
Family ownership will be excluded from the regressions.77 
[Insert Table 3.5 about here] 
                                               
77 Substituting these three variables for Board independence, Family divergence, and Family control would not 
affect the main findings in this chapter.  
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3.6.2 Baseline regression results 
3.6.2.1 Leadership succession and firm performance (H1)  
After the PSM procedure, 154 succession cases are successfully matched with an 
otherwise identical non-succession firm, constructing a post-matched subsample of 
308 observations. To test the effectiveness of the PSM procedure, a difference in 
means t-test by Succession is conducted in the post-matched subsample in terms of 
the pre-succession characteristics. Table 3.6 provides the result. It shows that the 
balance is reached in the subsample, as there is no significant difference between the 
succession cases and their matched non-succession observations in terms of all the 
matching factors in Model (1).78 
In addition, Table 3.7 presents the results for H1. It shows that leadership transitions 
do not cause a significant change in both the industry-adjusted ROA (Column (1)) and 
the corresponding Tobin’s q (Column (2)). This does not support my H1. A possible 
reason for this result is that the advantages of having a leadership transition may be 
offset by the disadvantages. This finding is not in line with the prior studies, as most 
of them document that the founders on average are related to higher firm value (e.g., 
Anderson & Reeb, 2003a; Villalonga & Amit, 2006). As previously discussed, this 
inconsistency may be driven by the differences in the choice of the sample (family 
firms in developed economies vis-à-vis family firms in China) and the research 
method (purely cross-sectional comparisons vis-à-vis PSM and DID analysis). 
[Insert Tables 3.6 and 3.7 about here] 
3.6.2.2 Family succession and firm performance (H2) 
Table 3.8 presents the results for H2 and shows that family successors do not have a 
significantly different impact on both ROA and Tobin’s q, compared with their 
nonfamily counterparts. This result also fails to support my H2. The underlying 
reason, as previously discussed, may be that all the contradictory perspectives of 
                                               
78 This proves that the PSM approach effectively solves the endogeneity problem that any potential firm 
performance variation around the succession may merely be a reflection of differential pre-succession trends 
between the succession and non-succession firms, rather than caused by the succession event per se.  
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agency theory, stewardship theory, and the resource-based view regarding the family 
succession-firm performance relationship can obtain sufficient support in China’s  
context. Therefore, the benefits of having family successors are very likely offset by 
the costs. The above finding is also different from that in the previous literature 
focusing on developed contexts, as the literature documents that family successors are 
detrimental to firm performance relative to nonfamily successors.   
The above difference between my results and those in the prior research, in turn, 
provides support for the institution-based view, i.e. family business managers’ 
behaviour and impact on firm performance may vary across different institutional 
settings (Steier, 2009).  
[Insert Table 3.8 about here] 
3.6.2.3 Successors’ pre-succession internal work experience and firm 
performance (H3) 
This section investigates whether the founders’ highly trusted successors, i.e. family 
or guanxi-connected successors, are significantly different from other successors in 
terms of the impact that their pre-succession internal experience has on firm 
performance.    
The results are presented in Table 3.9. Specifically, Columns (1) and (3) of the table 
indicate that FamilyOrGuanxi*Work is significantly and positively related to both 
Industry-adjusted ROA difference (at the 1% level) and Industry-adjusted Tobin’s q 
difference (at the 5% level). This suggests that family or guanxi-connected 
successors’ pre-succession internal experience has a significant and positive impact 
on firm performance, compared with other successors’ corresponding experience. 
This confirms my H3a. This result, in turn, supports my posit, i.e. family or guanxi-
connected successors’ internal experience before the succession can greatly help the 
successors acquire the founder’s personal specialised assets, thus significantly 
contributing to firm performance after the succession. However, for those successors 
who do not have a guanxi with the founder, their corresponding experience may not 
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be much helpful for the acquisition of the specialised assets, due to the founder’s 
lower trust towards them.  
Moreover, Columns (2) and (4) present the results for investigating family and 
guanxi-connected successors separately. In the columns, Guanxi is a dummy equal to 
one if the successor is a guanxi-connected member and zero otherwise. Family*Work 
is the interaction term between Family and Successor work. Guanxi*Work is the 
interaction term for Guanxi and Successor work. The results show that Family*Work 
and Guanxi*Work are both positive and significant for ROA and Tobin’s q. This 
provides further support for the hypothesis. However, the results also indicate that the 
coefficient of Guanxi*Work is larger and more significant than that of Family*Work 
in both columns. This is interesting, as the founders’ descendants have always been 
viewed as the most appropriate candidates to inherit the specialised assets (e.g., 
Cabrera-Suárez et al., 2001; Bennedsen et al., 2015; Xu et al., 2015).  
A proper explanation of the above finding is that the descendants may have fewer 
incentives to acquire the specialised assets. Specifically, being affected by the 
familism culture, Chinese parents typically have very strong unidirectional altruism to 
their children. This, in turn, may cause the descendants’ immoderate reliance on the 
founder. In addition, China’s one-child policy causes the descendants less likely to 
suffer competition from their siblings, which, in turn, may further trigger the 
descendants’ free-riding consciousness. In such a background, family successors may 
have fewer motivations to actively learn the founder’s tacit knowledge or transfer the 
founder’s personal connections to their own resources, as it is often a long, arduous, 
and costly process (Bracci & Vagnoni, 2011). On the other hand, nonfamily 
employees should have much stronger incentives to proactively and zealously 
observe, acquire, and ultimately assimilate the specialised assets. This is because the 
assets should not only help to increase the nonfamily members’ compensation and 
contribute to the consolidation of their position in the family firm but also be 
conducive to their future career prospects if they leave the firm.  
[Insert Table 3.9 about here] 
3.6.3 Robustness checks  
Chapter 3 - Leadership succession and firm performance 
 136 
Several checks are conducted to examine the robustness of the above results. Firstly, 
an extended PSM model is applied to the investigation of H1. Specifically, the model 
is extended by another set of firm- and environment-level factors, which are seldom 
controlled for in the previous literature but may have an impact on the successor 
decision. In addition, those factors are also applied to extend the regression models 
for H2 and H3, along with the consideration of several succession-specific features. 
Moreover, a number of alternative performance measures are used for robustness 
checks. Finally, a potential endogeneity issue is considered.  
3.6.3.1 The extension of the PSM Model for H1 
The previous baseline PSM model has included a number of firm-, governance-, and 
family-level characteristics widely controlled for in the existing relevant studies. 
However, as discussed in Chapter 2, there also exist some factors seldom considered 
in the literature, but whose roles in the successor decision should not be neglected. 
Hence, in this section, an extended PSM model is employed, to explore whether the 
preceding finding for H1 is due to the overlook of those factors. More specifically, 
seven firm- and environment-level factors one year before the succession are 
considered, including Dividend payout, Interest coverage, Nonfamily ownership, State 
ownership, Foreign ownership, Institutional environment, and Industrial competition. 
The definitions of these variables and why they may have an impact on the successor 
decision have been elaborated in Section 2.6.3.1 of Chapter 2.   
Table 3.10 reports the results of the difference in means t-test by Succession in the 
new post-matched subsample after including the above factors in the PSM model. It 
shows that the balance is reached between the treatment and control groups for all the 
pre-succession matching factors. Table 3.11 presents the regression results, indicating 
that Succession is not significantly related to Industry-adjusted ROA (Tobin q) 
difference. This is in line with my previous finding, and thus H1 is consistently 
rejected.  
[Insert Tables 3.10 and 3.11 about here] 
3.6.3.2 The extension of the models for H2 and H3  
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In this section, the aforementioned factors are also included in the regressions for H2 
and H3. Moreover, three succession-specific factors are also considered, including 
Early succession, Retire, and Postsuccession founder, all of which are dummy 
variables. More specifically, as discussed in Chapter 2, Early succession equals one if 
the founder leaves the leadership position before 65 and zero otherwise. Retire equals 
one if the founder is reported to leave due to “retirement” and zero otherwise. 
Postsuccession founder equals one if the founder remains as a board member or a top 
manager one year after the succession and zero otherwise. These factors, according to 
Pérez-González (2006), may also have an impact on either the successor selection or 
firm performance. 
Table 3.12 presents the relevant results. Specifically, Columns (1) and (2) show that 
the coefficient of Family is insignificant in both columns, which is consistent with the 
existing result. Hence, there is still no support for H2. However, Columns (3) and (4) 
indicate that FamilyOrGuanxi*Work is significantly and positively related to the 
dependent variables. This provides further support for my H3a.  
[Insert Table 3.12 about here] 
3.6.3.3 Alternative performance measures  
In this section, several alternative measures of firm performance are also applied, 
including industry-adjusted return on equity (ROE), industry-adjusted operating 
return on assets (OROA), and the industry adjustment of another measure of Tobin’s 
q. Specifically, ROE is the ratio of net income to equity. OROA is calculated as the 
earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) divided by total assets. The other measure 
of Tobin’s q is also calculated as the ratio of the market value of equity plus the book 
value of debt over the book value of total assets, but where the values of non-tradable 
stocks are their book values instead of the market prices of tradable stocks (Amit et 
al., 2010; Chen et al., 2013).  
Moreover, apart from the industry adjustments, the industry- and performance-
adjustments of all the aforementioned firm performance measures are also employed. 
Following Pérez-González (2006), this helps to control for the aggregate changes in 
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firm performance due to the mean-reversion from prior firm performance. As to the 
calculation, taking ROA as an example, the industry- and performance-adjusted ROA 
is the preceding industry-adjusted ROA minus the median of a control group of firms 
with similar performance. The control groups are created by dividing all publicly 
listed firms on the Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock Exchanges into deciles, sorted by the 
industry-adjusted ROA in the year prior to the succession. The yearly median of the 
relevant group of firms (ex-event) is then used as the control for each firm-year 
observation.  
The relevant results are untabulated, but all of which remain unchanged in statistical 
terms. 
3.6.3.4 Endogeneity 
Empirical work in corporate governance is often subject to an endogeneity issue, i.e. 
any observed significant relationship between the independent and dependent 
variables may be driven by some omitted factors affecting both the former and the 
latter. However, the main findings in this chapter are unlikely to suffer from this 
endogeneity issue. This is because the results for H1 and H2 both indicate an 
insignificant relationship between the independent variables of interest (Succession 
and Family) and the dependent variables (Industry-adjusted ROA difference and 
Industry-adjusted Tobin q difference). Moreover, although the result for H3 
documents a significant and positive relationship between FamilyOrGuanxi*Work 
and the above dependent variables, this result should also not be subjected to the 
endogeneity issue. This is because the two variables which compose the interaction 
term, i.e. FamilyOrGuanxi and Successor work, per se, are insignificantly related to 
the dependent variables. However, it is unlikely that an omitted variable exists that 
can make Successor work per se and FamilyOrGuanxi*Work have statistically 
different effects on the dependent variables, except the variable FamilyOrGuanxi. In 
this regard, FamilyOrGuanxi*Work should be an exogenous variable in this study. 
This, in turn, confirms the reliability of my extant results.  
3.6.4 Additional analysis 
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This section provides three addition analyses of the preceding impact that family or 
guanxi-connected successors’ pre-succession internal work experience has on firm 
performance. The analyses include the consideration of the possible effect of the 
difference in successors’ learning ability, the exploration of the components of the 
work experience, and the role of successors’ trust level.  
3.6.4.1 Different access to the specialised assets or different learning 
ability? 
The preceding results for H3 document that family or guanxi-connected successors’ 
pre-succession internal experience has a significant and positive impact on firm 
performance after the succession, compared with other successors’ corresponding 
experience. This, as previously discussed, supports my conjecture that family or 
guanxi-connected successors can acquire the founder’s specialised assets via the 
internal experience, and yet other successors may not. This is because Chinese family 
business founders’ personal specialised assets may be accessible only to the former 
two types of successors. However, a potential concern is that the difference in the 
acquisition of the specialised assets between the successors may not be driven by their 
different access to the assets, but due to the successors’ difference in learning ability. 
This is because successors’ ability to efficiently learn the founder’s tacit knowledge is 
also an important condition of their ultimate assimilation of the knowledge (Cabrera-
Suárez et al., 2001). Driven by the above concern, in this section, successors are 
divided into two groups based on their learning ability, and the relationship between 
their pre-transition internal work experience and firm performance are re-investigated 
in each group. Following the extant literature (e.g., Pérez-González, 2006; Lee et al., 
2008), successors’ education level is used as a proxy for their learning ability. This is 
because high education attainment may imply a good learner and enables the 
successor to learn more quickly and effectively by building on his or her existing 
knowledge bases (Lee et al., 2008). As to the measurement, the highest education 
level that a successor has attained is coded as a categorical variable, with “1” for High 
school, Technical secondary or below; “2” for College; “3” for Bachelors; “4” for 
Masters; and “5” for PhD (Wei & Wang, 2002; Han et al., 2014; Yang, 2014). 
Succession cases, therefore, are classified into the high (low) learning ability group, if 
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the successor’s highest education attainment is higher (lower) than the median value 
of the succession group. In this case, the previous results for H3 can be re-assessed 
when family successors, guanxi-successors, and successors without a guanxi have a 
similar learning ability.  
Table 3.13 reports the results across the groups. It indicates that 
FamilyOrGuanxi*Work is significantly and positively related to the dependent 
variables in both groups. This is in line with the preceding results for H3. This finding 
rules out the above concern, and thus confirms that the difference in the acquisition of 
the specialised assets between family (guanxi-connected) successors and other 
successors is indeed driven by their different access to the assets, rather than their 
potential different learning ability. 
 [Insert Table 3.13 about here] 
3.6.4.2 Non-managerial or managerial experience? 
Successors’ pre-succession internal work experience can generally be decomposed 
into two parts, i.e. the non-managerial and managerial experience. This section aims 
at exploring whether these two types of experience have a similar role in helping 
family or guanxi-connected successors to obtain the specialised assets. To this end, 
several variables are employed. More specifically, Successor manage denotes the 
successor’s pre-succession intra-firm managerial experience and is defined as the 
number of years that the successor has served as a director or a top manager in the 
firm before the succession. In addition, Successor non-manage is the successor’s non-
managerial working time in the firm before the succession, measured as the difference 
between the pre-succession internal work experience and the corresponding 
managerial experience. FamilyOrGuanxi*Manage is the interaction term between 
FamilyOrGuanxi and Successor manage. FamilyOrGuanxi*Non-Manage is the 
interaction term for FamilyOrGuanxi and Successor non-manage.  
The relevant results are reported in Table 3.14, showing that the coefficients of 
FamilyOrGuanxi*Non-Manage are insignificant, and yet those of 
FamilyOrGuanxi*Manage are significant and positive at the 5% level. This finding 
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implies that the specialised assets obtained by family or guanxi-connected successors 
via the pre-succession internal work experience are de facto mainly derived from the 
managerial experience rather than non-managerial working time.  
One possible interpretation of the above finding is that the internal managerial 
experience can provide the successors with some opportunities critical for the 
acquisition of the specialised assets, and yet the non-managerial experience cannot. 
More specifically, as previously discussed, the reason that the internal experience 
contributes to the acquisition of the assets is because it helps successors to be early 
exposed to the assets, to have time spent with the founder, to track the founder’s work 
practices, and to capture the nuances of the assets in different contexts. All these 
benefits, as researchers suggest (e.g., Cabrera-Suárez et al., 2001; Lee et al., 2003), 
are the key conditions for successors to obtain the founder’s tacit knowledge and 
intangible resources. These conditions can be satisfied through either the non-
managerial or managerial experience inside the family business. However, successors 
may need more than the above to ultimately assimilate and internalise the specialised 
assets. As Bracci and Vagnoni (2011) argue, the only way to absorb tacit resources 
and knowledge is through observation and practice. In other words, apart from 
observing the founder, practice is also an indispensable step to the final assimilation 
of the assets.  
Nevertheless, due to the uniqueness and tacitness of the specialised assets, the 
“practice to assimilation” process tends to be slow, arduous, and costly (Grant, 1996; 
Szulanski, 1996; Brown & Duguid, 1998; Wareham & Gerris, 1999). Taking this into 
consideration, the pre-succession internal managerial experience should be more 
valuable than the corresponding non-managerial experience, as the former can 
provide successors with sufficient time and direct opportunities to practise, and yet 
the latter cannot. More specifically, the longer time successors serve as directors or 
top managers in the firm before the succession, the more opportunities they can have 
to directly and progressively practise the observed management and leadership skills 
in different managerial and decisional processes. This, in turn, helps the successors to 
capture the essence of the skills and eventually internalise them. Moreover, being a 
director or a top manager in the firm before the succession may help the successor to 
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personally get in touch with the founder’s important business connections. This can 
provide the successor with opportunities to gradually build his or her own relationship 
with those connections and earn their recognition and trust. However, all the above 
opportunities provided by the internal managerial experience should be much less 
obtainable through plain non-managerial experience.  
Moreover, Cabrera-Suárez et al. (2001) suggest that a continuous and direct contact 
between the source and the recipient of the specialised assets during the transition 
process can facilitate the success of the transfer. In this respect, the internal 
managerial experience should be more beneficial than the corresponding non-
managerial experience. This is because just working in the firm does not necessarily 
mean that successors have close contact with the founder every day, but working as 
directors or top managers in the firm can greatly increase the successors’ likelihood to 
keep in continuous and direct touch with the founder.  
The above discussion implies that family or guanxi-connected successors’ pre-
succession internal managerial experience should play a much more important role in 
the acquisition of the specialised assets, relative to the corresponding non-managerial 
experience. This, in turn, can explain the results in Table 3.14.  
[Insert Table 3.14 about here] 
3.6.4.3 Do successors’ trust levels matter?  
It has been demonstrated that only the founders’ highly trusted successors have access 
to the specialised assets. This arouses another interesting question, i.e. whether 
successors’ access to and acquisition of the assets increase along with their trust levels 
for the founder.  
Following the previous literature, the guanxi between two individuals varies in 
different degrees (Tsui & Farh, 1997; Bedford, 2011). Specifically, the more 
commonalities exist between the guanxi parties, the more reasons and opportunities 
they have to interact with each other outside the workplace. As a result, their 
communication would be more frequent and comfortable, and their feeling of 
commonality would be stronger. All these contribute to their deeper trust in and 
Chapter 3 - Leadership succession and firm performance 
 143 
stronger affection to each other, and thus a higher level of intimacy of their guanxi. 
Furthermore, with a closer guanxi, one is more likely to take special care of and take 
favourable actions towards the other.  
Based on the above discussion, it should be reasonable to assume that for a family 
business founder and the successor, the more commonalities they share, a more 
intimate guanxi they may have. Moreover, due to the corresponding higher level of 
trust and stronger positive affection, the more willing that the founder may be to 
expose or even voluntarily transfer his or her specialised assets to the successor. As a 
result, the more specialised assets that the successor can get access to and acquire 
through the pre-succession internal experience, and thus the larger positive impact 
that the experience should have on firm performance.  
To examine the above conjecture, in light of the previous literature (Tsui & Farh, 
1997; Bedford, 2011), a variable, Trust index, is constructed for each successor and is 
calculated by the number of the aforementioned seven identities he or she possesses. 
The identities include being a descendant of the founder, sharing the same surname 
with the founder, sharing the same birthplace or native place with the founder, 
graduating from the same college or university with the founder, being a former 
colleague of the founder, serving as a top executive in more than one company 
controlled by the founder, and joining the family firm at its start-up stage. The larger 
the value of the index, the more trustworthy should be the successor for the founder. 
The following model is adopted to test the conjecture: 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =∝ +𝛽1𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽3𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 ∗ 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖,𝑡 +
𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                              (5)    
In the model, Trust index * Work is the interaction term between Trust index and 
Successor work. All the other variables are defined as the same as in the preceding 
models.  
Table 3.15 provides the results, indicating that the coefficients of Trust index * Work 
are significant and positive for both the industry-adjusted ROA and Tobin’s q 
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difference. This suggests that the higher is the successor’s trust index, the larger is the 
positive impact that the successor’s pre-succession internal work experience has on 
firm performance after the succession. This finding supports my conjecture, i.e. 
successors’ acquisition of the founder’s specialised assets not only depends on 
whether the successors are trustworthy for the founder but also is contingent upon 
how strong they are trusted by the founder.   
[Insert Table 3.15 about here] 
3.7 Conclusion 
This chapter investigates the leadership succession-firm performance relationship in 
Chinese family firms. To understand this issue as thoroughly as possible, the first 
purpose of this chapter is to explore whether leadership successions cause a 
significant performance change in family firms. After employing the PSM method 
and a DID analysis to alleviate endogeneity concerns, I find no evidence that 
leadership successions lead to a significant change in firm performance around the 
succession. I contend this finding suggests that the positive impact of leadership 
transitions is offset by the negative effect in China’s context. 
The second aim of this chapter is to investigate in those family firms that have 
experienced leadership successions, whether family successors are more or less 
beneficial to firm performance relative to their nonfamily counterparts. After 
controlling for an extensive array of confounding factors and the application of a DID 
analysis, I find that family successions do not have a significantly different effect on 
firm performance relative to their nonfamily counterparts. This result implies that the 
benefits of having family successors may also be offset by the costs in China’s 
background.  
The final purpose of this chapter is to examine the impact that successors’ acquisition 
of the founder’s specialised assets has on firm performance. To this end, I use 
successors’ pre-succession internal work experience as a proxy for their acquisition of 
the specialised assets. However, because the assets may be accessible only to the 
founders’ highly trusted successors, I conjecture that, in China’s context, the above 
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proxy only applies to successors who are the founder’s descendants or having a 
guanxi with the founder. Moreover, because the assets are crucial to the firm’s 
financial performance, I further hypothesise that family or guanxi-connected 
successors’ pre-succession internal experience has a significant and positive impact 
on firm performance, compared with other successors’ corresponding experience. My 
empirical results confirm this hypothesis, thus, in turn, supporting my posit that 
family or guanxi-connected internal experience before the succession contributes to 
their acquisition of the founder’s specialised assets, thus can significantly improving 
the post-succession firm performance. However, successors who do not have a guanxi 
with the founder are unlikely to acquire the assets through the same experience, 
because the founder does not provide them with the access or only provides them with 
limited access to the assets.  
Moreover, I find that the significant and positive effect of guanxi-connected 
successors’ pre-succession internal experience is larger and more significant than that 
of family successors’ corresponding experience. This finding is different from the 
common view that the founders’ descendants are those who can inherit the most 
specialised assets. I attribute this finding to the situation that China’s familism 
culture, Chinese persons’ strong unidirectional altruism to their children, and China’s 
one-child policy may largely decrease family successors’ incentives to actively 
acquire the specialised assets.  
Furthermore, I document that the significant and positive impact of family and 
guanxi-connected successors’ internal experience mainly stems from the successors’ 
managerial experience. I interpret this finding as that the internal managerial 
experience can provide the successors with some important benefits that the non-
managerial experience cannot, i.e. the opportunities to directly practise the observed 
tacit knowledge, to personally contact with the founder’s business connections, and to 
keep continuous and direct contact with the founder.  
Finally, I find that successors’ acquisition of the founder’s specialised assets is also 
contingent upon their trust levels for the founder. Specifically, I document that the 
closer is the guanxi between the founder and the successor, the larger is the positive 
impact of the successor’s pre-succession internal experience on firm performance.  
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This chapter has several major contributions. Firstly, it adds to the literature on 
leadership succession issues in family firms by providing initial evidence on the 
impact that the leadership transition event has on firm performance. As previously 
discussed, there is some research comparing founder-managed firms with successor-
managed firms in terms of their average performance (e.g., Anderson & Reeb, 2003a; 
Villalonga & Amit, 2006). However, a dynamic comparison in performance between 
these two types of firms, i.e. whether firms having leadership transitions experience a 
significant performance change, compared with their counterparts without a transition 
during the same period, is lacking. This chapter fills this empirical research void, and 
thus contributes to a more accurate understanding of the leadership succession-firm 
performance relationship in family firms.  
Secondly, this chapter provides support for the institution-based view via an in-depth 
theoretical analysis of how the validity of some prevalent perspectives regarding the 
family successor-firm performance relationship varies in China’s context. The 
analysis is then supported by empirical evidence, showing that the finding in China’s 
setting is different from that observed in western and developed economies. This 
shows the readers the importance of the consideration of institutional and cultural 
factors when using theories proved for the case of developed countries to explore 
issues in emerging or developing economies. This, in turn, may contribute to more 
attention to family firms’ succession issues in emerging and developing contexts, as 
the readers of this chapter may realise that they can have some distinctive findings in 
those contexts compared with that in developed countries.  
In addition, this chapter should be the first study linking family business successors’ 
pre-succession internal experience to their acquisition of the founder’s specialised 
assets. In this regard, it provides a new and interesting research direction for 
researchers interested in family business managers’ tenures, i.e. to explore whether 
the tenures are related to the managers’ obtainment of the founder’s specialised assets.  
Moreover, this chapter provides original evidence on the role that family business 
successors’ acquisition of the founder’s specialised assets plays in driving the firm’s 
financial performance. As previously mentioned, the importance of successors’ 
acquisition of the specialised assets has been largely highlighted in theory (e.g., 
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Bjuggren & Sund, 2002; Lee et al., 2003; Sharma & Irving, 2005), and yet empirical 
research to demonstrate the importance is lacking. In this respect, this chapter 
contributes to the literature on the specialised assets in family businesses. 
Finally, it highlights the role of nonfamily successors having a guanxi with the 
founder by demonstrating that both family and guanxi-connected successors can 
acquire the founder’s specialised assets through pre-succession internal experience 
and can use the assets to improve post-succession firm performance. This may 
provide a useful suggestion to family business founders on their successor decisions. 
More specifically, apart from the founders’ descendants, their guanxi-connected 
senior top executives may also be appropriate choices, not only in terms of the 
preservation of the specialised assets in the firm but also in terms of applying the 
assets to make a contribution to firm performance.  
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Chapter 3 Tables 
 
Table 3.1—Industry distribution of firms 
This table reports the industry distribution of the sampled 337 non-succession family firms, 
i.e. firms have always been managed by the founder as both the Chairman of the Board and 
the CEO, and 312 succession family firms, i.e. firms that have experienced a leadership 
succession during the sample period. The industrial classification is based on the Guidelines 
for Classification of Listed Companies proposed by Chinese Security Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC). The table presents both the numbers of each type of firms in each industry and their 
percentages in the group (shown in the parentheses).  
Industry 
Non-succession 
firms 
Succession 
firms 
All firms 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
1. Agriculture 3 8 11 
 (0.89) (2.56) (1.69) 
2. Mining 3 7 10 
 (0.89) (2.24) (1.54) 
3. Manufacturing 258 230 488 
 (76.56) (73.72) (75.19) 
4. Energy 0 1 1 
 (0.00) (0.32) (0.15) 
5. Construction 4 12 16 
 (1.19) (3.85) (2.47) 
6. Wholesale and retail 11 6 17 
 (3.26) (1.92) (2.62) 
7. Transport, storage and postal service 1 2 3 
 (0.30) (0.64) (0.46) 
8. Information technology 32 20 52 
 (9.50) (6.41) (8.01) 
9. Real estate 5 15 20 
 (1.48) (4.81) (3.08) 
10. Leasing and commercial service  6 2 8 
 (1.78) (0.64) (1.23) 
11. Scientific research service 3 1 4 
 (0.89) (0.32) (0.62) 
12. Environment and public facility 3 1 4 
 (0.89) (0.32) (0.62) 
13. Resident service, repair and others 2 0 2 
 (0.59) (0.00) (0.31) 
14. Health and social work 1 0 1 
 (0.30) (0.00) (0.15) 
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15. Culture, sports and entertainment 4 1 5 
 (1.19) (0.32) (0.77) 
16. Comprehensive industry 1 6 7 
  (0.30) (1.92) (1.08) 
Total 337 312 649 
  (100.00) (100.00) (100.00) 
 
Table 3.2—Summary statistics 
This table provides summary statistics of variables for the entire sample, including 337 non-
succession family firms and 348 leadership succession cases taking place in 312 firms. In the 
table, the first two variables measure the firm performance variation during the transition 
period of the succession firms. Specifically, for succession firms, Industry-adjusted ROA 
(Tobin q) difference is calculated as the difference between the average industry-adjusted 
ROA (Tobin’s q) two years after the succession and that two years before the succession. For 
non-succession firms, Industry-adjusted ROA (Tobin q) difference is measured as the 
difference between the average two years after the year t and that two years before the year t, 
where year t stands for each firm-year during the sample period. Moreover, for succession 
firms, all the other variables are measured in the year prior to the succession announcement. 
As for non-succession firms, those variables are calculated for the year t-1, where year t also 
represents each firm-year in the sample period. It is worth noting that the statistics are 
provided after winsorising all continuous variables at the 1% and 99% percentiles. 
 
Variables N Mean Std Median Min Max 
Industry-adjusted ROA difference (%) 928 -1.49 5.44 -1.06 -22.03 14.57 
Industry-adjusted Tobin q difference 769 -0.15 1.42 -0.26 -3.94 5.93 
Industry-adjusted ROAt-1 (%) 1641 1.66 4.61 1.32 -13.04 19.04 
Industry-adjusted Tobin q t-1 1541 0.73 1.32 0.41 -1.29 5.99 
Firm age t-1 1641 10.96 4.79 11 2 22 
Ln(total assets) t-1 1641 21.06 0.85 20.96 19.19 23.83 
Long-debt level t-1 (%) 1641 2.05 4.58 0 0 23.29 
Sales growth t-1 (%) 1302 25.47 53.23 16.66 -51.17 393.87 
Board size t-1 1637 8.37 1.39 9 5 12 
Board ownership t-1 (%) 1617 27.83 23.98 30.15 0 69.58 
Board independence t-1 (%) 1633 37.66 5.27 36.36 33.33 57.14 
Family ownership t-1 (%) 1626 39.33 16.26 38.64 7.43 77.77 
Family control t-1 (%) 1627 44.43 15.32 43.32 14.46 80.6 
Family divergence t-1 (%) 1626 5.08 7.53 0 0 28.35 
Successor work t 348 6.39 5.89 5 0 37 
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Table 3.3—Comparison between non-succession and succession firms  
This table reports the mean comparisons between non-succession and succession firms in 
terms of most variables shown in the previous table (except Successor manage). Columns (0) 
and (1) provide the means for non-succession and succession sub-samples, respectively. 
Column “Mean difference” presents the results of the difference in means t-test for each 
variable. 
 
 
 
Variables 
Non-succession 
firms 
(0) 
Succession 
firms 
(1) 
Mean 
difference 
(0-1) 
Industry-adjusted ROA difference (%) -1.41 -1.71 0.31 
Industry-adjusted Tobin q difference -0.2 -0.05 -0.15 
Industry-adjusted ROAt-1 (%) 1.86 0.92 0.94*** 
Industry-adjusted Tobin q t-1 0.77 0.57 0.21** 
Firm age t-1 10.86 11.32 -0.46 
Ln(total assets) t-1 21.05 21.14 -0.09* 
Long-debt level t-1 (%) 1.86 2.78 -0.92*** 
Sales growth t-1 (%) 26.26 22.75 3.52 
Board size t-1 8.33 8.51 -0.18** 
Board ownership t-1 (%) 29.38 21.87 7.51*** 
Board independence t-1 (%) 37.89 36.8 1.09*** 
Family ownership t-1 (%) 40.82 33.76 7.06*** 
Family control t-1 (%) 45.41 40.76 4.66*** 
Family divergence t-1 (%) 4.58 6.96 -2.38*** 
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level (two-tailed test), respectively. 
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Table 3.4—Comparison between family and nonfamily successions 
This table presents the results of the comparisons between firms with family and nonfamily 
successions in terms of the variables shown in the prior table and the successors’ pre-
transition internal work experience. Column (1) reports the means of the variables for family 
succession firms, and Column (0) lists the means for firms having a nonfamily successor. 
Column “Mean difference” documents the results of the difference in means t-test.  
 
 
 
Variables 
Family 
successions 
(1) 
Nonfamily 
successions 
(0) 
Mean 
difference 
(1-0) 
Industry-adjusted ROA difference (%) -1.12 -1.9 0.78 
Industry-adjusted Tobin q difference 0.23 -0.1 0.33 
Industry-adjusted ROAt-1 (%) 0.37 0.56 -0.19 
Industry-adjusted Tobin q t-1 0.2 0.69 -0.49*** 
Firm age t-1 11.63 11.25 0.37 
Ln(total assets) t-1 21.28 21.1 0.18 
Long-debt level t-1 (%) 3.52 2.67 0.85 
Sales growth t-1 (%) 35.82 34.5 1.32 
Board size t-1 8.66 8.47 0.19 
Board ownership t-1 (%) 19.65 22.88 -3.22 
Board independence t-1 (%) 36.82 36.79 0.02 
Family ownership t-1 (%) 34.23 33.86 0.37 
Family control t-1 (%) 42.42 40.44 1.98 
Family divergence t-1 (%) 7.94 6.58 1.36 
Successor work t 6.99 6.18 0.81 
***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level (two-tailed test), respectively. 
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Table 3.5—Correlation matrix  
This matrix reports the Pearson correlation coefficients for the dependent and independent variables. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
Industry-ROA difference (1) 1               
Industry-Tobin q difference (2) 0.26*** 1              
Succession (3) -0.02 0.05 1             
Industry-ROA t-1 (4) -0.25*** -0.22*** -0.08*** 1            
Industry-Tobin q t-1 (5) -0.06* -0.27*** -0.06** 0.48*** 1           
Firm age t-1 (6) 0.06* 0.05 0.04 -0.06** -0.09*** 1          
Firm size t-1 (7) 0.03 -0.21*** 0.04* -0.09*** -0.31*** 0.11*** 1         
Long-debt level t-1 (8) 0.02 -0.04 0.08*** -0.07*** -0.16*** 0.13*** 0.25*** 1        
Sales growth t-1 (9) 0.03 -0.19*** -0.03 0.22*** 0.15*** 0 0.06** 0.06** 1       
Board size t-1 (10) 0 -0.07* 0.05** -0.02 -0.06** 0.03 0.10*** -0.01 0 1      
Board ownership t-1 (11) -0.01 0.07* -0.13*** 0.12*** 0.14*** -0.13*** -0.16*** -0.16*** -0.03 -0.08*** 1     
Independence t-1 (12) 0.02 0.04 -0.08*** 0.06** 0.01 -0.05** 0.01 -0.03 -0.04 -0.56*** 0.06** 1    
Family ownership t-1 (13) -0.06* -0.04 -0.18*** 0.20*** 0.12*** -0.14*** 0.04 -0.08*** 0.03 -0.18*** 0.40*** 0.21*** 1   
Family control t-1 (14) -0.07** -0.05 -0.12*** 0.21*** 0.06** -0.15*** 0.10*** 0 0.04 -0.14*** 0.15*** 0.19*** 0.89*** 1  
Family divergence t-1 (15) -0.02 -0.01 0.13*** 0 -0.13*** 0 0.13*** 0.17*** 0.01 0.10*** -0.56*** -0.07*** -0.35*** 0.12*** 1 
***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level (two-tailed test), respectively. 
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Table 3.6— Post-PSM comparison between non-succession and succession firms 
This table reports the difference between the succession cases and their matched non-
succession firms in terms of a series of the pre-succession characteristics after the 
PSM process. Here, Column “P-value” presents the p-values for the difference in 
means t-tests. 
 
Variables 
Non-succession 
firms 
Succession 
firms 
Mean 
difference 
P-value 
Industry-adjusted ROA t-1 (%) 1.42 0.88 0.54 0.75 
Industry-adjusted Tobin q t-1 0.79 0.58 0.21 0.29 
Firm age t-1 11.4 11.37 0.04 0.7 
Ln(total assets) t-1 21.2 21.22 -0.02 0.73 
Long-debt level t-1 (%) 2.57 2.12 0.45 0.12 
Sales growth t-1 (%) 31.82 25.22 6.6 0.14 
Board independence t-1 (%) 37.58 37.07 0.51 0.34 
Family control t-1 (%) 41.73 41.51 0.21 0.42 
Family divergence t-1 (%) 6.62 5.4 1.21 0.34 
***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level (two-tailed test), respectively. 
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Table 3.7— Leadership succession and firm performance   
This table reports the results of the DID analysis of the leadership succession-firm 
performance relationship after the PSM procedure. The dependent variables are the difference 
between the two-year average industry-adjusted ROA after the succession and that before the 
succession (Column (1)) as well as the corresponding difference for the industry-adjusted 
Tobin’s q (Column (2)). Succession equals one for the succession cases and zero for non-
succession observations.  
 
 Industry-adjusted ROA  
difference 
Industry-adjusted Tobin q 
difference 
 (1) (2) 
Succession -0.007 0.150 
 (0.006) (0.180) 
Industry-adjusted ROA t-1 -0.290
***  
 (0.095)  
Industry-adjusted Tobin q t-1  -0.385
*** 
  (0.094) 
Firm age t-1 -0.000 -0.005 
 (0.001) (0.016) 
Firm size t-1 0.000 -0.721
*** 
 (0.005) (0.131) 
Long-debt level t-1 0.025 1.957 
 (0.087) (1.511) 
Sales growth t-1 0.005 -0.425
** 
 (0.009) (0.169) 
Board independence t-1 0.008 0.751 
 (0.057) (1.768) 
Family control t-1 -0.013 2.050
*** 
 (0.022) (0.713) 
Family divergence t-1 0.118
*** -0.395 
 (0.043) (1.074) 
Industry & year dummies Yes Yes 
Observations 308 260 
R2 0.148 0.366 
Adj. R2 0.063 0.289 
Firm-level clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
 ***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level (two-tailed test), respectively. 
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Table 3.8—Family succession and firm performance 
This table provides the results of the DID analysis of the comparison between family and 
nonfamily successors in terms of their effect on firm performance. The dependent variables 
are defined as the same as in the previous table. Family is the independent variable of interest, 
equal to one if the successor is a descendant of the founder, by blood or marriage; otherwise, 
it equals zero. All the other variables are the controls for pre-succession firm-, governance-, 
and family-level characteristics, as well as industry and year fixed effects. 
 
 Industry-adjusted ROA 
difference 
Industry-adjusted Tobin q 
difference 
 (1) (2) 
Family 0.005 0.197 
 (0.011) (0.236) 
Industry-adjusted ROA t-1 -0.336
**  
 (0.164)  
Industry-adjusted Tobin q t-1  -0.441
*** 
  (0.132) 
Firm age t-1 -0.001 0.005 
 (0.001) (0.020) 
Firm size t-1 0.008 -0.784
*** 
 (0.007) (0.164) 
Long-debt level t-1 -0.049 2.833 
 (0.122) (1.740) 
Sales growth t-1 0.002 -0.103
* 
 (0.005) (0.061) 
Board independence t-1 -0.045 0.709 
 (0.117) (2.426) 
Family control t-1 -0.020 1.293
* 
 (0.034) (0.755) 
Family divergence t-1 0.143
** 0.227 
 (0.069) (1.479) 
Industry & year dummies Yes Yes 
Observations 236 204 
R2 0.190 0.325 
Adj. R2 0.090 0.226 
Firm-level clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level (two-tailed test), respectively. 
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Table 3.9—Successors’ pre-succession internal work experience and firm 
performance  
This table reports the results for the comparison among family, guanxi-connected, and non-
guanxi-connected successors in terms of the effect that their work experience in the firm 
before the succession has on firm performance. In Columns (1) and (3), FamilyOrGuanxi 
equals one if the successor is the founder’s descendant or a guanxi-connected nonfamily 
member and zero otherwise. Successor work is the number of the years that the successor has 
worked in the family business till the succession announcement year. FamilyOrGuanxi*Work 
is the interaction term between FamilyOrGuanxi and Successor work. In Columns (2) and (4), 
Guanxi equals one if the successor is a nonfamily member having a guanxi with the founder 
before the succession and zero otherwise. Family*Work is the interaction term between 
Family and Successor work. Guanxi*Work is the interaction term for Guanxi and Successor 
work. Other variables are defined as the same as in the previous tables.  
 
 Industry-adjusted ROA 
difference 
Industry-adjusted Tobin q 
difference 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
FamilyOrGuanxi -0.021  -0.541  
 (0.017)  (0.381)  
Family  -0.006  -0.140 
  (0.020)  (0.485) 
Guanxi  -0.030  -0.811* 
  (0.022)  (0.437) 
Successor work t -0.014
*** -0.014*** -0.153* -0.158* 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.080) (0.081) 
FamilyOrGuanxi*Work 0.016***  0.185**  
 (0.006)  (0.086)  
Family*Work  0.014**  0.162* 
  (0.006)  (0.090) 
Guanxi*Work  0.017***  0.206** 
  (0.006)  (0.089) 
Industry-adjusted ROA t-1 -0.336
** -0.328**   
 (0.138) (0.137)   
Industry-adjusted Tobin q t-1   -0.434
*** -0.413*** 
   (0.128) (0.131) 
Firm age t-1 -0.001 -0.001 0.005 0.004 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.020) (0.020) 
Firm size t-1 0.003 0.003 -0.831
*** -0.817*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.164) (0.163) 
Long-debt level t-1 -0.054 -0.060 3.305
* 3.091 
 (0.122) (0.123) (1.861) (1.889) 
Sales growth t-1 0.002 0.002 -0.106
* -0.109* 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.056) (0.058) 
Board independence t-1 -0.059 -0.058 -0.134 0.112 
 (0.101) (0.101) (2.450) (2.373) 
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Table 3.9 continued     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Family control t-1 -0.027 -0.029 1.432
* 1.354* 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.802) (0.774) 
Family divergence t-1 0.155
** 0.147** 0.363 0.144 
 (0.067) (0.068) (1.449) (1.499) 
Industry & year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 236 236 204 204 
R2 0.268 0.273 0.350 0.361 
Adj. R2 0.169 0.167 0.246 0.250 
Firm-level clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level (two-tailed test), respectively. 
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Table 3.10— Comparison between non-succession and succession firms after the 
extension of the PSM model 
This table provides the mean comparison between the succession cases and the matched non-
succession observations after extending the baseline PSM model by another host of firm- and 
environment-level characteristics.  
 
Variables 
Non-succession 
firms 
Succession 
firms 
Mean 
difference P-value 
Industry-adjusted ROA t-1 (%) 1.03 0.92 0.11 0.81 
Industry-adjusted Tobin q t-1 0.63 0.56 0.06 0.23 
Firm age t-1 11.27 11.28 -0.01 0.45 
Ln(total assets) t-1 21.15 21.19 -0.05 0.43 
Long-debt level t-1 (%) 2.56 2.22 0.34 0.67 
Sales growth t-1 (%) 27.56 25.36 2.2 0.13 
Board independence t-1 (%) 36.91 36.94 -0.04 0.99 
Family control t-1 (%) 42.76 41.21 1.55 0.36 
Family divergence t-1 (%) 5.4 5.6 -0.2 0.95 
Dividend payout t-1 (%) 25.84 27.06 -1.22 0.65 
Interest coverage t-1 0.61 0.55 0.06 0.77 
Nonfamily ownership t-1 (%) 9.05 8.47 0.57 0.65 
State ownership t-1 (%) 0.64 0.36 0.28 0.45 
Foreign ownership t-1 (%) 1.35 1.49 -0.15 0.47 
Institutional development t-1 9.63 9.7 -0.08 0.91 
Industrial competition t-1 0.04 0.04 0 0.69 
***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level (two-tailed test), respectively. 
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Table 3.11—Leadership succession and firm performance after the extension of 
the PSM model 
This table reports the results for the relationship between leadership successions and firm 
performance variation after applying the extended PSM model.   
 
 Industry-adjusted ROA  
difference 
Industry-adjusted Tobin q 
difference 
 (1) (2) 
Succession -0.004 0.048 
 (0.007) (0.171) 
Industry-adjusted ROA t-1 -0.313
***  
 (0.106)  
Industry-adjusted Tobin q t-1  -0.494
*** 
  (0.126) 
Firm age t-1 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.020) 
Firm size t-1 0.004 -0.609
*** 
 (0.005) (0.125) 
Long-debt level t-1 -0.026 1.484 
 (0.103) (1.429) 
Sales growth t-1 0.000 -0.002 
 (0.000) (0.002) 
Board independence t-1 -0.038 0.122 
 (0.080) (2.174) 
Family control t-1 -0.016 0.515 
 (0.024) (0.603) 
Family divergence t-1 0.024 -0.751 
 (0.052) (1.138) 
Dividend payout t-1 -0.008 -0.054 
 (0.010) (0.305) 
Interest coverage t-1 -0.007 -0.656
*** 
 (0.008) (0.178) 
Nonfamily ownership t-1 0.007 -0.623 
 (0.031) (0.978) 
State ownership t-1 0.051 0.320 
 (0.213) (3.242) 
Foreign ownership t-1 0.009 -0.883 
 (0.055) (1.759) 
Institutional environment t-1 0.000 0.044 
 (0.003) (0.059) 
Industrial competition t-1 0.132 2.013 
 (0.091) (4.598) 
Industry & year dummies Yes Yes 
Observations 304 255 
R2 0.154 0.358 
Adj. R2 0.047 0.259 
Firm-level clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level (two-tailed test), respectively. 
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Table 3.12—The consideration of other firm-level, environmental, and 
succession-specific characteristics for H2 and H3 
This table reports the results for H2 and H3 after controlling for another set of firm-level, 
environmental, and succession-specific characteristics in the baseline regression models.  
 
 H2 H3 
 Industry-
adjusted ROA  
difference 
Industry-
adjusted Tobin q 
difference 
Industry-
adjusted ROA  
difference 
Industry-
adjusted Tobin q 
difference 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Family 0.005 0.154   
 (0.013) (0.264)   
FamilyOrGuanxi   -0.024 -0.574 
   (0.019) (0.429) 
Successor work t   -0.014
** -0.143* 
   (0.006) (0.079) 
FamilyOrGuanxi*Work   0.016*** 0.175** 
   (0.006) (0.084) 
Industry-adjusted ROA t-1 -0.332
*  -0.334**  
 (0.173)  (0.150)  
Industry-adjusted Tobin q t-1  -0.424
***  -0.419*** 
  (0.150)  (0.152) 
Firm age t-1 -0.002 -0.015 -0.002 -0.016 
 (0.001) (0.022) (0.001) (0.022) 
Firm size t-1 0.013 -0.618
*** 0.009 -0.662*** 
 (0.009) (0.181) (0.009) (0.179) 
Long-debt level t-1 -0.056 2.605 -0.059 3.017 
 (0.126) (1.838) (0.123) (1.939) 
Sales growth t-1 0.001 -0.116
* 0.001 -0.118** 
 (0.006) (0.059) (0.005) (0.053) 
Board independence t-1 -0.001 1.516 -0.025 0.543 
 (0.124) (2.591) (0.111) (2.611) 
Family control t-1 -0.015 1.199 -0.019 1.368
* 
 (0.035) (0.773) (0.034) (0.804) 
Family divergence t-1 0.162
** 1.214 0.169** 1.272 
 (0.077) (1.658) (0.073) (1.601) 
Dividend payout t-1 -0.004 -0.258 -0.005 -0.291 
 (0.015) (0.309) (0.014) (0.307) 
Interest coverage t-1 -0.011 -0.565
*** -0.009 -0.531** 
 (0.012) (0.215) (0.012) (0.214) 
Nonfamily ownership t-1 -0.027 0.251 -0.005 0.188 
 (0.069) (1.440) (0.070) (1.485) 
State ownership t-1 0.084 4.049 0.019 2.544 
 (0.265) (5.386) (0.218) (4.392) 
Foreign ownership t-1 0.017 -2.592 0.002 -2.798 
 (0.094) (1.974) (0.092) (2.031) 
Institutional environment t-1 0.001 0.011 0.001 0.020 
 (0.004) (0.078) (0.004) (0.075) 
Industrial competition t-1 0.072 1.789 0.051 1.322 
 (0.095) (3.511) (0.096) (3.658) 
Early succession -0.017 -0.023 -0.011 -0.049 
 (0.016) (0.351) (0.014) (0.341) 
Retire -0.020 0.163 -0.017 0.270 
 (0.032) (0.425) (0.030) (0.410) 
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Table 3.12 continued     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Postsuccession founder 0.012 0.021 0.007 -0.035 
 (0.012) (0.250) (0.013) (0.270) 
Industry & year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 236 204 236 204 
R2 0.218 0.381 0.286 0.403 
Adj. R2 0.048 0.220 0.122 0.238 
Firm-level clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level (two-tailed test), respectively. 
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Table 3.13— Successors’ learning ability 
    This table reports the results for H3 when confining successors to similar learning ability. 
The learning ability is measured by the highest education level attained by the successors, and 
those whose highest education attainment is above (below) the median value are classified 
into the “high(low) ability” group.  
 Industry-adjusted ROA 
difference 
Industry-adjusted Tobin q 
difference 
Groups: Low ability High ability Low ability High ability 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
FamilyOrGuanxi -0.034 -0.045 -0.726 -0.537 
 (0.029) (0.039) (0.582) (0.710) 
Successor work t -0.015*** -0.014* -0.100 -0.197* 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.133) (0.109) 
FamilyOrGuanxi*Work 0.019*** 0.015** 0.159* 0.232** 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.141) (0.111) 
Industry-adjusted ROA t-1 -0.342* -0.294   
 (0.185) (0.220)   
Industry-adjusted Tobin q t-1   -0.278
* -0.495* 
   (0.160) (0.294) 
Firm age t-1 -0.000 -0.002 -0.014 -0.051 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.036) (0.043) 
Firm size t-1 -0.008 0.012 -0.909*** -0.539* 
 (0.015) (0.013) (0.228) (0.317) 
Long-debt level t-1 0.066 -0.257 5.567 0.812 
 (0.135) (0.163) (3.408) (3.729) 
Sales growth t-1 0.004 0.002 -0.157*** 0.027 
 (0.007) (0.004) (0.049) (0.072) 
Board independence t-1 -0.166 0.143 -4.622 2.941 
 (0.220) (0.182) (3.569) (3.402) 
Family control t-1 -0.027 0.028 0.273 2.051* 
 (0.083) (0.070) (1.121) (1.234) 
Family divergence t-1 0.124 0.112 4.336 -1.264 
 (0.121) (0.179) (2.800) (2.729) 
Dividend payout t-1 0.003 -0.039 -0.601 -0.217 
 (0.020) (0.030) (0.539) (0.499) 
Interest coverage t-1 -0.001 -0.004 -0.164 -0.960*** 
 (0.020) (0.022) (0.310) (0.363) 
Nonfamily ownership t-1 -0.070 0.046 -0.498 0.820 
 (0.122) (0.186) (1.993) (3.211) 
State ownership t-1 0.154 -0.283 4.459 -3.015 
 (0.330) (0.681) (6.807) (9.993) 
Foreign ownership t-1 0.248* -0.057 -1.128 -1.920 
 (0.148) (0.225) (3.525) (4.185) 
Institutional environment t-1 0.010 -0.005 0.081 0.083 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.098) (0.145) 
Industrial competition t-1 -0.060 0.074 -0.722 3.196 
 (0.115) (0.199) (3.992) (5.843) 
Early succession 0.045 -0.022 0.814 -0.161 
 (0.036) (0.031) (0.753) (0.483) 
Retire -0.039 -0.015 0.829 -0.289 
 (0.080) (0.036) (0.865) (0.555) 
Postsuccession founder -0.016 0.016 -0.139 -0.198 
 (0.025) (0.021) (0.497) (0.554) 
Industry & year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 124 112 103 101 
R2 0.578 0.518 0.511 0.534 
Adj. R2 0.292 0.010 0.182 0.197 
Firm-level clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level (two-tailed test), respectively. 
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Table 3.14—The decomposition of successors’ work experience 
This table provides the results for H3 after decomposing successors’ pre-succession internal 
work experience into the non-managerial and managerial experience. Successors’ pre-
succession internal managerial experience, i.e. Successor manage, is measured as the number 
of the years that the successor has worked as a director or a top manager in the family firm 
before the succession. The corresponding non-managerial experience, i.e. Successor non-
manage, is calculated as the difference between the pre-succession internal work experience 
and the managerial experience. FamilyOrGuanxi*Non-manage is the interaction term between 
FamilyOrGuanxi and Successor non-manage. FamilyOrGuanxi*Manage represents the 
interaction term for FamilyOrGuanxi and Successor manage.  
 
 Industry-adjusted ROA 
difference 
Industry-adjusted Tobin q 
difference 
 (1) (2) 
FamilyOrGuanxi -0.013 -0.635 
 (0.020) (0.443) 
Successor non-manage t -0.011 -0.172 
 (0.008) (0.110) 
Successor manage t -0.017
* -0.110 
 (0.009) (0.120) 
FamilyOrGuanxi*Non-manage 0.009 0.138  
 (0.008) (0.125)  
FamilyOrGuanxi*Manage 0.019** 0.213**  
 (0.009) (0.117)  
Industry-adjusted ROA t-1 -0.357
**  
 (0.151)  
Industry-adjusted Tobin q t-1  -0.414
*** 
  (0.152) 
Firm age t-1 -0.002 -0.014 
 (0.001) (0.022) 
Firm size t-1 0.011 -0.665
*** 
 (0.009) (0.183) 
Long-debt level t-1 -0.055 3.072 
 (0.122) (1.942) 
Sales growth t-1 0.002 -0.119
** 
 (0.005) (0.056) 
Board independence t-1 -0.016 0.573 
 (0.105) (2.635) 
Family control t-1 -0.022 1.412
* 
 (0.034) (0.793) 
Family divergence t-1 0.178
** 1.325 
 (0.072) (1.613) 
Dividend payout t-1 -0.006 -0.304 
 (0.014) (0.305) 
Interest coverage t-1 -0.012 -0.536
** 
 (0.012) (0.216) 
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Table 3.14 continued   
 (1) (2) 
Nonfamily ownership t-1 -0.018 0.185 
 (0.072) (1.540) 
State ownership t-1 0.042 2.815 
 (0.211) (4.436) 
Foreign ownership t-1 -0.003 -2.780 
 (0.093) (2.101) 
Institutional environment t-1 0.003 0.055 
 (0.004) (0.075) 
Industrial competition t-1 0.093 1.294 
 (0.095) (3.798) 
Early succession -0.011 -0.035 
 (0.014) (0.341) 
Retire -0.012 0.207 
 (0.028) (0.407) 
Postsuccession founder 0.009 -0.067 
 (0.014) (0.292) 
Industry & year dummies Yes Yes 
Observations 236 204 
R2 0.299 0.406 
Adj. R2 0.128 0.232 
Firm-level clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level (two-tailed test), respectively. 
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Table 3.15—The role of successors’ trust level 
This table reports the results for testing whether the impact that successors’ internal experience 
has on firm performance is contingent upon their trust levels for the founder. Trust index denotes a 
successor’s trust level, measured by the number of the preceding guanxi identities (including 
being a family member of the founder) that the successor possesses. Trust index*Work is the 
interaction term between Trust index and Successor work.  
 
 Industry-adjusted ROA 
difference 
Industry-adjusted Tobin q 
difference 
 (1) (2) 
Trust index -0.001 -0.133 
 (0.013) (0.246) 
Successor work t -0.003 -0.030 
 (0.002) (0.029) 
Trust index*Work 0.002* 0.030* 
 (0.001) (0.017) 
Industry-adjusted ROA t-1 -0.453***  
 (0.144)  
Industry-adjusted Tobin q t-1  -0.426
*** 
  (0.148) 
Firm age t-1 -0.001 -0.013 
 (0.001) (0.022) 
Firm size t-1 0.005 -0.699*** 
 (0.010) (0.188) 
Long-debt level t-1 -0.103 3.241* 
 (0.131) (1.893) 
Sales growth t-1 0.002 -0.111* 
 (0.005) (0.058) 
Board independence t-1 -0.051 1.199 
 (0.141) (2.621) 
Family control t-1 0.012 1.409* 
 (0.038) (0.789) 
Family divergence t-1 0.109 1.455 
 (0.083) (1.659) 
Dividend payout t-1 0.007 -0.206 
 (0.017) (0.303) 
Interest coverage t-1 -0.003 -0.566*** 
 (0.013) (0.214) 
Nonfamily ownership t-1 -0.037 0.175 
 (0.088) (1.478) 
State ownership t-1 -0.182 1.202 
 (0.297) (4.160) 
Foreign ownership t-1 0.094 -2.805 
 (0.127) (2.019) 
Institutional environment t-1 0.004 0.054 
 (0.004) (0.076) 
Industrial competition t-1 0.067 1.790 
 (0.105) (3.741) 
Early succession -0.023 -0.127 
 (0.018) (0.342) 
Retire -0.029 0.216 
 (0.033) (0.424) 
Postsuccession founder 0.002 -0.043 
 (0.012) (0.274) 
Industry & year dummies Yes Yes 
Observations 236 204 
R2 0.327 0.398 
Adj. R2 0.120 0.232 
Firm-level clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level (two-tailed test), respectively. 
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Table 3.16—Definitions of variables 
Variable Definition 
ROA Net income / total assets 
Industry-adjusted ROA ROA - the median ROA of the relevant industry and year 
Industry-adjusted ROA difference 
 
(Post-succession 2-year average ROA) – (pre-succession 2-year 
average ROA)  
ROA t-1 ROA in year t-1 
Tobin q 
 
 
(Market value of equity + book value of debt) / book value of total 
assets, taking tradable stocks’ market price as non-tradable stocks’ 
market price 
Industry-adjusted Tobin q Tobin q - the median Tobin q of the relevant industry and year 
Industry-adjusted Tobin q difference 
 
(Post-succession 2-year average Tobin q) – (pre-succession 2-year 
average Tobin q)  
Tobin q t-1 Tobin q in year t-1 
ROE Net income / equity 
OROA Earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) / total assets 
Another measure of Tobin's q 
 
(Market value of equity + book value of debt) / book value of total 
assets, the value of non-tradable stocks is its book value 
Industry- and performance-adjusted 
ROA 
Industry-adjusted ROA - the median Industry-adjusted ROA of a 
control group of firms with similar performance 
Succession 
 
An indicator equal to 1 if the firm has experienced a leadership 
succession, and 0 otherwise 
Family 
 
An indicator equal to 1 if the successor is the founder’s descendant, 
by blood or marriage, and 0 otherwise  
FamilyOrGuanxi 
 
 
An indicator equal to 1 if the successor is the founder’s descendant or 
a nonfamily member having a guanxi with the founder, and 0 
otherwise 
Guanxi 
 
An indicator equal to 1 if the successor is a nonfamily member 
having a guanxi with the founder, and 0 otherwise 
Trust index 
 
The number of the guanxi identities (including a descendant of the 
founder) that the successor has 
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Successor work t 
 
The number of years the successor has worked in the firm till the 
succession announcement year 
Successor manage t 
 
The number of years the successor has worked as a director or a top 
manager in the firm till the succession announcement year 
Successor non-manage t The difference between Successor work t and Successor manage t 
FamilyOrGuanxi*Work The interaction term between FamilyOrGuanxi and Successor work t 
Family*Work The interaction term between Family and Successor work t 
Guanxi*Work The interaction term between Guanxi and Successor work t 
Trust index*Work The interaction term between Trust index and Successor work t 
FamilyOrGuanxi*Manage 
 
The interaction term between FamilyOrGuanxi and Successor 
manage t 
FamilyOrGuanxi*Non-manage 
 
The interaction term between FamilyOrGuanxi and Successor non-
manage t 
Firm size t-1 The natural logarithm of total assets in year t-1 
Firm age t-1 The number of years since the firm’s founding year to year t-1 
Long-debt level t-1 
 
Long-term debt / total assets in year t-1, where long-term debt is the 
borrowing with a maturity of more than 1 year 
Sales growth t-1 
 
The difference in total sales between year t-1 and year t-2 divided by 
total sales in year t-2 
Board size t-1 The number of directors on the board in year t-1 
Board ownership t-1 Directors’ ownership / total shares outstanding in year t-1 
Board independence t-1 
 
The proportion of independent directors among the board directors in 
year t-1 
Family ownership t-1 
 
 
 
The number of shares held by the family as a percentage of total 
shares outstanding in year t-1. If the family controls the firm 
indirectly through a pyramid structure, it is calculated as the product 
of the family’s ownership stakes along the control chain. 
Family control t-1 
 
 
The family’s votes as a percentage of total votes outstanding in year 
t-1. If the family controls the firm through a pyramid structure, it is 
measured by the minimum voting stake along the control chain. 
Family divergence t-1 The difference between Family control t-1 and Family ownership t-1 
Dividend payout t-1 Dividend per share as a percentage of earning per share in year t-1 
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Interest coverage t-1 
 
 
 
An indicator equals to 1 if the interest coverage ratio, calculated as 
earnings before interest and tax divided by the total interest payable 
on bonds and other contractual debt, is greater than 2 in year t-1, and 
0 otherwise 
Nonfamily ownership t-1 
 
 
The number of shares held by nonfamily block-holders/ total shares 
outstanding in year t-1, where block-holders are individuals or 
institutions holding at least 5% ownership 
State ownership t-1 State-owned shares／total shares outstanding in year t-1 
Foreign ownership t-1 Foreign shares / total shares outstanding in year t-1 
Institutional development t-1 
 
Fan et al.’s (2011) index of the market development levels for 
Chinese provinces in year t-1 
Industrial competition t-1 
 
𝐻 = ∑ 𝑆𝑖
2𝑛
𝑖=1 , where Si is the market share of firm i (firm’s sales as a 
percentage of sales for the same industry), n is the number of firms in 
the industry 
Early succession 
 
An indicator equal to 1 if the founder leaves the leadership position 
before 65, and 0 otherwise 
Retire 
 
An indicator equal to 1 if the founder is reported to leave due to 
“retirement”, and 0 otherwise 
Postsuccession founder 
 
An indicator equal to 1 if the founder remains as a director or a top 
manager in the firm one year after the succession, and 0 otherwise 
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Chapter 4  Leadership successor decision and 
access to debt  
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter 3 has investigated the relationship between the leadership successor decision 
and firm performance in Chinese family firms. A natural follow-up question is, apart 
from firm performance, whether the successor decision affects the firm’s other 
financial outcomes which are also important to the firm’s longevity and development. 
This chapter attempts to provide some evidence on this question by exploring the 
impact that the successor choice may have on the firm’s access to debt finance. The 
reason to focus on this outcome, as discussed in Chapter 1, is because debt financing 
is an important financing channel for Chinese family firms. Firstly, it can trade-off the 
firm owners’ need for external finance and the aversion to control dilution (Amore et 
al., 2011). Secondly, it is critical to the firms’ growth and development, as China’s 
underdeveloped capital market makes debt capital, especially in the form of bank 
credit, become the key source of external finance for the firms (Fan et al., 2008; Cull 
et al., 2015).79 Thirdly, unlike state-owned enterprises (SOEs) which enjoy soft 
budget constraints and financing preference terms provided by the government, 
family firms in China often face credit discrimination and suffer from financial 
constraints (Xu et al., 2013). Therefore, it is especially interesting and important to 
examine family firms’ ability in debt financing in the context of China. 
Family business founders, as mentioned in the previous chapters, often face a 
dilemma between appointing a family member and a nonfamily agent as the new 
leader of the firm. Firm leaders, in turn, have long been considered as playing a key 
role in shaping the firm’s financial strategies and access to external finance (e.g., 
Minichilli et al., 2010; Amore et al., 2011). Motivated by these arguments, the first 
aim of this chapter is to explore whether family successors and their nonfamily 
                                               
79 The reason for this situation, as mentioned in Chapter 1, is because, in China, more than 70% of the financial 
resources are controlled by state-owned banks (Allen et al., 2005; Chen et al., 2013a; Shi, 2013).  
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counterparts have different impacts on the firm’s access to debt finance in China’s 
setting.  
As reviewed in Chapter 3, several prior studies have compared the above two types of 
successors in terms of their impact on firm performance (e.g., Smith & Amoako-Adu, 
1999; Pérez-González, 2006; Bennedsen et al., 2007; Cucculelli & Micucci, 2008). 
However, the attention to firms’ debt financing is very scarce. To the best of my 
knowledge, Amore et al.’s (2011) study is the only one hitherto providing some 
evidence on this issue in the context of Italy. More specifically, the authors find that 
nonfamily succession firms exhibit a significant increase in debt level relative to their 
family succession counterparts. The authors attribute this finding to the fact that 
nonfamily agents are better able to identify or create more investment and growth 
opportunities to the firm, and thus need more funds to cope with those opportunities. 
Moreover, they find that the positive nonfamily succession-debt level relationship 
primarily stems from short-term debt, which confirms the above explanation, as short 
maturities are particularly appropriate for firms with more growth opportunities 
(Barclay & Smith, 1995; Johnson, 2003).  
While the above study has investigated the role of family and nonfamily successors in 
determining the firm’s debt finance, the exploration of this issue for family firms in 
China is still necessary and worthwhile. This is because, firstly, the business and 
institutional environment in China is different from that in Italy, which may cause the 
difference in the successors’ behaviour and capability, and, in turn, affect the firm’s 
financing policy and ability. For example, China’s legal system is much weaker than 
that in Italy80, and thus nonfamily agents in China are more likely to behave 
opportunistically and self-interestedly (Burkart et al., 2003). In addition, affected by 
Confucian familism, Chinese people typically have a low degree of trust outside of 
kinship. These factors may aggravate the conflict between the controlling family and 
the leadership successor if the successor is a nonfamily member (Jensen & Meckling, 
                                               
80 Allen et al. (2005) compare the institutional environment in China with that in La Porta et al.’s (1998) sampled 
countries, in which Italy is included. While Allen et al.’s (2005) statistics show that China and Italy have similar 
scores in terms of creditor and shareholder protection systems, they also underline that the scores measure the legal 
system on paper rather than in practice. However, for a more practical measure, the quality of legal enforcement, 
China’s scores are significantly lower than that of Italy. For example, for two key categories of “law enforcement”, 
i.e. the “rule of law” and “government corruption”, China is scored as 5 and 2, respectively, and yet Italy is scored 
as 8.33 and 6.13, respectively.  
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1976; Xu et al., 2015). This, in turn, may increase lenders’ agency concerns of 
managerial opportunism in the family firm, and thus may adversely affect the firm’s 
access to debt capital.  
However, in the meantime, different from the founders in other economies having a 
large pool of heirs for a family succession, those in China typically face a much 
severer human capital constraint for a qualified family successor due to the one-child 
policy. This also casts doubt on the capabilities of family successors, including their 
ability in terms of fundraising.  
In other words, the leadership successors’ ability in financing should always be a 
special concern for family firms in China, no matter the successor is the founder’s 
family member or not. This, in turn, may adversely affect the firm’s access to debt 
finance after the succession. Considering the fact that most Chinese family firms have 
already viewed the limited access to credit resources as one of the main barriers to 
their growth and development (Li et al., 2008), the successors’ impact on the firm’s 
debt-financing becomes especially crucial for the firm’s survival and longevity after 
the succession. Thus, this issue deserves special attention.  
Moreover, Amore et al. (2011) interpret their finding, i.e. nonfamily successors are 
positively related to the firm’s debt ratio, as a reflection of the successors’ greater 
demand for funds to fulfil their investment needs. However, this interpretation may 
not apply to China’s setting. More specifically, as mentioned in Chapter 1, the vast 
majority of financial resources in China are dominated by the government, and thus 
the allocation of the resources is often biased towards state-owned enterprises instead 
of their private counterparts, such as family businesses (Allen et al., 2005). In 
addition, Chinese private enterprises’ smaller size, younger age, and lack of political 
support make them much riskier in the eyes of most lenders compared with SOEs (Xu 
et al., 2013). These factors impose difficulties in accessing debt capital and result in 
severe financial constraints in most Chinese family businesses (Xu et al., 2013; Cull 
et al., 2015). In this context, family firms’ debt level is less likely determined by how 
much the successors demand, but more likely determined by how much they can 
raise. In other words, even if nonfamily successors indeed need more debt capital for 
investment, their firms’ debt level may still not be necessarily higher, if they are less 
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capable of fundraising compared with family successors. Therefore, instead of 
analysing family firms’ debt financing from the angle of the successors’ investment 
demand, it should be more appropriate to explore the issue from the perspective of the 
successors’ ability in debt financing in China’s setting. Meanwhile, it is interesting 
and necessary to examine whether Amore et al.’s (2011) finding holds in China. 
Furthermore, Amore et al.’s (2011) study has a small limitation, that is, they classify 
successors’ family or nonfamily nature by surname affinity with the controlling 
family. However, it is still possible that some successors sharing the controlling 
family’s surname are not their family members, and some who are not are de facto the 
family’s in-laws. This may have an adverse impact on the validity and reliability of 
the authors’ findings. 
For the above reasons and the aforementioned importance of debt finance for Chinese 
family firms, family and nonfamily successors’ impact on the firm’s access to debt 
after the succession deserves a systematic investigation in the context of China. 
In addition, as discussed in Chapter 1, the aforementioned credit discrimination 
against Chinese family businesses makes them have to heavily rely on their founders’ 
specialised assets to compete for credit resources (Allen et al., 2005). In this context, 
successors’ acquisition of the specialised assets should also play an important role in 
determining the firm’s access to debt capital after the succession. Motivated by this 
conjecture, the second research purpose of this chapter is to explore whether 
successors’ acquisition of the founder’s specialised assets has an impact on the firm’s 
post-succession access to debt finance.  
To explore the above issue, following Chapter 3, successors’ managerial experience 
in the firm before the succession is used as a proxy for their acquisition of the 
founder’s specialised assets.81 However, because the assets are accessible only to the 
founder’s highly trusted members and the Chinese familism culture means that family 
business founders tend to have a low degree of trust outside of kinship, I posit that the 
above proxy may be applicable only to family successors. This, in turn, leads to my 
                                               
81 In Chapter 3, I use successors’ pre-succession internal work experience as a proxy for their acquisition of the 
specialised assets. However, in later analysis, I find that it is the internal managerial experience, rather than non-
managerial working time, helps the successors to acquire the assets.  
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hypothesis that family successors’ pre-succession internal managerial experience is 
more conducive to the firm’s access to debt, relative to their nonfamily counterparts’ 
corresponding experience.  
As to my empirical results, I find that family successors are significantly and 
negatively related to the firm’s debt level82 compared with nonfamily successors. 
This finding confirms my posit that family successors are less capable of debt 
financing compared with nonfamily agents. Although this finding is similar to the 
preceding Amore et al.’s (2011) result and thus might also be attributable to 
nonfamily agents’ greater investment needs, my following results rule out this 
possibility. More specifically, I find that the negative family succession-debt level 
relationship mainly stems from the long-term debt level. This is different from Amore 
et al.’s (2011) result that the relationship is driven by short-term debt, thus 
inconsistent with their argument that short-term debt is particularly suitable for firms 
with more investment opportunities. Instead, the above finding further confirms my 
argument, as having good access to long-term debt has long been viewed as a 
reflection of superior ability in debt financing in China (e.g., Zou & Adams, 2008). 
Moreover, Amore et al. (2011) attribute nonfamily agents’ greater investment demand 
to the more growth opportunities they bring in the firm, but I do not find a significant 
and positive impact of nonfamily successors on the firm’s post-succession growth 
opportunities.    
Furthermore, my results are robust to possible endogeneity issues, and my explanation 
for the results still holds after allowing for alternative interpretations other than the 
aforementioned one from Amore et al. (2011).  
In addition, I find that family successors’ pre-succession internal managerial 
experience has a significant and positive impact on the firm’s debt level, in terms of 
not only short-term but also long-term debt. This supports my conjecture that family 
successors’ managerial experience in the firm before the succession is more beneficial 
to the firm’s access to debt than nonfamily successors’ corresponding experience. The 
                                               
82 Based on the previous literature (Graham & Rogers, 2002; Zou & Adams, 2008; Amore et al., 2017), a firm’s 
debt level is used as a proxy for its access to debt. Alternative proxies for the access to debt finance are also 
employed in this chapter.  
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reason behind is that family successors are more likely to acquire the specialised 
assets critical to the firm’s access to debt finance via the experience, compared with 
nonfamily agents. The above finding, in turn, implies that family successors’ inferior 
debt-financing ability can be significantly mitigated by the specialised assets that they 
obtain from the founder before the succession.  
In addition, I find that the validity of the above result is contingent upon where the 
firm is located. Specifically, I find that the positive impact of family successors’ pre-
succession internal experience is much weaker in firms headquartered in provinces 
with a high marketisation level regarding resource allocation. This is because, in those 
provinces where the economic resource allocation is more market-oriented, i.e. based 
on rules and market principles, the contribution that the acquisition of the specialised 
assets can make to the firm’s access to credit resources should be less significant. 
Moreover, the above positive result also diminishes in firms located in provinces 
without a nationally famous Confucian centre. The reason is that the founders in those 
provinces should be less deeply affected by familism, and thus their specialised assets 
may be accessible to both family and nonfamily members.  
Furthermore, apart from the short-term and long-term debt level, family successors’ 
pre-succession internal experience is also positively related to the firm’s debt maturity 
and access to credit loans, as well as negatively associated with the firm’s cost of 
debt. This finding further confirms my posit that family successors’ acquisition of the 
specialised assets greatly contributes to the firm’s access to debt finance after the 
succession.  
Moreover, by regarding the founders’ political connections as a type of the specialised 
assets, I find that the connections can make a greater contribution to the firm’s access 
to debt-financing after the succession if the successor is the founder’s descendant 
rather than a nonfamily agent. This provides further support for the perspective that 
the specialised assets which are critical to the firm’s access to debt capital are much 
more likely to be acquired by family successors relative to nonfamily agents.  
Finally, after classifying nonfamily successors into those having a guanxi with the 
founder and those without a guanxi, I find that the former’s pre-succession internal 
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experience has a positive impact on the firm’s access to debt compared with the latter, 
and yet the impact is insignificant. However, this finding is inconsistent with my 
result in Chapter 2, which shows that both family and guanxi-connected successors’ 
pre-succession internal experience has a significant and positive effect on firm 
performance. A possible reason for this inconsistency is that good firm performance 
and good access to debt finance may rely on different types of specialised assets. 
More specifically, the former should mainly rely on the founder’s tacit knowledge, 
such as superior managerial and leadership skills and strategies. Such skills and 
strategies can be assimilated and internalised by a successor through observation and 
practice, as long as the founder per se is willing to share them with the successor and 
provides the successor with the opportunities to practice them (Bracci & Vagnoni, 
2011). Hence, this type of specialised assets should be acquirable for both family 
successors and nonfamily successors having a guanxi with the founder. However, 
family firms’ access to debt capital should primarily rely on the founder’s personal 
connections with the lenders. This type of specialised assets may be difficult for 
guanxi-connected successors to acquire even if the founder provides them with the 
access to the lenders. This is because the lenders may be more willing to help and 
build a personal connection with a family successor due to his or her unique identity, 
i.e. the descendant of the founder, and the fact that he or she has become or will be the 
ultimate controller in the firm. However, a nonfamily successor having a guanxi with 
the founder may be less attractive to the lenders, because the successor’s nonfamily 
identity makes him or her essentially similar to other nonfamily managers, i.e. the 
agents working for the controlling family instead of the genuine dominator of the 
firm. 
This chapter has three major contributions. Firstly, it contributes to a better 
understanding of the difference between family and nonfamily successors in terms of 
their impact on the firm’s financial consequences. Specifically, different from most 
researchers focusing on firm performance83, this chapter pays attention to the 
successors’ effect on the firm’s access to debt, an under-researched issue given the 
preceding importance of debt financing for family firms, especially the family firms 
                                               
83 E.g., Smith & Amoako-Adu (1999); Morck et al. (2000); Pérez-González (2006); Bennedsen et al. (2007); 
Cucculelli & Micucci (2008); Bertrand et al. (2008); Xu et al. (2015). 
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in China. Although there has been one study providing some evidence on the above 
issue (Amore et al., 2011), my research, as previously discussed, is different from that 
study in terms of the setting, the theoretical perspective, and the finding. This may 
provide some implications for researchers interested in similar issues in countries 
having a similar business environment as China, such as the government also 
dominates the majority of economic resources. For example, for researchers who 
would like to investigate the financing behaviour in private enterprises, apart from 
basing on the firm leaders’ investment need to explore the issue, focusing on their 
ability to finance is also an appropriate research perspective. 
 
In addition, unlike the extant research emphasising the importance of successors’ 
acquisition of the founder’s specialised assets from theoretical angles84, this chapter 
follows my previous chapter to provide more initial evidence on the impact that the 
successors’ obtainment of the assets has on the firm’s financial outcomes, in 
particular, the firm’s access to debt finance. This enriches the literature on the 
specialised assets in family businesses. 
Finally, this chapter offers a practical suggestion to family business founders who 
prefer a family successor and the founders’ descendants who may inherit the business, 
that being a top executive in the firm before the succession can greatly remedy the 
descendant’s potential inferior financing ability compared with nonfamily agents. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 reviews the 
literature. Section 4.3 develops the hypotheses. Section 4.4 describes the data 
collection and research design, Section 4.5 provides the empirical results, and Section 
4.6 concludes. 
4.2 Literature review 
4.2.1 The family management-debt financing relationship 
According to my research focus, the first stream of the relevant literature investigates 
the relationship between family management and the firm’s debt financing. However, 
                                               
84 E.g., Bjuggren & Sund (2002); Lee et al. (2003); Sharma & Irving (2005); Royer et al. (2008).  
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the literature is limited (Anderson et al., 2003b; Chua et al., 2011; González et al., 
2013; Pan & Tian, 2016). Among the limited literature, González et al. (2013) 
investigate the effect of family involvement on Colombian firms’ capital structure, 
finding that family CEOs are related to a higher debt level, relative to nonfamily 
CEOs in both family and nonfamily businesses. They reason this result as that family 
managers tend to be more risk-averse than their nonfamily counterparts, thus 
preferring lower leverage in the firm. However, the authors, in turn, find that the 
negative impact of family CEOs mainly occurs in young and median-age firms. For 
old firms, that impact changes in sign and becomes positive. The authors view this 
finding as support for Fama and Jensen’s (1983) argument, that family firms avoid 
high leverage at early stages due to risk aversion. However, as the firm grows, the 
family tends to prefer a higher debt level, in the hope of financing larger growth 
opportunities but without losing control in the firm.  
Nevertheless, Chua et al. (2011) observe a contradictory result based on the US new 
ventures, indicating that the number of family managers is positively associated with 
the amount of debt capital acquired by the venture. The authors attribute this result to 
family managers’ lower likelihood of opportunism, higher risk aversion, and long-
term orientation, which may reduce the borrower-lender agency costs and thus may 
increase the firm’s access to debt.  
Apart from firms’ level of debt, the impact of family managers on the firm’s cost of 
debt also receives some attention. For example, Anderson et al. (2003b) focus on the 
S&P 500 firms and demonstrate that family CEOs tend to bear a higher cost of debt85 
than nonfamily CEOs. Moreover, the higher debt cost is mainly derived from 
descendant CEOs rather than the family business founders. The authors interpret this 
as that descendants are more likely to detract from firm performance, as their 
appointment is often based on nepotism instead of capabilities.  
                                               
85 Anderson et al. (2003b) use the firm’s bond yield in excess of the Treasury yield as the measure of the firm’s 
cost of debt. More specifically, the yield spread is calculated as the difference between the weighted-average yield 
to maturity on the firm’s outstanding traded debt and yield to maturity on a Treasury security with the 
corresponding duration. Anderson et al. (2003b) employ this measure because it indicates the firm’s debt risk 
premium.  
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In addition, Pan and Tian (2016) document a similar result by using Chinese private 
enterprises as the sample, although they use a different indicator of the firm’s debt 
cost. More specifically, because most Chinese enterprises’ debt capital comes from 
banks and the lending rate in China is relatively regulated, the authors measure the 
firm’s cost of debt by its use of collateral for borrowing. Their result indicates that the 
use of collateral is higher for family firms with a family Chairman/CEO. Pan and Tian 
(2016) attribute this finding to family managers’ stronger incentives and power to 
expropriate outside investors for private benefits.  
Briefly speaking, the extant literature produces inconclusive findings regarding the 
role of family management in driving the firm’s debt level. However, the evidence on 
the firm’s debt cost is relatively unidirectional, i.e. family CEOs bear a higher cost 
relative to their nonfamily counterparts.  
4.2.2 Successors in family businesses 
The second strand of the relevant studies is those exclusively focusing on the 
successors in family firms. Given that family business founders often struggle 
between appointing a descendant and an unrelated agent as the successor, the 
comparison between these two types of successors regarding their impact on the 
firm’s financial outcomes has received a lot of attention (e.g., Smith & Amoako-Adu, 
1999; Morck et al., 2000; Pérez-González, 2006; Bennedsen et al., 2007; Cucculelli & 
Micucci, 2008; Bertrand et al., 2008; Amore et al., 2011; Xu et al., 2015). However, 
the majority of the literature appears to be interested in firm performance only. The 
relevant literature has been reviewed in Sections 3.3.3 and 3.3.5 of Chapter 3, and 
most of which demonstrates that family successors are adverse to firm performance 
relative to their nonfamily counterparts.  
Although family and nonfamily successors’ influence on firm performance is largely 
investigated, little is known about the impact of these two types of successors on other 
financial consequences, such as the firm’s debt financing. As previously discussed, 
the aforementioned Amore et al.’s (2011) research appears to be the only one hitherto 
focusing on the above issue and shows that nonfamily successors lead to a significant 
increase in the firm’s debt ratio compared with family successors in Italy. However, 
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as discussed in the above section, exploring the issue exclusively for China’s setting 
is still worthwhile due to China’s distinctive business environment.  
4.2.3 The specialised assets in family businesses 
The third strand of relevant research relates to the role of family business founders’ 
specialised assets in the succession process. Studies in this strand can further be 
classified into two branches. The first branch pays attention to the specialised asset-
successor selection relationship, which has been reviewed in Chapter 2 (e.g., Lee et 
al., 2003; Royer et al., 2008; Xu et al., 2015).86 The second branch focuses on the 
transfer process of the assets from the founder to the successor, which has also been 
discussed in Sections 3.3.6 and 3.3.7 of Chapter 3 (e.g., Cabrera-Suárez et al., 2001; 
Steier, 2001; Dou & Jia, 2008; Dou & Li, 2013).  
4.3 Hypothesis development  
4.3.1 Family successor and access to debt  
Family successors have been widely viewed as less skilled and competent than 
nonfamily agents (e.g., Schulze et al., 2003; Pérez-González, 2006; Jiang & Peng, 
2011). The main reason is the fact that family successors are selected from a much 
smaller pool of talents compared to nonfamily successors and are likely to be 
appointed due to nepotism rather than capability (e.g., Pérez-González, 2006). In this 
sense, incapable family successors are more likely to be prevalent in China’s context. 
This is because the Chinese Confucian familism makes the founder more likely to 
base on nepotism to appoint the successor87, and China’s one-child policy further and 
significantly restricts the pool for a qualified family successor88. In this case, it should 
be reasonable to hypothesise that family successors are less able to raise much debt 
                                               
86 Lee et al.’s (2003) study and Royer et al.’s (2008) study have been discussed in Section 2.2.1 of Chapter 2. Xu 
et al.’s (2015) research has been discussed in Section 2.2.4 of Chapter 2.  
 
87 Affected by Confucian familism, Chinese family business founders are very likely to consider the business as a 
family property that will be bequeathed to descendants and have the desire to keep family ownership and control 
over the business, and thus are more likely to choose a family successor regardless of the successor’s capability 
(Zhang & Ma, 2009).  
 
88 China’s one-child policy was enacted in late 1979 and has imposed significant human capital constraints on 
Chinese family business founders for their selection of a qualified family successor, as many of them have only 
one child (Cao et al., 2015). 
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capital relative to nonfamily agents. Moreover, banks per se are also less likely to 
grant much credit to family successors, because they may bear higher monitoring 
costs and default risks considering the family successors’ potential incapability to 
manage the business. Therefore, the following hypothesis is developed: 
H1a: Family successors are negatively related to the firm’s access to debt, compared 
with nonfamily successors. 
However, in the meantime, family successors are often viewed as having a stronger 
stewardship sense towards the firm relative to nonfamily agents (Miller & Le Breton-
Miller, 2006).89 This sense, according to the stewardship theory, may motivate family 
successors’ long-term commitment to the firm, assiduous management of the firm, 
efficient utilisation of firm resources, and value-enhancing investment (Davis et al., 
1997). This, in turn, may reduce the lenders’ agency concerns of managerial 
opportunism, and thus may contribute to the firm’s access to debt finance (Chua et al., 
2011). Based on this discussion, the following hypothesis is postulated: 
H1b: Family successors are positively related to the firm’s access to debt, compared 
with nonfamily successors. 
4.3.2 Successors’ acquisition of the founder’s specialised assets and 
access to debt 
As previously discussed, Chinese family business founders’ specialised assets are 
critical to the firm’s access to external finance (Allen et al., 2005; Chen et al., 2011).90 
In this case, whether successors can acquire the founder’s specialised assets before the 
succession should be crucial to the firm’s financing ability after the succession. 
                                               
89 Stewardship theory proponents contend that managers who are “insiders”- whose names are closely linked with 
the business and whose personal satisfaction, family fortune, and public reputation are tied to the business, may act 
as especially solicitous stewards of the business (Bubolz, 2001; Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2005). In this case, 
family successors may identify strongly with the family business and view the success of the business as an 
extension of their well-being (Davis et al., 1997). 
 
90 As stated in the Introduction section in Chapter 1 and this chapter, this is due to the circumstance that, in China, 
it is the government who controls the majority of financial resources. As a result, the resources are usually 
allocated to SOEs instead of private enterprises, and family firms often suffer discrimination in terms of financing 
due to their younger age, smaller size, and lack of political support compared to SOEs. Thus, Chinese family firms 
have to heavily rely on their specialised assets, such as strategies and network resources, to compete for external 
finance (Allen et al., 2005; Chen et al., 2011). The specialised assets, as the resource-based view theorists suggest, 
are mainly derived from the founder’s tacit knowledge and personal connections (Lee et al., 2003; Royer et al., 
2008).  
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Chapter 3 has elaborated on the applicability of successors’ internal experience before 
the succession, especially managerial experience, as a proxy for the successors’ 
acquisition of the founder’s specialised assets. Briefly speaking, the pre-succession 
internal managerial experience can help the successor to satisfy all the conditions 
critical to the acquisition and assimilation of the specialised assets. According to the 
resource-based view, those conditions include spending time with the founder91, 
working in the same environment with the founder92, observing the founder, 
practising the observed tacit knowledge and skills93, and directly getting in touch with 
the founder’s connections94. However, because the founders’ specialised assets are 
individual specific, distinctive, and very valuable, they tend to be accessible only to 
the founder’s highly trusted members (Lee et al., 2003; Royer et al., 2008; Bracci & 
Vagnoni, 2011). Therefore, the proxy above may apply only to the successors highly 
trusted by the founder.  
It has been widely accepted that family successors are more trustworthy than 
nonfamily agents for the founder (e.g., Cabrera-Suárez et al., 2001; Royer et al., 2008; 
Bennedsen et al., 2015). This case is more likely to happen in China’s context, as 
under the influence of the traditional familism culture, Chinese people tend to have a 
low degree of trust towards nonfamily members (Xu et al., 2015). Therefore, it should 
be reasonable to conjecture that family successors’ pre-succession internal managerial 
experience is highly related to their acquisition of the founder’s specialised assets. 
Those assets include strategies and skills to attract and negotiate with potential 
                                               
91 The resource-based view theorists suggest that the time spent together between the founder and the successor is 
the main precondition of the transfer of the specialised assets (e.g., Hansen, 1999; Bracci & Vagnoni, 2011). This 
is because, the longer time the successor spends with the founder, the longer time and more opportunities the 
successor can have to get exposed to the founder’s tacit knowledge and personal connections. As a result, the more 
opportunities the successor has to learn the knowledge, to get in touch with the connections and build good 
relationships with them, and in turn to transform the specialised assets into his or her own resources. In this regard, 
the managerial experience in the family firm can greatly increase the successor’s time spent with the founder, as 
the founder should typically spend a lot of time in the firm.  
 
92 The founders’ specialised assets are often highly context-specific (Cabrera-Suárez et al., 2001). Therefore, 
working in the same environment can help successors to learn and capture the nuances of the founder’s skills and 
strategies in different circumstances. 
 
93 Researchers suggest that the only way to assimilate tacit knowledge is through observation and practice (Bracci 
& Vagnoni, 2011). In this regard, working as a top executive in the firm can provide the successor with 
opportunities to observe the founder and practise the observed skills in managerial and decisional processes.  
 
94 The internal managerial experience may help the successor to personally get access to the founder’s business 
connections, and thus can provide him or her with the opportunities to build good relationships with the 
connections and in turn earn their recognition and trust.  
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lenders, the founder’s personal connections with banks or other financial institutions, 
as well as political connections, all of which are critical to the firm’s access to credit 
resources (Li et al., 2008; Bennedsen et al., 2015; Xu et al., 2015). However, 
nonfamily successors’ corresponding experience may contribute less to their 
obtainment of the specialised assets. This is because, for the persons who are less 
trustworthy, the founder may limit their access to his or her specialised assets to avoid 
appropriation risk95 (Lee et al., 2003; Bracci & Vagnoni, 2011). In this regard, family 
successors’ pre-succession internal managerial experience, relative to their nonfamily 
counterparts’ corresponding experience, should be more conducive to the firm’s 
access to debt finance.96 Therefore, the following hypothesis is postulated: 
H2: Family successors’ pre-succession internal managerial experience is positively 
related to the firm’s access to debt, compared with nonfamily successors’ 
corresponding experience.  
4.4 Data and methods  
4.4.1 Data collection 
The sample used in this chapter is the same as in Chapter 2, i.e. 348 Chairman of the 
Board or CEO succession cases in Chinese family firms listed on the Shanghai or 
Shenzhen Stock Exchanges during 2003-2014, with the firm founder as the 
predecessor. The data collection process of the succession cases has been discussed in 
Section 2.5.1 of Chapter 2.  
4.4.2 Research design 
H1 investigates family successors’ effect on the firm’s access to debt relative to their 
nonfamily counterparts. H2 examines whether family successors’ acquisition of the 
founder’s specialised assets plays a role in determining the access. To these ends, 
                                               
95 The risk that those people may betray the family firm after the acquisition of the specialised assets or utilise the 
assets to ask for a much higher compensation (Lee et al., 2003).  
 
96 However, as discussed in Chapter 3, Chinese family business founders should also have a high level of trust 
towards their guanxi-connected members, and thus this type of successors should also have good access to the 
founder’s specialised assets. This chapter also investigates the impact that guanxi-connected successors’ pre-
succession internal experience has on the firm’s access to debt, and the corresponding results are provided and 
discussed in Section 4.5.4.5.  
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following the previous literature (e.g., Pérez-González, 2006; Bennedsen et al., 2007; 
Amore et al., 2011) and my Chapter 3, the DID analysis approach is employed via the 
following regression models: 
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =∝ +𝛽1𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                        
(1) 
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =∝ +𝛽1𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦 ∗
𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡         (2)                                         
Models (1) and (2) are for H1 and H2, respectively, in which i indicates the firm and t 
indicates the succession year. The dependent variable, Debt differencei,t, denotes the 
difference in the firm’s access to debt between the post-succession and pre-succession 
period (e.g., Pérez-González, 2006).97 Following the previous literature (e.g., Graham 
& Rogers, 2002; Zou & Adams, 2008; Amore et al., 2017), firms’ total debt level, i.e. 
total debt scaled by total assets, is used to proxy for their access to debt finance.98 
Debt differencei,t is calculated as the two-year average total debt level after the 
succession minus the two-year average total debt level prior to the succession (Amore 
et al., 2011).99  
As to the main independent variables, in Model (1), Family is an indicator equal to 
one if the successor is the founder’s descendant, by blood or marriage; otherwise, it 
equals zero. In Model (2), Successor manage denotes the successor’s pre-succession 
internal managerial experience and is calculated as the number of the years that the 
                                               
97 Pérez-González (2006) suggests that applying the within-firm change around the succession as the dependent 
variable helps to reduce endogeneity concerns about time-invariant differences in firm characteristics, aggregate 
changes in the business environment such as macroeconomic shocks, or succession-specific shocks. 
 
98 Two alternative proxies for firms’ access to debt are also used. The first one is the difference between the firm’s 
debt level and the average debt level of the relevant industry and year. The rationale for this proxy is that a positive 
or negative difference between the firm’s debt level and the industry average should indicate whether the firm has 
superior (above-average) or inferior (below-average) access to debt financing. The second proxy is the amount of 
the firm’s debt financing, i.e. the value of the firm’s total debt (without scaled by total assets), the use of which 
follows Li et al. (2008) and Chua et al. (2011). The results for the hypotheses based on these two alternative 
proxies are qualitatively similar to those based on the debt level as the proxy. The results are available upon 
request. 
 
99 Following the prior literature (e.g., Pérez-González, 2006; Bennedsen et al., 2007), an alternative time window 
from three years before the succession to three years after the succession is also employed. The relevant results are 
qualitatively similar to those obtained based on the above “two years ex-ante to two years ex-post” period. The 
results are available upon request. 
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successor has worked as a director or a top manager in the family business till the 
succession announcement year. Family*Manage, therefore, is the interaction term 
between Family and Successor manage. This variable, as previously discussed, is a 
proxy for family successors’ acquisition of the founder’s specialised assets. 
Control variables represents a series of firm-, governance-, and family-level factors 
one year prior to the succession, including Firm age, Firm size, Debt level, Firm 
profitability, Sales growth, Business risk, Dividend payout, Interest coverage, Board 
size, Family ownership, and Family divergence. The control for these variables, 
firstly, is attributed to the fact that they may have an impact on the firm’s successor 
decision. The reasons why these variables may affect the successor choice and their 
definitions100 have been elaborated in Sections 2.5.2 and 2.6.3.1 of Chapter 2. 
Secondly and also more importantly, these factors may play a role in determining the 
firm’s debt level. For example, Firm age may have a positive impact on the firm’s 
access to debt, as older firms are better able to create good credit histories, which help 
to reduce the perceived risk to lenders (e.g., Diamond, 1989; Leeth & Scott, 1989).  
Firm size is considered because larger firms tend to have lower default risk and better 
reputation, which contribute to the firm’s access to debt capital (e.g., Diamond, 1991; 
Petersen & Rajan, 1994; Zou & Adams, 2008).  
Debt level, i.e. the firm’s pre-succession debt level, is also controlled for, as a higher 
ex-ante debt level may reduce the firm’s ex-post debt-financing ability (Molly et al., 
2010).  
Firm profitability is considered because banks are more prone to grant credit to 
financially healthier firms (e.g., Firth et al., 2009).  
The incorporation of Sales growth is derived from the perspective that family firms 
with more growth opportunities tend to have a greater need for debt capital (Amore et 
al., 2011).  
                                               
100 The definitions of the variables are also described in Table 4.14. 
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The control for Business risk is attributed to the viewpoint that firms with higher 
business risk are more likely to lower the use of debt in order to safeguard against 
bankruptcy (e.g., Jensen et al., 1992; Mishra & McConaughy, 1999; López-Gracia & 
Sánchez-Andújar, 2007).  
Dividend payout is often expected to be negatively related to the firm’s debt level, as 
dividend and debt usually substitute for each other as a mechanism to alleviate the 
firm’s free cash flow problem (Fama & French, 2002; Zou & Xiao, 2006).  
Interest coverage is a dummy equal to one if the firm’s interest coverage ratio is 
greater than two and zero otherwise. Its consideration is in light of Goergen and 
Renneboog’s (2001) argument that interest coverage of less than two is typically a 
sign that the firm faces severe financial needs or financial constraints.  
Board size is controlled for because it is documented to be negatively related to the 
firm’s cost of debt (Anderson et al., 2004). Lower debt cost, in turn, may enable the 
firm to borrow more (Lim et al., 2018).101 
The inclusion of Family ownership and Family divergence102 stem from the evidence 
that owners with a greater shareholding tend to raise capital via debt instead of equity 
to avoid the dilution of their control over the business (Keasey et al., 2015). In 
addition, the control-ownership wedge may trigger the family’s extraction of private 
benefits and thus may exacerbate the agency conflicts between the family and 
creditors (Claessens et al., 2002; Boubakri & Ghouma, 2010; Lin et al., 2011).  
Finally, to control for industrial and temporal fixed effects, Industry denotes a set of 
industry dummies based on the industrial classification guide proposed by China 
                                               
101 My original regression model has also controlled for Board independence and Board ownership. However, 
Board independence is shown to be highly correlated with Board size (with a correlation coefficient of -0.575). 
Additionally, Board ownership is highly related to Family ownership (the coefficient is 0.521) and Family 
divergence (the coefficient is -0.595). Therefore, Board independence and Board ownership are excluded from the 
model.  
 
102 Family control, the measure of the family’s voting rights, was also included in my original regression models. 
The current models exclude this variable because it is highly correlated with Family ownership (with a correlation 
coefficient of 0.878).  
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Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), and Year is a vector of year dummies 
from 2003 to 2014.  
 
4.5 Empirical results and discussion 
4.5.1 Descriptive statistics 
4.5.1.1 Summary statistics  
Table 4.1 reports the summary statistics of variables applied to the preceding models.  
The first variable, Debt difference, is the dependent variable, i.e. the change in the 
firm’s total debt level during the succession period. The mean of this variable is 
0.36%, indicating that the sample, on average, experiences an increase in debt level 
during the succession. However, the median of Debt difference is zero, implying that 
the debt level, in fact, remains stable in the majority of the sampled firms during the 
succession period. In addition, the table shows that the sampled successors’ average 
internal managerial experience before the succession is 3.48 years, and yet there is at 
least one successor who has worked as a top manager in the firm for 15 years before 
becoming a leader of the firm.  
[Insert Table 4.1 about here] 
4.5.1.2 Comparison between family and nonfamily successions 
Table 4.2 compares family successions with nonfamily successions in terms of the 
variables. It indicates that the dependent variable, i.e. the difference between the post-
succession and pre-succession debt levels, is significantly lower in firms with a family 
successor relative to those with a nonfamily one. This is in line with my H1a, i.e. 
family successors are negatively related to the firm’s access to debt in comparison to 
their nonfamily counterparts. Moreover, the family succession group is shown to have 
a significantly higher debt level one year prior to the succession. This suggests that 
the change in the firm’s access to debt around the succession is indeed caused by the 
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succession event per se, rather than merely a reflection of the firm’s pre-succession 
trend in debt financing.  
Furthermore, family successors’ pre-succession internal managerial experience is 
significantly longer than that of nonfamily successors. Except for the aforementioned 
ones, the rest of the variables are insignificantly different between the family 
succession and nonfamily succession groups.  
[Insert Table 4.2 about here]  
4.5.1.3 Correlation among variables  
Table 4.3 presents the correlation matrix for the aforementioned variables. It shows 
that all the independent variables do not have a high pairwise correlation. Moreover, 
the dependent variable, Debt difference, is significantly and negatively correlated with 
the variable of interest, Family. This further supports my H1a.  
[Insert Table 4.3 about here]  
4.5.2 Baseline regression results  
4.5.2.1 Family successions and the firm’s access to debt (H1)  
Table 4.4 presents the results for H1. Column (1) indicates that family successors are 
significantly and negatively related to the firm’s debt level after the succession,  
compared with their nonfamily counterparts. This confirms H1a, and thus suggests 
that family successors are less capable of raising debt capital relative to nonfamily 
successors. The reason behind, as discussed in the hypothesis development section, 
may be that the Chinese familism culture makes the family business founders more 
likely to base on nepotism rather than capabilities to choose a family successor. 
Moreover, China’s one-child policy further limits the small talent pool for a family 
successor compared with that for a nonfamily successor. Furthermore, financial 
institutions are also less likely to grant much credit to family successors, as the latter’s 
potential inability to manage the business may lead to high monitoring costs and 
default risks to the former.  
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Columns (2) and (3) report the results after dividing the firm’s total debt level into 
long-term and short-term debt levels. The long-term (short-term) debt level is the 
proxy for the firm’s access to the corresponding debt finance. Similar to the 
measurement of the total debt level, the long-term debt level is measured as long-term 
debt scaled by total assets, in which long-term debt is defined as the firm’s borrowing 
with a maturity of more than one year (e.g., Fan et al., 2008; Yang et al., 2012). 
Correspondingly, the short-term debt level is calculated as the firm’s short-term debt, 
i.e. the borrowing with a maturity of not greater than one year, divided by total assets. 
The dependent variable in Column (2), similar to that in Column (1), is measured as 
the difference between the average long-term debt level two years after and that two 
years before the succession. The dependent variable in Column (3) is the 
corresponding difference for the firm’s short-term debt level.   
The results indicate that the preceding negative impact of family successions is 
mainly driven by long-term debt, as family successors do not exhibit a significantly 
different effect on the firm’s short-term debt level, relative to nonfamily successors. 
This result is different from the aforementioned Amore et al.’s (2011) finding, i.e. the 
negative relationship between family successors and the firm’s debt level is derived 
from short-term debt.103 This further confirms my argument that the lower debt level 
in family succession firms is caused by the successors’ inferior debt-financing ability 
relative to nonfamily agents. This is because having good access to long-term loans, 
compared with the access to short-term debt, has been much more widely regarded as 
a reflection of superior ability in terms of debt financing in the previous literature, 
especially in the context of underdeveloped financial market and weak creditor 
protection, such as in China (e.g., Houston & James, 1996; Zou & Adams, 2008; 
Bennedsen et al., 2015). More specifically, managers normally prefer long-term rather 
than short-term debt, as the former can avoid frequent monitoring from the creditors, 
alleviate financial constraints with lower liquidity risk, and allow the managers to 
invest in projects with a relatively long-term horizon (e.g., Datta et al., 2005; Fagiolo 
& Luzzi, 2006; D'Aurizio et al., 2015; Díaz-Díaz et al., 2016). However, creditors are 
                                               
103 As mentioned before, Amore et al. (2011) also observe a negative impact of family successions on the firm’s 
debt level and reason that nonfamily agents need more funds for the more growth opportunities they bring to the 
firm. Moreover, they argue that their additional finding, i.e. the negative effect mainly stems from short-term debt, 
further supports their reasoning, because short-term debt is more suited for firms with greater growth 
opportunities. 
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less likely to grant long-term loans, as they may cause higher monitoring costs and 
default risks (e.g., Chen, 2004; Fan et al., 2008; Zou & Adams, 2008). In this case, 
long-term debt is much less common in economies with weak legal protections for 
creditors, such as China, as lenders per se have to monitor the borrowers more 
frequently and effectively (Zou & Adams, 2008). Therefore, in such a context, 
managers or firms having good access to long-term debt finance are often viewed as 
having a great capability of debt-financing.  
[Insert Table 4.4 about here]  
4.5.2.2 Family successors’ acquisition of the founder’s specialised assets 
and the firm’s access to debt (H2)  
In H2, successors’ pre-succession internal managerial experience is used to proxy for 
their acquisition of the founder’s specialised assets. However, this proxy should be 
more applicable to family successors rather than nonfamily agents. This is because the 
former, compared to the latter, are much more likely to acquire the specialised assets 
which are critical to the firm’s access to debt finance via the internal managerial 
experience before the succession. In this case, I hypothesise that family successors’ 
pre-succession intra-firm managerial experience has a significant and positive impact 
on the firm’s access to debt, compared with nonfamily successors’ corresponding 
experience.  
Table 4.5 reports the results. It shows that the interaction term, Family*Manage, is 
significant and positive in all columns. This suggests that family successors’ pre-
succession internal managerial experience has a significant and positive effect on the 
firm’s access to debt capital after the succession, not only in terms of the access to 
short-term debt capital but also in terms of that to long-term debt. This confirms H2. 
Thus, it in turn supports the argument that family successors’ internal managerial 
experience before the succession can greatly help them acquire the founder’s 
specialised assets which are crucial to the firm’s access to credit resources, and thus 
significantly contributes to the firm’s access to debt after the succession. However, 
nonfamily successors’ corresponding experience may be much less helpful for the 
acquisition of the assets. The above result, in turn, implies that family successors’ 
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inferior ability in debt financing compared with nonfamily agents, which has been 
demonstrated in the above section, can be significantly mitigated by the specialised 
assets that they acquire from the founder before the succession.  
[Insert Table 4.5 about here]  
4.5.3 Robustness checks 
Three sets of checks are conducted in this section to examine the validity and 
robustness of the above results. The checks include extending the regression models 
with more control variables, the instrumental variables approach to alleviate 
endogeneity issues, and several tests to rule out alternative explanations.  
4.5.3.1 The extension of the baseline models   
The preceding regression models have included a number of firm-, governance-, and 
family-level factors widely controlled for in the previous literature. However, there 
also exist some factors much less prevalent in the literature but may still play a role in 
determining either the successor choice or the firm’s debt level. Therefore, in this 
section, the baseline models are extended by another vector of pre-succession firm-
level, environmental, and succession-specific variables, to explore whether the above 
findings are de facto due to the overlook of those factors.  
The firm-level factors include Nonfamily ownership, State ownership, Foreign 
ownership, Asset tangibility, Cash holding, and Income tax rate. More specifically, 
Nonfamily ownership is the ratio of the number of shares held by the firm’s nonfamily 
block-holders to the total shares outstanding, where block-holders are individuals or 
institutions holding at least 5% ownership of the firm (Villalonga & Amit, 2006). 
Including this variable is because nonfamily large shareholders can not only affect the 
controlling family’s decision-making, such as the choice of the successor, but also 
corporate behaviour, such as the firm’s financing activities.  
State ownership and Foreign ownership are two unique types of nonfamily 
ownership. There is evidence showing that in China, having the state as a minority 
shareholder contributes to the firm’s bank finance (Zou & Xiao, 2006; Firth et al., 
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2009; Lim et al., 2018). Moreover, foreign shareholders may demand a higher debt 
level in the firm as a monitoring mechanism of the management (Zou & Xiao, 2006; 
Huizinga et al., 2008). These two variables are calculated as the corresponding 
shareholding, i.e. the number of shares held by the state or foreign investors, as a 
percentage of the total shares outstanding.  
Asset tangibility is the firm’s fixed assets scaled by total assets. Controlling for this 
factor is because firms having more tangible assets can provide more security for 
borrowing, which may increase lenders’ willingness to grant credit (Zou & Adams, 
2008; Lim et al., 2018).  
Cash holding is the sum of cash and cash equivalents scaled total assets (Anderson & 
Reeb, 2003b). The inclusion of this factor stems from the argument that firms with 
greater internal funds have less need for external financing (Mishra & McConaughy, 
1999; Amore et al., 2011).  
Income tax rate is defined as the ratio between income tax expense and earnings after 
interest and before tax. It is considered because firms facing a higher tax rate have 
stronger incentives to increase the use of debt, in order to reduce tax burden (López-
Gracia & Sánchez-Andújar, 2007).  
In addition to the above firm-level characteristics, two contextual factors, i.e. 
Institutional environment and Industrial competition, are also considered. These two 
factors are also controlled for in the previous two chapters due to their possible 
impact on the successor decision in family firms. This is also the reason for their 
consideration in this chapter. The definitions of these two factors have been described 
in Section 2.6.3.1 of Chapter 2 and are also presented in Table 4.14.  
Finally, three succession-specific factors controlled for in Chapter 3, i.e. Early 
succession, Retire, and Postsuccession founder, are also considered in this chapter, for 
the reason that they may have an effect on the successor decision (Pérez-González, 
2006). The definitions of these factors are also described in Table 4.14.  
Table 4.6 reports the regression results after incorporating the above variables into the 
preceding baseline regression models. It can be seen that the results are statistically 
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similar to those drawn from the baseline models, thus verifying the robustness of my 
findings.  
[Insert Table 4.6 about here] 
4.5.3.2 Endogeneity 
Even though the DID analysis approach is applied in the preceding sections, there still 
exists a concern that the above results are driven by some variables not captured by 
the models yet affecting both the firm’s successor choice and change in the access to 
debt finance during the succession period. To mitigate this concern, the instrumental 
variables approach is employed. More specifically, two instruments for variable 
Family are used. Following Xu et al. (2015), the first one is Founder age, defined as 
the founder’s age one year prior to the succession. This variable has been documented 
to be positively related to the likelihood of a family succession in Chapter 2. 
However, the founder’s age before the succession is unlikely to have a direct impact 
on the change in the firm’s debt level around the succession event. The second 
instrumental variable is based on a family planning rate reported by the National 
Bureau of Statistics of China annually for provinces in China. The rate is calculated as 
the number of newborns whose birth complies with China’s one-child policy as a 
percentage of the number of total newborns for each province in each year. It is a 
comprehensive index of the efficiency and effectiveness of the one-child policy across 
Chinese provinces (the National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2006). Based on this 
index, my second instrumental variable is Family planning, calculated as the average 
of the family planning rates in the firm’s headquartered province for the years before 
the succession. This variable is expected to be negatively correlated with the 
appointment of a family successor. This is because the more efficient the policy in the 
province, the higher is the likelihood that the founders located in that province have 
only one child, which has been proved to have a significantly negative impact on the 
founder’s intention of a family succession (Cao et al., 2015). However, the province-
level family planning rate is unlikely to affect an individual family firm’s variation in 
debt level around the leadership transition. The data for Family planning comes from 
the Chinese Population and Employment Statistics Yearbook from 2006 to 2013.  
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Columns (1) and (3) of Table 4.7 present the results of the first-stage regressions 
where the dependent variable is Family. Consistent with my predictions for the 
instruments, the coefficients of Founder age are significant and positive and those of 
Family planning are significant and negative at the 10% level or better. In addition, 
the first-stage F-statistics are highly significant as well as greater than both Staiger 
and Stock’s (1997) rule of thumb, ten, and the maximum critical value provided by 
Stock and Yogo (2005).104 This suggests that my instruments are not weak. 
Moreover, the p-values for Hansen’s J over-identification test are not significant, 
indicating that both the instruments are valid (Hansen, 1982).  
More importantly, in the second-stage analysis (Columns (2) and (4)), Predicted 
(Family), the variable with the predicted values of Family from the first-stage 
regressions, is significantly and negatively related to Debt difference and Long-debt 
difference. This is consistent with my prior results for H1a, thus suggesting that the 
results are not due to the potential endogeneity of Family.  
There is some concern that the first instrument, the founder’s age before the 
succession, may affect the firm’s pre-succession characteristics, such as the pre-
succession debt level, which in turn may impact the change in the debt level during 
the succession period. However, as can be seen from the previous sections, most pre-
succession factors have already been considered as long as they may have an impact 
on the firm’s debt level theoretically or empirically. In addition, the aforementioned 
statistics for the F-test and Hansen’s J test confirm the validity of both instruments. 
Moreover, the reported p-values for the Durbin-Wu-Hausman endogeneity test 
indicate that Family, in fact, is exogenous in the regressions (Durbin, 1954; Wu, 
1973; Hausman, 1978). Therefore, the validity and robustness of the existing results 
for H1a should not be affected by the above concern for Founder age as one of the 
instruments.  
Furthermore, the exogeneity of Family, in turn, should imply that the results for H2 
are also not subject to the endogeneity issues. This is because, Successor manage per 
                                               
104 It is worth noting that according to Wooldridge (2010), maximum-likelihood estimation, compared with 2SLS 
estimation, is more appropriate for a small sample and regressions with a binary endogenous variable. Therefore, 
the Stock-Yogo critical value is for the maximum-likelihood estimation.  
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se, in fact, is insignificantly related to Debt difference, Long-debt difference, and 
Short-debt difference.105 However, the interaction term, i.e. Family*Manage, is 
significantly and positively associated with the dependent variables. Nevertheless, it 
is unlikely to exist an omitted variable that can make Successor manage and 
Family*Manage have statistically different effects on the dependent variables, except 
the variable Family. Hence, Family*Manage should also be an exogenous variable in 
the regressions. This suggests that my previous results for H2 are also valid and 
robust.106 
[Insert Table 4.7 about here] 
4.5.3.3 Alternative explanations 
While the existing results for H1a support the view that the negative family 
succession-debt level relationship is due to the successors’ lower debt-financing 
ability relative to nonfamily agents, alternative interpretations may still exist. For 
example, the preceding descriptive statistics show that the family succession group 
has a significantly higher debt level than its nonfamily counterpart before the 
succession. In this case, family successors per se may choose to reduce the debt level 
to alleviate the associated high risk of financial distress, and in turn safeguard against 
bankruptcy (Mishra & McConaughy, 1999; López-Gracia & Sánchez-Andújar, 2007). 
To test this conjecture, the PSM method is employed to obtain a subsample in which 
the family and nonfamily succession groups have a statistically similar debt level 
prior to the succession.107 Column (1) of Table 4.8 presents the result based on the 
post-matched subsample. It indicates that family successors are still significantly and 
negatively related to the firm’s debt level change relative to nonfamily successors, 
                                               
105 The results are available upon request. 
106 I have still employed the instrumental variables approach to test for H2, where the instruments are the 
interaction term between Founder age and Successor manage as well as that between Family planning and 
Successor manage. The results show that the variable for the predicted values of Family*Manage is still 
significantly and positively related to Debt difference, Long-debt difference, and Short-debt difference. This is in 
line with my existing results for H2. Moreover, the p-values for the Durbin-Wu-Hausman endogeneity test are 
0.425, 0.663, and 0.713, respectively. This confirms the exogeneity of Family*Manage. The results are available 
upon request.  
 
107 The propensity score matching generates a subsample of 70 family succession cases and their matched 70 
nonfamily succession cases. An untabulated t-test result for the subsample indicates that the debt level one year 
before the succession in the family succession group is insignificantly different from that in the nonfamily 
succession group, as the p-value for the result is 0.2.  
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even if their firms have a similar debt level before the succession. This finding rules 
out the above conjecture.   
Apart from the high financial risk caused by high debt levels, a high level of business 
risk derived from high earnings volatility can also trigger financial distress in the firm 
(Bradley et al., 1984; Fama & French, 2002; Zou & Xiao, 2006). Therefore, it is also 
likely that the family succession group happens to have a higher level of business risk 
before the succession. This, in turn, forces the successor to reduce the firm’s debt 
level to keep the firm’s total risk of bankruptcy at a manageable level (Jensen et al., 
1992; Mishra & McConaughy, 1999). If this is the case, firstly, the pre-succession 
business risk level in the family succession group should be higher than that in the 
nonfamily succession group. Secondly, the correlation between the family succession 
and the debt level in firms with high business risk is expected to be significantly 
different from that in firms with low risk. This is because, compared with family 
successors exposed to high business risk, those in low-risk firms may have little 
incentive to reduce their total risk exposure by lowering the use of debt. 
However, the statistics regarding Business risk in Table 4.2 show that family 
succession firms do not have significantly different levels of business risk before the 
succession relative to nonfamily succession companies. Moreover, in Columns (2) 
and (3) of Table 4.8, the sample is split into subsamples with low (below-median) or 
high (above-median) business risk, and separate regressions are estimated for each 
subsample. After comparing the coefficient of Family in Column (2) with that in 
Column (3) via a Chow test, the p-value for the test result indicates that the 
relationship between family successors and the firm’s debt level is not significantly 
different across the two groups. Therefore, the above alternative explanation for H1a 
can also be excluded.    
Another possible explanation is that the family controllers in nonfamily succession 
firms may happen to have weak controlling power, and thus enforce higher debt 
levels on the nonfamily successor to increase outside supervision (Amore et al., 2011; 
González et al., 2013). More specifically, the conflict of interests between the 
controlling family and the nonfamily successor may cause the successor to behave 
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opportunistically and self-interestedly (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).108 In this case, for 
the controlling family, forcing the successor to take on more debt can reduce the free 
cash available to him or her for opportunistic behaviours (Chen & Strange, 2005). 
Moreover, a higher debt level can also increase the outside monitoring from the 
creditors, thus helping the controlling family to mitigate the agency costs from the 
potential managerial opportunism (González et al., 2013; Sun et al., 2016). However, 
for family succession firms, the family controllers have little incentive to use debt as a 
governance device due to the high alignment of interests between the controllers and 
the successor.  
Two tests are conducted for the above possibility. Firstly, the family’s controlling 
power before the succession is compared between the family and nonfamily 
succession groups. Two of the control variables, Family ownership and Family 
divergence, as well as variable Family control, are used as the indicators of the 
controlling power (e.g., Villalonga & Amit, 2006; Villalonga & Amit, 2009; Ansari et 
al., 2014). The comparison reported in Table 4.2 shows that none of the three 
variables is significantly different between the two groups.109 This suggests that the 
families in nonfamily succession firms do not have a significantly lower controlling 
power than their counterparts in family succession firms.  
Secondly, the sample is classified into firms in which the family has weak (below-
median) or strong (above-median) controlling power one year prior to the succession. 
The classification is based on the above three variables and aims at investigating 
whether the negative (positive) correlation between family (nonfamily) successions 
and the firm’s debt level attenuates in firms where the family has strong controlling 
power. The rationale for this conjecture is that the families with strong control over 
the firm should have much less need to resort to creditors to monitor the nonfamily 
successor’s behaviour.  
                                               
108 For example, the successor may transfer the firm’s resources to his or her personal benefit via building 
‘empires’ or consuming perquisites such as corporate jets, luxurious offices etc. (Chen & Strange, 2005). 
109 As mentioned earlier, Family control is not controlled for in the regressions due to its high correlation with 
Family ownership, and thus the comparison of this variable between the family and nonfamily succession groups 
is not reported in Table 4.2. However, the unreported comparison result shows that Family control is also 
insignificantly different between the two groups. 
 
Chapter 4 - Leadership successor decision and access to debt 
 197 
For brevity, only the results for the grouping based on Family control, i.e. the most 
direct measure of the control rights of the family, are reported in Columns (3) and (4) 
of Table 4.8.110 Contrary to the conjecture, the results show that the negative family 
succession-debt level relationship is even stronger in firms highly controlled by the 
family. Moreover, the corresponding p-value for the Chow test suggests that 
notwithstanding the coefficient of Family is more negative for the firms strongly 
controlled by the family, it is still insignificantly different from that for the firms 
weakly controlled by the family.  
The above results confirm that the much higher debt level in nonfamily succession 
firms, i.e. the existing finding for H1a, is not a governance mechanism used by the 
controlling family to monitor the nonfamily successor’s management. 
Apart from the above alternative interpretations, the result for H1a may also be 
explained by the aforementioned Amore et al.’s (2011) viewpoint, that nonfamily 
successors can bring more growth opportunities to the firm, and thus need more funds 
for those opportunities. Nevertheless, Column (5) of Table 4.8 documents that Family 
is insignificantly related to the post-succession two-year average sales growth ratio, 
where the ratio is often employed as a proxy for firms’ growth opportunities (e.g., 
Chen & Strange, 2005; Cao et al., 2015; Liu & Xue, 2015). This indicates that family 
and nonfamily successors do not have a significantly different impact on the firm’s 
growth opportunities after the succession, and thus inconsistent with Amore et al.’s 
(2011) explanation.  
Another possible reason for the result is that family succession firms have already 
reserved enough internal funds before the succession, such as having a high level of 
cash holding, and thus have less need for debt to finance the successor’s investment 
(Amore et al., 2011).111 However, an unreported t-test result indicates that the family 
succession group, in fact, has a significantly lower cash holding ratio one year before 
                                               
110 Although the results for the classifications based on Family ownership and Family divergence are not 
tabulated, they are qualitatively similar to those reported for Family control.  
 
111 The pecking order theory suggests that managers tend to finance their investment in the order of internal funds, 
debt, and equity (Myers, 1984; Myers & Majluf, 1984).  
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the succession relative to the nonfamily succession group.112 Therefore, the above 
reason can also be ruled out.  
Moreover, if the result for H1a, i.e. family succession firms experience a significant 
decrease in debt level compared with nonfamily succession firms, indeed is derived 
from family successors’ or the family’s own choice due to the preceding reasons, the 
finding for H2 would not exist. For example, if it indeed is family successors per se 
choosing to use less debt to decrease the bankruptcy risk or having less need for debt 
due to the fewer growth opportunities or more internal funds of the firm, the 
successors’ acquisition of the specialised assets would not have a significant and 
positive impact on the firm’s debt level. 
Given the above discussion, it can be concluded that the finding for H1a indeed can 
be attributed to family successors’ inferior ability in term of debt financing relative to 
their nonfamily counterparts. Nevertheless, such disadvantage of family successions 
can be greatly mitigated by the successors’ acquisition of the founder’s specialised 
assets before the succession.  
[Insert Table 4.8 about here] 
4.5.4 Additional analysis 
This section provides several additional analyses for the existing results. The analyses 
consider the potential impact of regional marketisation level and cultural atmosphere, 
alternative proxies for firms’ access to debt, the founders’ political connections as a 
type of the specialised assets, and the role of guanxi-connected nonfamily successors. 
4.5.4.1 Does the regional marketisation level matter? 
As previously discussed, the majority of financial resources in China are dominated 
by the state-owned banks and thus tend to be allocated to state-owned enterprises. 
However, private enterprises, such as family businesses, are often subject to credit 
discrimination and having limited access to external finance due to the lack of 
                                               
112 As mentioned earlier, Cash holding is the sum of cash and cash equivalents scaled by total assets (Anderson & 
Reeb, 2003b). The mean of the one-year pre-succession cash holding ratio in family succession firms is 0.22, 
which is significantly lower than that in nonfamily succession firms (0.26) at the 5% level.  
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government support (Li et al., 2008; Liu et al., 2013). This causes that family firms 
have to heavily rely on the founder’s specialised assets, such as political connections 
or personal ties with banks, to obtain loans (Allen et al., 2005; Li et al., 2008). This, 
in turn, results in my finding for H2, i.e. family successors’ acquisition of the 
specialised assets significantly contributes to the firm’s access to debt finance after 
the succession. Given such a context, it should be reasonable to posit that the validity 
of the above finding is contingent upon the region where the firm is located. This is 
because, as mentioned in Chapter 2, there exists a great heterogeneity in the degree of 
marketisation of Chinese provinces. As a result, the controlling power of the local 
government in allocating economic resources varies across different provinces (Fan et 
al., 2009). More specifically, the government intervention in resource allocation 
typically is much heavier in provinces with a low marketisation level. As a result, 
family firms in those provinces are more likely to be unfairly treated on credit 
allocation, and thus the role of the founder’s specialised assets in debt financing 
becomes especially important. On the contrary, in provinces where resource 
allocation is more market-oriented, banks are more likely to distribute credit based on 
rules and market principles rather than the borrowers’ political support or personal 
relationship with the banks (Yang et al., 2012). Therefore, for family firms located in 
those provinces, the role of the founders’ personal specialised assets in determining 
the firm’s access to credit resources should be less important. As a direct 
consequence, the contribution that the successors’ acquisition of the assets can make 
to the firm’s access to debt capital should be less significant.  
Based on the above discussion, I posit that the result for H2, i.e. the positive 
relationship between family successors’ acquisition of the specialised assets and the 
firm’s debt level, is weaker in firms located in provinces with a high degree of 
marketisation in the local resource allocation.  
To test the above posit, the sample is divided into firms whose headquartered 
provinces have a low (below-median) or high (above-median) level of marketisation 
in terms of economic resource allocation one year prior to the succession. Such 
grouping is based on Fan et al.’s (2011b) index, “the importance of the market in 
economic resource allocation”, for each province in China. The higher the index value 
Chapter 4 - Leadership successor decision and access to debt 
 200 
of a province, the more important is the role of the market in economic resource 
allocation in that province (Fan et al., 2011b). Whether a firm’s headquartered 
province has a low (high) marketisation level, therefore, is defined as whether the 
index value of the firm’s headquartered province is below (above) the sample median.  
Table 4.9 reports the results for H2 across the above groups. Columns (1) and (2) 
show that the coefficients of Family*Manage, the interaction term denoting family 
successors’ acquisition of the founder’s specialised assets, are significantly and 
positively related to Debt difference in both groups. However, the coefficient is lower 
and less significant among firms whose headquartered province has a high 
marketisation level (Column (2)). In addition, when using Long-debt difference and 
Short-debt difference as the dependent variables, Columns (3) to (6) indicate that the 
coefficient of the interaction term is positive and significant only in the “low 
marketisation” group. These results, together, support the aforementioned posit, thus 
confirming that the contribution of the successors’ acquisition of the specialised assets 
to the firm’s access to debt indeed is contingent on where the firm is located. 
[Insert Table 4.9 about here] 
4.5.4.2 Does the cultural atmosphere matter? 
As previously mentioned, only the persons highly trustworthy for the founder have 
access to the founder’s personal specialised assets (Lee et al., 2003). Moreover, the 
Confucian familism culture makes Chinese people tend to have a low degree of trust 
towards nonfamily members (Xu et al., 2015). Therefore, I contend that family 
successors’ pre-succession internal managerial experience can greatly help them to 
acquire the founder’s specialised assets, and yet nonfamily successors’ corresponding 
experience may be much less helpful. This, in turn, leads to my H2, that family 
successors’ managerial experience in the firm before the succession is more 
conducive to the firm’s access to debt finance, relative to their nonfamily 
counterparts’ corresponding experience. However, the degree to which Chinese 
people are influenced by the traditional culture may be heterogeneous across regions 
(Yan & Sorenson, 2006). Therefore, in this section, I conjecture that whether family 
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and nonfamily successors have different access to the founder’s specialised assets 
depends on how strong the founder is affected by familism.  
Based on my discussion in Chapter 2, familism is one of the core values of 
Confucianism (Zhang & Ma, 2009). Moreover, firms located in regions with 
nationally famous Confucian centres, i.e. the places where Confucius has lived for a 
long time to spread his philosophy, should be surrounded by strong Confucianism 
atmosphere (Du, 2015).113 As a result, the founders in those firms should be more 
deeply edified by Confucian familism, and thus their specialised assets are more 
likely to be obtainable only to family successors. On the contrary, the founders in 
regions without a Confucian centre may be less deeply affected by familism, and thus 
less likely to have a low level of trust outside of kinship. In this case, nonfamily 
successors may have similar access to the specialised assets as their family 
counterparts. As a result, the significantly positive impact that family successors’ pre-
succession internal managerial experience has on the firm’s access to debt, i.e. the 
finding for H2, may diminish.    
To test the above conjecture, the sample is divided into firms whose headquartered 
provinces have or do not have a Confucian centre. Table 4.10 presents the results for 
H2 across the two groups of firms. Columns (1), (2), (5), (6) indicate that when the 
dependent variable is Debt difference or Short-debt difference, the coefficient of 
Family*Manage is more positive and only significant for the firms headquartered in 
provinces with a Confucian centre. Moreover, for Long-Debt difference (Columns (3) 
and (4)), while Family*Manage is significant and positive in both groups, the 
coefficient is still higher and more significant among firms having a Confucian centre 
in the headquartered province. These results are consistent with my conjecture, i.e. the 
greater contribution that family successors’ pre-succession internal managerial 
                                               
113 Confucius used to travel to different places to promote his philosophy. Because of his tremendous and 
profound impact in Chinese history, those places where he has lived for a long time, to accept students and spread 
his theory, have become nationally famous monuments in China, which are often called Confucian centres (Du, 
2015). China has 31 provinces, yet only seven provinces, i.e. Shandong, Sichuan, Henan, Fujian, Jiangsu, 
Zhejiang, and Jiangxi, have a Confucian centre. In this case, family firms located in those provinces should be 
surrounded by strong Confucianism atmosphere relative to other firms. Therefore, the founders of those firms, 
compared with their counterparts in other regions, should be much more deeply affected by Confucianism.  
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experience can make to the firm’s access to debt attenuates if the founder is not 
strongly affected by Confucian familism.   
 [Insert Table 4.10 about here] 
4.5.4.3 Alternative proxies for firms’ access to debt  
Apart from the debt level, whether a firm has superior access to debt financing may 
also be reflected in some other aspects, such as debt maturity, the cost of debt, and the 
access to credit loans (Zou & Adams, 2008; Díaz-Díaz et al., 2016; Pan & Tian, 
2016). Hence, this section applies the above alternative proxies for firms’ access to 
debt to test for H1 and H2. Following the prior literature, debt maturity is often 
measured as the firm’s long-term debt divided by total debt (e.g., Fan et al., 2008; 
Díaz-Díaz et al., 2016). The cost of debt is usually calculated as the firm’s interest 
expenses scaled by its average short- and long-term debt during the year (e.g., Pittman 
& Fortin, 2004; Bliss & Gul, 2012). The longer the debt maturity and the lower the 
debt cost, the greater the firm’s access to the credit market.  
Moreover, the outstanding loans in Chinese enterprises can mainly be divided into 
three types, i.e. collateral, guaranteed, and credit loans (Chen et al., 2013f; Pan & 
Tian, 2016). Credit loans, based on the designation, are the loans granted by the 
lenders without any collateral or guarantee requirement. This type of loans is typically 
unlikely to be obtained by private enterprises in China, due to their small size, young 
age, and the lack of political support, as well as the weak creditor protection systems 
in China (Chen et al., 2013c). Given such a context, having access to credit loans can 
also be an indicator of having good access to credit resources for family firms in 
China. 
Table 4.11 reports the results. Debt maturity difference is the difference in the firm’s 
debt maturity between the post- and pre-succession period and calculated as the two-
year average ratio of long-term debt to total debt after the succession minus the 
corresponding ratio before the succession. Debt cost difference is measured as the 
firm’s two-year average cost of debt after the succession minus that before the 
succession. Credit loan is a dummy equal to one if the firm has credit loans during the 
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two years after the succession and zero otherwise. Moreover, three additional control 
variables, Debt maturity t-1, Debt cost t-1, and Past credit loan t, are employed for the 
corresponding dependent variables. Specifically, Debt maturity (Debt cost) t-1 is the 
firm’s debt maturity (cost of debt) one year prior to the succession. Past credit loan t 
is a dummy equal to one if the firm has credit loans during the two-year pre-
succession period and zero otherwise.  
As to the regression results, Column (1) indicates that family successors are 
significantly and negatively related to the firm’s debt maturity compared with 
nonfamily agents. This is consistent with the aforementioned result for H1a, that the 
negative impact of family successions on the firm’s debt level is mainly derived from 
the decrease in long-term debt. However, Columns (3) and (5) show that family and 
nonfamily successors do not have a significantly different impact on the firm’s cost of 
debt and access to credit loans.  
In addition, Columns (2), (4), and (6) document that the coefficient of 
Family*Manage is significant and positive for Debt maturity difference and Credit 
loan, yet significant and negative for Debt cost difference. This suggests that family 
successors’ acquisition of the specialised assets can not only increase the firm’s debt 
maturity and likelihood to have credit loans114, but also decrease the firm’s cost of 
debt. This finding further supports my H2.  
[Insert Table 4.11 about here] 
4.5.4.4 Founders’ political connection as a specialised asset 
Due to the dominant role of the government in economic resource allocation in China, 
the founders’ political connections have become one of the most important specialised 
assets for Chinese family firms (Xu et al., 2015). The connections can bring huge 
benefits to the firms, including better access to financing (Li et al., 2008). However, 
because the founders’ personal valuable assets are accessible only to their highly 
                                               
114 For this test, I have also attempted to use the change in the firm’s percentage of credit loans during the two-
year pre-succession to two-year post-succession period as the dependent variable, in which the percentage of credit 
loans is measured as the ratio of credit loans to total debt. However, due to the extensive missing information 
about firms’ credit loans in CSMAR, only the period from one year before to one year after the succession has 
enough observations for the regression test. The result shows that the coefficient of Family*Manage is significant 
and positive at the 1% level, which is qualitatively similar to the result reported in Table 4.11.  
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trusted members, family successors may have better access to the founder’s political 
connections, relative to their nonfamily counterparts. This leads to another conjecture, 
i.e. the founders’ political connections are more beneficial to the firm’s post-
succession access to debt if the successor is the founder’s descendant rather than a 
nonfamily agent. 
For the above conjecture, two additional variables are employed, i.e. Political 
connection and Family*Political connection. Specifically, Political connection is a 
dummy equal to one if the founder has a political identity before the succession and 
zero otherwise. As defined in Chapter 2, the political identity can be: a current or 
former officer of either the central government or a local government; currently or 
formerly serving in any institutions or organisations directly affiliated with the central 
or a local government; or a current or former representative of the National People’s 
Congress (NPC), the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), or 
the National Congress of Communist Party of China (NCCPC). Family*Political 
connection, thereby, is the interaction term between Family and Political connection. 
The results are reported in Table 4.12. It indicates that Family*Political connection is 
significantly and positively related to the firm’s debt level (Column (1)), which is 
mainly driven by the increase in the short-term debt (Column (3)). Moreover, the 
interaction term is significantly and negatively associated with the firm’s cost of debt 
(Column (5)). However, when the dependent variable becomes the long-term debt 
level, the debt maturity, or the access to credit loans (Columns (2), (4), and (6)), the 
interaction term turns to be insignificant. Although Family*Political connection is not 
significantly related to all the proxies for firms’ access to debt finance, the results still 
provide some evidence for the aforementioned conjecture.    
[Insert Table 4.12 about here] 
4.5.4.5 Guanxi-connected nonfamily successors 
As discussed in the previous two chapters, Chinese family business founders should 
also have a high level of trust towards their guanxi-connected nonfamily members. 
Therefore, the founders should also be willing to transfer their specialised assets to 
nonfamily successors having a guanxi with them. In other words, those guanxi-
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connected successors should also have good access to the founder’s specialised assets, 
and thus can acquire the assets through pre-succession internal experience. This posit 
has been confirmed in the previous chapter, as I find that both family and guanxi-
connected successors’ pre-succession internal experience has a significant and 
positive impact on firm performance after the succession. Given this finding, in this 
section, successors are classified into family successors, guanxi-connected successors, 
and successors without a guanxi. This classification helps me to explore whether apart 
from family successors, guanxi-connected successors’ pre-succession internal 
managerial experience can also significantly improve the firm’s access to debt finance 
after the succession.  
Table 4.13 presents the results. Family, the same as in the above sections, is a dummy 
equal to one if the successor is the founder’s descendant and zero otherwise. Guanxi 
is also a dummy, which equals one if the successor is a nonfamily member having a 
guanxi with the founder and zero otherwise.115 The independent variables of interest 
in the table are Family*Manage and Guanxi*Manage, where the former is still the 
interaction term between Family and Successor manage and the latter is that between 
Guanxi and Successor manage.  
The results show that the coefficients of Family*Manage are still significant and 
positive in all three columns, consistent with my previous results. Guanxi*Manage is 
also positive, yet insignificant for the dependent variables. This suggests that for 
nonfamily successors who are guanxi-connected, their pre-succession internal 
managerial experience does not have a significantly different impact on the firm’s 
access to debt, compared with their counterparts without a guanxi. An appropriate 
interpretation is that even if the founders per se are willing to transfer their specialised 
assets to both family and guanxi-connected successors, some assets critical to the 
firm’s access to credit resources in China, such as personal connections with banks, 
are much more difficult for the guanxi-connected successors to acquire. This is 
because the connected banks may be more willing to help and build good 
                                               
115 Following my previous chapters, a nonfamily successor is defined as guanxi-connected with the founder if he 
or she has one of the following identities: 1) sharing the same surname with the founder; 2) sharing the same 
birthplace or native place (the same province) with the founder; 3) graduating from the same college or university 
as the founder; 4) being the founder’s former colleague before the startup of the family firm; 5) acting as a 
director or a top manager in more than one company controlled by the founder before the succession; and 6) 
joining the family firm at its start-up stage, i.e. the first three years after the setting-up of the company. 
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relationships with family successors due to their unique connection with the founder, 
i.e. the blood ties, and the fact that they have become or will be the ultimate controller 
in the firm. However, guanxi-connected successors may be less attractive to the 
banks, because the nonfamily identity makes the successors essentially similar to 
other nonfamily successors, i.e. the agents working for the controlling family rather 
than the genuine dominator of the firm.  
Moreover, a possible reason for the inconsistency between the above finding and that 
in my previous chapter is that firm performance should mainly rely on the leader’s 
tacit knowledge, such as the business founder’s superior managerial and leadership 
skills and strategies. This tacit knowledge can be absorbed by a successor through 
observation and practice, as long as the founder is willing to provide the successor 
with the access to the knowledge and opportunities to practice it (Bracci & Vagnoni, 
2011). Thus, such knowledge is obtainable for both family successors and nonfamily 
successors having a guanxi with the founder. However, family firms’ access to credit 
resources should primarily rely on the founder’s personal relationships with banks or 
other financial institutions, which, as discussed above, should be much more easily 
for family successors to transform into their own resources because of their special 
identity.  
[Insert Table 4.13 about here] 
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter explores the role that the successor decision plays in determining the 
firm’s access to debt finance in Chinese family firms. To this end, first, I investigate 
whether the choice of a family or nonfamily successor has a significantly different 
influence on the firm’s access to debt after the succession. Based on the DID analysis 
approach, I find that family successors have a significant and negative impact on the 
firm’s access to debt capital, compared with their nonfamily counterparts. This is in 
line with my H1a, thus supporting my argument that family successors per se are less 
capable of debt financing relative to nonfamily agents. In addition, I document that 
the result is mainly driven by the access to long-term debt. This further supports my 
argument, as having superior access to long-term debt finance has long been regarded 
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as a reflection of great debt-financing ability in China’s setting (e.g., Zou & Adams, 
2008). Moreover, the results and the argument for the results still hold after ruling out 
endogeneity concerns and alternative explanations.  
Secondly, I explore whether successors’ acquisition of the founder’s specialised assets 
contributes to the firm’s access to debt finance. Following the previous chapter, I use 
successors’ pre-succession internal managerial experience to proxy for their 
obtainment of the assets. I posit that this proxy is more applicable to family 
successors relative to nonfamily agents due to family business founders’ much higher 
level of trust towards the former. This, in turn, results in my H2 that family 
successors’ managerial experience in the firm before succession is more conducive to 
the firm’s access to debt, compared with nonfamily successors’ corresponding 
experience. My empirical result confirms this hypothesis, showing that family 
successors’ pre-succession internal managerial experience has a significant and 
positive effect on the firm’s access to not only short-term loans but also long-term 
loans. This, in turn, implies that family successors’ weaker debt-financing ability can 
be greatly alleviated by the specialised assets that they acquire from the founder.  
In addition, I find that the validity of the above result for H2 attenuates if the firm’s 
headquartered province has a high degree of marketisation in the local financial 
resource allocation and the founder is not surrounded by strong Confucianism 
atmosphere.  
Moreover, family successors’ pre-succession internal managerial experience is also 
shown to have a significant and positive impact on the firm’s debt maturity and access 
to credit loans, and a significant and negative impact on the firm’s debt cost. This 
further confirms that family successors’ acquisition of the founder’s specialised assets 
greatly contributes to the firm’s access to debt finance.  
Finally, my results indicate that the founders’ political connections, as a type of the 
specialised assets, are more beneficial to the firm’s access to debt after the succession 
if the successor is the founder’s descendant instead of a nonfamily member. This 
further supports my argument for H2, that the founders’ specialised assets which are 
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critical to the firm’s access to credit resources are more easily to be obtained by their 
descendants compared with nonfamily agents.  
In general, the contributions of this chapter are three-folded. Firstly, it complements 
people’s understanding of the economic consequences of the successor decision in 
Chinese family firms, by going beyond firm performance measures to explore 
whether the choice of a family or nonfamily successor has an impact on the firm’s 
debt financing.  
Secondly, this chapter, following Chapter 3, provides more original evidence on the 
importance of successors’ acquisition of the founder’s specialised assets for the firm’s 
survival and development after the succession. As previously mentioned, the 
importance of the assets for family businesses have long been highlighted in theory by 
researchers (e.g., Cabrera-Suárez et al., 2001; Lee et al., 2003; Bracci & Vagnoni, 
2011), and yet have never been empirically examined.  
Finally, this chapter may provide a useful suggestion to family business founders’ 
descendants who may take over the leadership position in the future, that their internal 
managerial experience before the succession can provide them with sufficient 
opportunities to transform the founder’s specialised assets into their own resources. 
This, in turn, can greatly mitigate their potential inferior capability of fundraising 
relative to nonfamily agents.  
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Chapter 4 Tables 
 
Table 4.1—Summary statistics 
This table provides summary statistics of variables, in which the first variable is the 
dependent variable, i.e. the difference in the firm’s total debt level between the two-year post-
succession and two-year pre-succession period. The rest are the independent variables. It is 
worth noting that the statistics are provided after winsorising all continuous variables at the 
1% and 99% percentiles. 
   
Variable N Mean Std Median Min Max 
Debt difference (%) 266 0.36 10.56 0 -31.52 24.55 
Firm age t-1 348 11.35 5.06 11 3 25 
Ln(total assets) t-1 348 21.14 0.89 21.12 19.29 23.83 
Debt level t-1 (%) 348 16.51 14.54 14.5 0 60.57 
Firm profitability t-1 (%) 295 4.57 5.49 4.37 -10.84 22.29 
Sales growth t-1 (%) 295 34.85 165.59 14.68 -67.75 1609.59 
Business risk t-1 183 0.04 0.07 0.02 0 0.48 
Dividend payout t-1 (%) 348 26.49 30.99 19.3 0 176.96 
Interest coverage t-1 348 0.59 0.49 1 0 1 
Board size t-1 346 8.52 1.49 9 5 12 
Family ownership t-1 (%) 343 33.96 17.39 30 7.43 75 
Family divergence t-1 (%) 343 6.92 8.24 3.33 0 28.35 
Successor manage t 347 3.48 3.02 3 0 15 
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Table 4.2—Comparison between family and nonfamily successions  
This table reports the mean comparisons between family and nonfamily succession firms in 
terms of the variables in the previous table. Column (1) reports the means of the variables for 
the family succession group and Column (0) lists the means for the nonfamily succession 
group. Column “Mean difference” reports the results of the difference in means t-test for each 
variable. 
 
Variables 
Family 
successions 
(1) 
Nonfamily 
successions 
(0) 
Mean 
difference 
(1-0) 
Debt difference (%) -2.61 1.42 -4.04*** 
Firm age t-1 11.63 11.25 0.37 
Ln(total assets) t-1 21.28 21.1 0.18 
Debt level t-1 (%) 19.15 15.6 3.55** 
Firm profitability t-1 (%) 4.61 4.55 0.06 
Sales growth t-1 (%) 35.82 34.5 1.32 
Business risk t-1 0.03 0.04 -0.01 
Dividend payout t-1 (%) 28.38 25.84 2.54 
Interest coverage t-1 0.61 0.58 0.02 
Board size t-1 8.66 8.47 0.19 
Family ownership t-1 (%) 34.23 33.86 0.37 
Family divergence t-1 (%) 7.94 6.58 1.36 
Successor manage t 4.1 3.27 0.83** 
***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level (two-tailed test), respectively. 
 
Chapter 4 - Leadership successor decision and access to debt 
 211 
Table 4.3—Correlation matrix 
This matrix reports the Pearson correlation coefficients for the dependent and independent variables. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Debt difference (1) 1              
Family (2) -0.17*** 1             
Firm age t-1 (3) -0.06 0.03 1            
Firm size t-1 (4) 0.02 0.09 0.22*** 1           
Debt level t-1 (5) -0.25*** 0.11** 0.14*** 0.12** 1          
Firm profitability t-1 (6) 0.01 0 -0.09 0.13** -0.40*** 1         
Sales growth t-1 (7) 0.08 0 0.19*** -0.03 -0.04 0.18*** 1        
Business risk t-1 (8) 0.03 -0.09 0.16** -0.24*** 0.23*** -0.06 0.18** 1       
Dividend payout t-1 (9) -0.04 0.04 -0.23*** -0.08 -0.21*** 0.16*** -0.12** -0.22*** 1      
Interest coverage t-1 (10) -0.05 0.02 -0.02 0.24*** 0.15*** 0.20*** -0.09* -0.12 -0.03 1     
Board size t-1 (11) 0 0.05 -0.09 0.16*** 0.04 0.08 -0.02 0.01 0.04 0.03 1    
Family ownership t-1 (12) 0.15** 0.01 -0.24*** -0.02 -0.31*** 0.16*** 0.01 -0.04 0.05 -0.08 -0.04 1   
Family divergence t-1 (13) -0.16*** 0.07 0.17*** 0.24*** 0.17*** 0.01 0.06 0.05 -0.04 0.16*** 0.07 -0.37*** 1  
Successor manage t (14) -0.12** 0.12** 0.18*** 0.28*** 0.05 -0.08 0.01 -0.1 -0.11** 0.09 0.06 -0.23*** 0.15*** 1 
***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level (two-tailed test), respectively. 
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Table 4.4—Family successions and the firm’s access to debt 
This table provides the results of the DID analysis of the comparison between family and 
nonfamily successors in terms of their effect on the change in the firm’s debt level around the 
succession. The dependent variables, Debt difference, Long-debt difference, and Short-debt 
difference, are the difference between the two-year average total debt level after the succession 
and that before the succession, as well as the corresponding differences for the long-term debt 
level and short-term debt level. Family is the independent variable of interest, equal to one if 
the successor is a descendant of the founder, by blood or marriage; otherwise, it equals zero. 
All the other variables are the controls for pre-succession firm-, governance-, and family-level 
characteristics, as well as industry and year fixed effects. 
 
 Debt 
difference 
Long-debt 
difference 
Short-debt 
difference 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Family -0.040** -0.018** -0.010 
 (0.019) (0.010) (0.016) 
Debt level t-1 -0.221
***   
 (0.080)   
Long-debt level t-1  -0.346
***  
  (0.097)  
Short-debt level t-1   -0.188
*** 
   (0.071) 
Firm age t-1 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Firm size t-1 0.024
** 0.002 0.027** 
 (0.012) (0.007) (0.011) 
Firm profitability t-1 -0.571
** 0.043 -0.556** 
 (0.274) (0.089) (0.230) 
Sales growth t-1 0.008 0.003 0.001 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) 
Interest coverage t-1 0.022 0.022
* 0.001 
 (0.021) (0.011) (0.020) 
Dividend payout t-1 -0.074
*** -0.035* -0.061** 
 (0.028) (0.019) (0.027) 
Business risk t-1 0.111 0.067 0.036 
 (0.198) (0.075) (0.183) 
Board size t-1 0.008 -0.004 0.011
** 
 (0.007) (0.004) (0.005) 
Family ownership t-1 0.088 -0.018 0.050 
 (0.071) (0.043) (0.062) 
Family divergence t-1 -0.327
** -0.098 -0.202* 
 (0.128) (0.085) (0.108) 
Industry & year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 161 161 178 
R2 0.311 0.400 0.271 
Adj. R2 0.158 0.267 0.128 
Firm-level clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
 ***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level (two-tailed test), respectively. 
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Table 4.5—Family successors’ acquisition of the founder’s specialised assets and 
the firm’s access to debt 
This table presents the results of the comparison between family and nonfamily successors 
regarding the effect that their managerial experience in the firm before the succession has on 
the firm’s debt level. Successor manage therefore denotes the number of the years that the 
successor has worked as a director or a top manager in the family business till the succession 
announcement year. Family*Manage is the interaction term between Family and Successor 
manage. All other variables are defined as the same as in the prior table.  
 
 Debt 
difference 
Long-debt 
difference 
Short-debt 
difference 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Family -0.136*** -0.069*** -0.066** 
 (0.036) (0.019) (0.033) 
Successor manage t -0.007
** -0.004** -0.005* 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Family*Manage 0.019*** 0.010*** 0.011** 
 (0.006) (0.003) (0.005) 
Debt level t-1 -0.227
***   
 (0.077)   
Long-debt level t-1  -0.385
***  
  (0.098)  
Short-debt level t-1   -0.185
** 
   (0.071) 
Firm age t-1 0.002 0.001 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Firm size t-1 0.030
*** 0.007 0.032*** 
 (0.012) (0.007) (0.011) 
Firm profitability t-1 -0.570
** 0.039 -0.553** 
 (0.266) (0.084) (0.228) 
Sales growth t-1 0.007
* 0.003 0.001 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Interest coverage t-1 0.026 0.024
** 0.001 
 (0.021) (0.011) (0.019) 
Dividend payout t-1 -0.089
*** -0.043** -0.063** 
 (0.026) (0.019) (0.025) 
Business risk t-1 0.099 0.061 0.027 
 (0.195) (0.071) (0.185) 
Board size t-1 0.007 -0.005 0.010
** 
 (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) 
Family ownership t-1 0.068 -0.033 0.038 
 (0.070) (0.044) (0.064) 
Family divergence t-1 -0.304
** -0.087 -0.184* 
 (0.128) (0.084) (0.110) 
Industry & year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 161 161 178 
R2 0.363 0.444 0.297 
Adj. R2 0.209 0.310 0.148 
Firm-level clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
  ***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level (two-tailed test), respectively. 
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    Table 4.6—The consideration of other firm-level, environmental, and succession-
specific characteristics 
This table reports the results after controlling for another set of firm- and environment-level as 
well as succession-specific factors in the baseline regression models. The definitions of all 
variables are described in Table 4.14.  
 
 Debt difference Long-debt difference Short-debt difference 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Family -0.048** -0.137*** -0.026** -0.078*** -0.008 -0.058 
 (0.022) (0.040) (0.011) (0.018) (0.019) (0.035) 
Successor manage t  -0.007*  -0.005***  -0.005 
  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.003) 
Family*Manage  0.018***  0.010***  0.010** 
  (0.006)  (0.002)  (0.006) 
Debt level t-1 -0.157** -0.178**     
 (0.078) (0.075)     
Long-debt level t-1   -0.353*** -0.401***   
   (0.098) (0.100)   
Short-debt level t-1     -0.131* -0.137* 
     (0.070) (0.071) 
Firm age t-1 0.001 0.002 -0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Firm size t-1 0.020* 0.029** 0.003 0.010 0.024** 0.029** 
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.011) 
Firm profitability t-1 -0.563** -0.560** -0.022 -0.014 -0.498** -0.487** 
 (0.251) (0.246) (0.101) (0.096) (0.218) (0.218) 
Sales growth t-1 0.006 0.006 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.001 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Business risk t-1 0.152 0.141 0.067 0.056 0.048 0.039 
 (0.198) (0.196) (0.082) (0.078) (0.177) (0.181) 
Dividend payout t-1 -0.062* -0.079** -0.035 -0.046** -0.054* -0.057** 
 (0.033) (0.031) (0.023) (0.023) (0.030) (0.029) 
Interest coverage t-1 0.023 0.030 0.022* 0.026** 0.003 0.004 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.012) (0.012) (0.020) (0.020) 
Board size t-1 0.007 0.007 -0.005 -0.005 0.010* 0.009* 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Family ownership t-1 0.107 0.079 -0.022 -0.041 0.056 0.043 
 (0.078) (0.076) (0.048) (0.047) (0.073) (0.073) 
Family divergence t-1 -0.307** -0.292** -0.054 -0.046 -0.214* -0.202* 
 (0.123) (0.124) (0.083) (0.079) (0.114) (0.117) 
Nonfamily ownership t-1 -0.044 -0.076 -0.006 -0.033 -0.112 -0.129 
 (0.118) (0.124) (0.048) (0.050) (0.105) (0.108) 
State ownership t-1 0.289 0.223 -0.003 -0.025 0.591 0.560 
 (0.337) (0.364) (0.180) (0.183) (0.363) (0.378) 
Foreign ownership t-1 -0.522 -0.857 -0.908** -1.146*** 0.390 0.194 
 (0.555) (0.532) (0.360) (0.353) (0.559) (0.533) 
Asset tangibility t-1 -0.020 -0.007 -0.052 -0.041 0.000 0.014 
 (0.090) (0.087) (0.049) (0.047) (0.074) (0.071) 
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Table 4.6 continued       
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Cash holding t-1 0.106 0.119 -0.012 -0.006 0.070 0.075 
 (0.084) (0.078) (0.048) (0.045) (0.074) (0.071) 
Income tax rate t-1 0.185 0.146 0.116** 0.093* 0.022 -0.008 
 (0.114) (0.118) (0.056) (0.053) (0.100) (0.104) 
Institutional environment t-1 -0.008 -0.008 -0.001 -0.001 -0.005 -0.004 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) 
Industrial competition t-1 -0.116 -0.078 -0.019 0.006 -0.085 -0.064 
 (0.187) (0.190) (0.082) (0.082) (0.135) (0.137) 
Early succession -0.012 -0.013 -0.035** -0.038** 0.025 0.025 
 (0.033) (0.035) (0.015) (0.016) (0.026) (0.028) 
Retire 0.074 0.043 -0.003 -0.017 0.055 0.042 
 (0.055) (0.061) (0.034) (0.039) (0.038) (0.038) 
Postsuccession founder 0.006 0.002 0.015 0.014 0.009 0.007 
 (0.021) (0.019) (0.012) (0.011) (0.017) (0.016) 
Industry & year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 161 161 161 161 178 178 
R2 0.371 0.412 0.466 0.512 0.319 0.339 
Adj. R2 0.161 0.203 0.287 0.338 0.120 0.134 
Firm-level clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level (two-tailed test), respectively. 
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Table 4.7—Two-stage regression analysis for H1 
This table presents the results for H1 via two-stage regressions. Columns (1) and (3) report the 
first-stage regression results where the dependent variable is Family, the dummy equal to one if 
the successor is a descendant and zero otherwise. The first instrumental variable, Founder age, 
is the founder’s age one year prior to the succession. The second instrument, Family planning, 
is the average family planning rate in the firm’s headquartered province for the pre-succession 
years. Columns (2) and (4) present the second-stage regression results. The dependent 
variables, Debt difference and Long-debt difference, are defined as the same as in the above 
tables. The independent variable of interest, Predicted (Family), is the predicted value of 
Family from the first-stage regressions. All other control variables are the same as those in the 
baseline regression models. Industry and year effects are also included. 
    
 Family Debt 
difference 
Family Long-debt 
difference 
 1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Founder age t-1 0.026***  0.026***  
 (0.005)  (0.005)  
Family planning -0.017*  -0.018*  
 (0.010)  (0.010)  
Predicted (Family)  -0.082*  -0.046* 
  (0.046)  (0.024) 
Debt level t-1 0.073 -0.186**   
 (0.263) (0.081)   
Long-debt level t-1   -0.169 -0.338*** 
   (0.547) (0.084) 
Firm age t-1 0.006 0.002 0.005 0.001 
 (0.010) (0.002) (0.010) (0.002) 
Firm size t-1 -0.025 0.015 -0.020 -0.004 
 (0.043) (0.012) (0.049) (0.007) 
Firm profitability t-1 -0.169 -0.473* -0.267 0.028 
 (0.657) (0.257) (0.669) (0.085) 
Sales growth t-1 0.002 0.007 0.003 0.002 
 (0.013) (0.004) (0.013) (0.003) 
Dividend payout t-1 0.032 0.022 0.034 0.024** 
 (0.083) (0.020) (0.082) (0.010) 
Interest coverage t-1 -0.050 -0.073*** -0.049 -0.038** 
 (0.124) (0.028) (0.126) (0.019) 
Business risk t-1 -0.187 -0.033 -0.118 0.052 
 (0.589) (0.191) (0.574) (0.080) 
Board size t-1 -0.020 0.005 -0.021 -0.004 
 (0.026) (0.007) (0.026) (0.004) 
Family ownership t-1 0.147 0.108 0.123 0.001 
 (0.299) (0.067) (0.293) (0.040) 
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Table 4.7 continued     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Family divergence t-1 0.522 -0.212* 0.529 -0.017 
 (0.611) (0.128) (0.612) (0.087) 
Industry & year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 144 144 144 144 
1st Stage F-statistics 14.13*** 14.47*** 
Stock-Yogo critical value for F-stat 8.68 (10% maximal size) 
Hansen’s J test p-value 0.147  0.512  
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test p-value 0.313  0.197  
Firm-level clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level (two-tailed test), respectively. 
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Table 4.8—Alternative explanations for H1 
This table presents the results for testing whether the finding for H1 attributable to alternative 
interpretations. The post-PSM subsample is derived from the propensity score matching of the 
firms’ pre-succession debt level. The low-risk (high-risk) subsample consists of firms whose 
pre-succession business risk, i.e. the standard deviation of ROA over the three years before the 
succession, is below (above) the median. The low (high) control firms are those whose family’s 
pre-succession control rights, i.e. the family’s votes as a percentage of total votes outstanding in 
the firm one year before the succession, is below (above) the median value. The dependent 
variable in Column (6), Postsuccession sales growth, is the post-succession two-year average 
sales growth ratio. Sales growth ratio is measured as the change in total sales from the previous 
year scaled by total sales in the previous year. 
 
 Debt difference Postsuccession 
sales growth 
Subsamples: Post-
PSM 
Low 
risk 
High 
risk 
Low 
control 
High 
control 
 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Family -0.044* -0.031 -0.071 -0.006 -0.018 -0.301 
 (0.025) (0.033) (0.047) (0.037) (0.056) (0.325) 
Debt level t-1 -0.200
* -0.365** -0.073 -0.156 -0.282** 0.327 
 (0.110) (0.154) (0.126) (0.131) (0.123) (1.290) 
Firm age t-1 -0.002 0.000 0.004 0.007 -0.004 0.023 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.039) 
Firm size t-1 0.034
** 0.025 -0.005 0.029 0.016 -0.341 
 (0.017) (0.022) (0.018) (0.021) (0.021) (0.232) 
Firm profitability t-1 -0.318 -0.144 -0.613
** -0.802** -1.007*** -3.382 
 (0.382) (0.667) (0.304) (0.366) (0.359) (3.443) 
Sales growth t-1 0.011
* 0.031 0.003 0.012 0.017*** 0.172 
 (0.006) (0.019) (0.006) (0.016) (0.005) (0.169) 
Business risk t-1 0.278 -4.190 0.201 0.135 0.556 -6.413 
 (0.314) (3.712) (0.239) (0.232) (0.489) (3.911) 
Dividend payout t-1 -0.068 -0.036 -0.006 -0.074
* -0.202 -0.014 
 (0.047) (0.050) (0.087) (0.038) (0.209) (0.349) 
Interest coverage t-1 0.000 0.042 0.025 0.004 0.090
*** 0.307 
 (0.000) (0.039) (0.033) (0.032) (0.032) (0.356) 
Board size t-1 0.013 0.000 0.014 0.020 0.001 -0.014 
 (0.013) (0.009) (0.013) (0.012) (0.009) (0.123) 
Family ownership t-1 0.041 0.018 0.213
* 0.408 -0.510*** 1.271 
 (0.128) (0.135) (0.124) (0.272) (0.165) (1.385) 
Family divergence t-1 -0.332 -0.233 -0.055 -0.428
* -1.045*** 2.274 
 (0.258) (0.207) (0.238) (0.233) (0.242) (2.101) 
Nonfamily ownership t-1 0.166 0.057 -0.003 -0.077 -0.522
** 0.893 
 (0.201) (0.189) (0.212) (0.163) (0.217) (1.632) 
State ownership t-1 -0.070 -0.039 0.847 0.203 3.196
*** -4.399 
 (0.411) (0.385) (0.689) (0.477) (1.129) (6.085) 
Foreign ownership t-1 -1.972 0.999 0.213 1.369 -0.245 -14.752 
 (1.238) (1.636) (0.960) (1.171) (1.029) (11.319) 
Asset tangibility t-1 0.010 -0.013 0.104 0.039 -0.355
*** -0.987 
 (0.138) (0.181) (0.146) (0.149) (0.122) (1.693) 
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Table 4.8 continued       
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Cash holding t-1 0.169 -0.002 0.259 0.218 -0.110 0.924 
 (0.167) (0.136) (0.195) (0.147) (0.117) (2.301) 
Income tax rate t-1 0.238 0.323 0.216 0.188 0.137 0.226 
 (0.218) (0.248) (0.162) (0.147) (0.194) (1.913) 
Institutional environment t-1 -0.006 -0.024
** -0.010 -0.003 0.002 -0.011 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.076) 
Industrial competition t-1 -0.031 -0.574
** 0.063 -0.009 -0.806** -2.736 
 (0.334) (0.287) (0.226) (0.220) (0.302) (1.928) 
Early succession 0.005 -0.072 0.052 0.018 -0.029 -0.255 
 (0.044) (0.065) (0.045) (0.049) (0.074) (0.690) 
Retire 0.093 -0.025 - 0.076 - 0.013 
 (0.058) (0.072) - (0.069) - (0.630) 
Postsuccession founder 0.012 0.033 -0.018 0.007 -0.026 -0.338 
 (0.038) (0.031) (0.034) (0.032) (0.034) (0.302) 
Industry & year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 90 78 83 103 58 176 
R2 0.532 0.635 0.490 0.461 0.844 0.351 
Adj. R2 0.150 0.240 0.070 0.113 0.505 0.158 
Chow test p-value for Family 0.352 0.776  
Firm-level clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 4.9—Successors’ acquisition of the specialised assets and the regional 
marketisation level 
    The table provides the results for testing whether the finding for H2 is contingent on the 
marketisation level in the firm’s headquartered province in terms of resource allocation. The 
definition of the marketisation level is based on Fan et al.’s (2011) index, “the importance of 
the market in economic resource allocation”, for each province in China. Firms in the “Low 
(High) market” group are those whose headquartered province has a below-median (above-
median) index value one year before the succession.  
 
 Debt                     
difference 
Long-debt 
difference 
Short-debt 
difference 
Groups: Low 
market 
High 
market 
Low 
market 
High 
market 
Low 
market 
High  
market 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Family -0.149*** -0.219*** -0.116*** -0.057 -0.065 -0.096 
 (0.047) (0.076) (0.033) (0.056) (0.048) (0.076) 
Successor manage t -0.000 -0.014** -0.004 -0.002 -0.001 -0.014* 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.007) 
Family*Manage 0.030*** 0.026** 0.020** 0.008 0.021* 0.016 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.007) (0.011) (0.010) 
Debt level t-1 -0.019 -0.425**     
 (0.090) (0.197)     
Long-debt level t-1   -0.368*** -0.503*   
   (0.125) (0.270)   
Short-debt level t-1     -0.043 -0.349** 
     (0.087) (0.151) 
Firm age t-1 0.005* 0.004 0.003 0.000 0.003 0.006 
 (0.003) (0.006) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) 
Firm size t-1 -0.006 0.057* 0.001 0.021 0.009 0.026 
 (0.017) (0.031) (0.012) (0.018) (0.015) (0.031) 
Firm profitability t-1 -0.036 -0.966** 0.247 -0.052 -0.163 -0.802** 
 (0.281) (0.396) (0.194) (0.139) (0.305) (0.315) 
Sales growth t-1 0.005 -0.010 -0.003 0.005 0.005 -0.004 
 (0.005) (0.015) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) 
Business risk t-1 0.135 0.459 0.276 0.030 -0.383 0.266 
 (0.273) (0.282) (0.187) (0.129) (0.237) (0.239) 
Dividend payout t-1 -0.005 -0.079 -0.072* -0.014 -0.023 -0.079 
 (0.064) (0.066) (0.042) (0.029) (0.055) (0.054) 
Interest coverage t-1 0.039 0.015 0.027 0.035 0.010 -0.012 
 (0.026) (0.055) (0.019) (0.023) (0.024) (0.049) 
Board size t-1 -0.001 0.013 -0.008 -0.011 0.010 0.017 
 (0.008) (0.015) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.017) 
Family ownership t-1 0.117 0.223 -0.006 -0.060 0.033 0.114 
 (0.095) (0.230) (0.065) (0.096) (0.083) (0.188) 
Family divergence t-1 -0.362* -0.107 -0.013 -0.185 -0.134 -0.100 
 (0.194) (0.311) (0.145) (0.182) (0.173) (0.267) 
Nonfamily ownership t-1 0.014 -0.280 0.008 -0.154 -0.107 -0.291 
 (0.115) (0.360) (0.081) (0.128) (0.115) (0.296) 
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Table 4.9 continued       
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
State ownership t-1 0.273 0.284 0.030 -0.234 0.354 1.470 
 (0.382) (0.957) (0.257) (0.364) (0.393) (0.916) 
Foreign ownership t-1 -0.043 -6.560 -1.171** -3.729 0.552 -1.483 
 (0.748) (4.362) (0.480) (2.471) (0.630) (3.134) 
Asset tangibility t-1 -0.008 -0.386 -0.034 0.025 -0.023 -0.223 
 (0.102) (0.304) (0.076) (0.107) (0.100) (0.207) 
Cash holding t-1 0.044 0.338 -0.058 -0.037 0.033 0.112 
 (0.100) (0.311) (0.070) (0.145) (0.088) (0.231) 
Income tax rate t-1 0.297* -0.232 0.096 0.114 0.145 -0.316 
 (0.155) (0.406) (0.082) (0.151) (0.142) (0.330) 
Institutional environment t-1 -0.018* -0.006 -0.000 -0.003 -0.012 0.002 
 (0.010) (0.018) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.015) 
Industrial competition t-1 -0.434* -0.324 -0.079 0.181 -0.243 -0.458 
 (0.245) (0.534) (0.146) (0.130) (0.190) (0.429) 
Early succession 0.012 -0.060 -0.073** -0.001 0.090** 0.007 
 (0.047) (0.111) (0.028) (0.050) (0.042) (0.061) 
Retire 0.026 0.234 -0.025 0.040 -0.095 0.114 
 (0.073) (0.157) (0.056) (0.084) (0.069) (0.123) 
Postsuccession founder -0.004 -0.005 0.016 -0.001 -0.004 0.007 
 (0.027) (0.036) (0.017) (0.020) (0.026) (0.034) 
Industry & year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 90 71 90 71 97 81 
R2 0.638 0.623 0.660 0.615 0.528 0.499 
Adj. R2 0.314 0.058 0.355 0.038 0.161 0.054 
Firm-level clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level (two-tailed test), respectively. 
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Table 4.10—Successors’ acquisition of the specialised assets and the regional 
cultural atmosphere 
    The table presents the results for testing whether the finding for H2 is contingent upon whether 
the firm’s headquartered province has a nationally famous Confucian centre. Firms in the “No 
centre (Centre)” group are those headquartered in provinces without (with) a Confucian centre.   
 
 Debt                   
difference 
Long-debt  
difference 
  Short-debt   
  difference 
Groups: No centre Centre No centre Centre No centre Centre 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Family -0.136* -0.201*** -0.083** -0.072** -0.073 -0.101 
 (0.072) (0.070) (0.034) (0.035) (0.064) (0.070) 
Successor manage t -0.001 -0.017** -0.006* -0.006** -0.001 -0.015** 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) 
Family*Manage 0.013 0.031** 0.010* 0.012** 0.010 0.023* 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.011) 
Debt level t-1 -0.002 -0.277**     
 (0.145) (0.133)     
Long-debt level t-1   -0.353** -0.578***   
   (0.155) (0.207)   
Short-debt level t-1     -0.135 -0.077 
     (0.127) (0.130) 
Firm age t-1 0.007* 0.009 0.007*** -0.000 -0.001 0.010* 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) 
Firm size t-1 0.001 0.026 -0.001 0.010 0.028* 0.016 
 (0.017) (0.024) (0.010) (0.013) (0.016) (0.026) 
Firm profitability t-1 -0.559 -0.717* 0.058 0.136 -0.501 -0.534* 
 (0.358) (0.402) (0.194) (0.114) (0.373) (0.313) 
Sales growth t-1 0.011 0.002 0.005 0.005 0.002 -0.004 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) 
Business risk t-1 0.306 0.214 0.174 -0.043 0.038 0.031 
 (0.333) (0.285) (0.183) (0.077) (0.329) (0.223) 
Dividend payout t-1 0.050 -0.106* -0.073 -0.033 -0.029 -0.095* 
 (0.076) (0.060) (0.057) (0.026) (0.056) (0.056) 
Interest coverage t-1 0.060 0.019 0.056*** 0.036* 0.000 0.007 
 (0.036) (0.050) (0.021) (0.019) (0.034) (0.045) 
Board size t-1 0.001 0.019 -0.002 -0.009 0.009 0.016 
 (0.011) (0.014) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.013) 
Family ownership t-1 0.173* -0.015 0.024 -0.194*** -0.011 0.096 
 (0.099) (0.189) (0.075) (0.062) (0.087) (0.177) 
Family divergence t-1 -0.412** -0.300 0.013 -0.276* -0.239 -0.166 
 (0.193) (0.249) (0.147) (0.147) (0.185) (0.251) 
Nonfamily ownership t-1 -0.042 -0.289 -0.027 -0.221* -0.093 -0.335 
 (0.164) (0.384) (0.092) (0.111) (0.161) (0.263) 
State ownership t-1 0.725 -0.266 0.316 -0.599* 0.667 0.504 
 (0.441) (0.649) (0.288) (0.301) (0.541) (0.661) 
Foreign ownership t-1 -0.356 -6.246 -1.290** -3.526* 0.288 -1.528 
 (0.825) (4.501) (0.583) (1.821) (0.956) (3.256) 
Asset tangibility t-1 -0.093 0.016 -0.055 0.080 -0.117 -0.003 
 (0.112) (0.221) (0.079) (0.076) (0.108) (0.156) 
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Table 4.10 continued       
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Cash holding t-1 0.066 0.338 -0.015 -0.109 0.004 0.219 
 (0.106) (0.271) (0.080) (0.109) (0.100) (0.204) 
Income tax rate t-1 0.118 -0.141 -0.003 -0.059 0.050 -0.282 
 (0.182) (0.333) (0.086) (0.098) (0.153) (0.315) 
Institutional environment t-1 -0.009 -0.010 0.002 -0.007 -0.004 -0.003 
 (0.011) (0.014) (0.005) (0.007) (0.009) (0.012) 
Industrial competition t-1 -0.131 -0.240 0.185 -0.051 -0.115 -0.424 
 (0.355) (0.305) (0.159) (0.099) (0.243) (0.282) 
Early succession 0.033 -0.097 -0.026 0.008 0.054 0.006 
 (0.039) (0.111) (0.025) (0.036) (0.036) (0.067) 
Retire 0.046 0.125 -0.065 0.026 -0.009 0.094 
 (0.070) (0.154) (0.062) (0.068) (0.074) (0.109) 
Postsuccession founder -0.024 0.019 0.014 0.002 -0.013 0.021 
 (0.032) (0.039) (0.020) (0.012) (0.029) (0.030) 
Industry & year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 84 77 84 77 93 85 
R2 0.618 0.556 0.648 0.759 0.485 0.451 
Adj. R2 0.227 0.008 0.288 0.462 0.053 0.098 
Firm-level clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level (two-tailed test), respectively. 
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Table 4.11—Alternative proxies for firms’ access to debt 
This table presents the results for H1 and H2 when alternative proxies for firms’ access to debt 
finance are used. Debt maturity difference (Debt cost difference) is the difference between the 
two-year average debt maturity (debt cost) after the succession and that before the succession. 
The debt maturity is the ratio of long-term debt to total debt. The debt cost is the interest 
expense divided by the average of short- and long-term debt. Credit loan is a dummy equal to 
one if the firm has credit loans during the post-succession two-year period and zero otherwise. 
There also are three additional control variables, i.e. Debt maturity t-1, Debt cost t-1, and Past 
credit loan t, for the corresponding dependent variables. Debt maturity t-1 (Debt cost t-1) is the 
corresponding variable one year prior to the succession. Past credit loan t is a dummy equal to 
one if the firm has credit loans during the pre-succession two-year period and zero otherwise.  
 
 Debt maturity difference Debt cost difference Credit loan  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Family -0.066* -0.197*** 0.019 0.065** 0.173 -0.864 
 (0.035) (0.063) (0.022) (0.032) (0.477) (0.925) 
Successor manage t  -0.015**  0.001  0.013 
  (0.006)  (0.004)  (0.097) 
Family*Manage  0.025***  -0.009*  0.248* 
  (0.010)  (0.005)  (0.145) 
Debt maturity t-1 -0.403*** -0.429***     
 (0.090) (0.091)     
Debt cost t-1   -0.318* -0.351*   
   (0.191) (0.196)   
Past credit loan t     6.466*** 7.302*** 
     (1.074) (1.273) 
Firm age t-1 -0.002 -0.000 0.004 0.004 -0.239*** -0.264*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.070) (0.073) 
Firm size t-1 0.006 0.024 0.007 0.007 0.786** 0.897** 
 (0.024) (0.023) (0.017) (0.018) (0.345) (0.362) 
Debt level t-1 -0.033 -0.068 0.042 0.043 3.637 4.328* 
 (0.155) (0.148) (0.097) (0.105) (2.263) (2.334) 
Firm profitability t-1 0.054 0.059 -0.237 -0.284 1.398 -1.168 
 (0.475) (0.460) (0.232) (0.252) (5.428) (6.095) 
Sales growth t-1 0.004 0.005 -0.005 0.001 -0.327* -0.444** 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.023) (0.025) (0.195) (0.218) 
Business risk t-1 -0.086 -0.104 0.157 0.149 -26.833*** -32.368*** 
 (0.292) (0.285) (0.263) (0.263) (9.536) (11.236) 
Dividend payout t-1 -0.099 -0.126 0.043 0.052 -1.352 -1.175 
 (0.094) (0.090) (0.035) (0.036) (0.903) (0.953) 
Interest coverage t-1 0.046 0.057 0.003 0.002 -2.247*** -2.578*** 
 (0.043) (0.043) (0.026) (0.026) (0.776) (0.819) 
Board size t-1 -0.029** -0.030** -0.004 -0.004 -0.222 -0.312* 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.007) (0.007) (0.155) (0.166) 
Family ownership t-1 -0.015 -0.074 0.133 0.126 -1.556 -1.279 
 (0.140) (0.139) (0.081) (0.084) (1.772) (1.936) 
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Table 4.11 continued       
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Family divergence t-1 -0.057 -0.031 -0.126 -0.131 6.628** 6.713* 
 (0.249) (0.249) (0.161) (0.175) (3.142) (3.686) 
Nonfamily ownership t-1 0.166 0.087 0.259 0.274 -6.884* -7.648* 
 (0.204) (0.205) (0.211) (0.235) (3.970) (4.166) 
State ownership t-1 0.030 -0.009 -0.208 -0.210 17.354*** 18.487*** 
 (0.739) (0.743) (0.448) (0.472) (6.593) (6.858) 
Foreign ownership t-1 -3.086** -3.794** -0.693 -0.534 -9.742 -4.935 
 (1.491) (1.511) (1.048) (1.026) (13.546) (16.225) 
Asset tangibility t-1 -0.304 -0.279 0.014 0.012 -5.612** -7.040*** 
 (0.187) (0.182) (0.142) (0.142) (2.355) (2.565) 
Cash holding t-1 -0.095 -0.083 -0.157 -0.148 -6.076*** -6.533*** 
 (0.215) (0.208) (0.105) (0.104) (2.256) (2.325) 
Income tax rate t-1 0.502* 0.429* -0.025 -0.034 -2.902 -2.816 
 (0.255) (0.239) (0.133) (0.140) (2.402) (2.533) 
Institutional environment t-1 0.002 0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.945*** -1.072*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.006) (0.007) (0.198) (0.240) 
Industrial competition t-1 0.196 0.274 -0.497*** -0.536*** 8.714*** 9.987*** 
 (0.270) (0.271) (0.163) (0.165) (3.247) (3.449) 
Early succession -0.142** -0.155** 0.007 0.010 -0.351 0.905 
 (0.064) (0.068) (0.035) (0.034) (0.861) (0.852) 
Retire -0.201** -0.230** 0.021 0.018 -1.006 -1.262 
 (0.098) (0.102) (0.103) (0.109) (1.013) (1.274) 
Postsuccession founder 0.056 0.052 -0.012 -0.007 0.243 0.023 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.024) (0.024) (0.463) (0.528) 
Industry & year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 161 161 112 112 157 157 
R2/ Pseudo R2 0.453 0.478 0.520 0.531 0.697 0.707 
Adj. R2 0.264 0.286 0.239 0.234   
Firm-level clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level (two-tailed test), respectively. 
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Table 4.12—Founders’ political connections 
This table reports the results when viewing the founders’ political connections as a type of 
specialised assets. The dependent variables are defined as the same as in the previous tables. 
Political connection is a dummy equal to one if the founder has a political identity before the 
succession and zero otherwise. The political identities include a current or former officer of 
either the central government or a local government; currently or formerly serving in any 
institutions or organisations directly controlled by the central or a local government; and a 
current or former representative of the NPC, the CPPCC, or the NCCPC. Family*Political 
connection is the interaction term between Family and Political connection. All other control 
variables are also the same as those in the prior tables. 
 
 Debt                     
difference 
Long-debt
difference 
Short-debt 
difference 
Debt maturity 
difference 
Debt cost 
difference 
Credit 
loan 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Family -0.101*** -0.030* -0.079** -0.076 0.096** -0.059 
 (0.038) (0.017) (0.030) (0.067) (0.043) (0.107) 
Political connection 0.000 0.007 -0.024 -0.003 0.041* -0.069 
 (0.025) (0.012) (0.022) (0.042) (0.025) (0.078) 
Family*Political connection 0.074* 0.005 0.106*** 0.015 -0.122** 0.077 
 (0.041) (0.019) (0.035) (0.081) (0.055) (0.130) 
Debt level t-1 -0.159**   -0.036 0.078 -0.071 
 (0.079)   (0.158) (0.099) (0.275) 
Long-debt level t-1  -0.344***     
  (0.099)     
Short-debt level t-1   -0.147**    
   (0.072)    
Debt maturity t-1    -0.405***   
    (0.093)   
Debt cost t-1     -0.389**  
     (0.183)  
Past credit loan t      0.722*** 
      (0.070) 
Firm age t-1 0.001 -0.000 0.002 -0.002 0.004 -0.011 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.008) 
Firm size t-1 0.017 0.002 0.023* 0.006 0.002 0.055 
 (0.013) (0.007) (0.012) (0.027) (0.017) (0.036) 
Firm profitability t-1 -0.570** -0.020 -0.531** 0.050 -0.253 -0.037 
 (0.253) (0.102) (0.219) (0.478) (0.236) (0.497) 
Sales growth t-1 0.006 0.003 0.000 0.004 0.003 0.003 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.023) (0.007) 
Business risk t-1 0.159 0.071 0.047 -0.086 0.190 -0.513 
 (0.195) (0.084) (0.173) (0.294) (0.240) (0.436) 
Dividend payout t-1 -0.064* -0.035 -0.046 -0.099 0.056 -0.152 
 (0.033) (0.024) (0.028) (0.095) (0.036) (0.119) 
Interest coverage t-1 0.028 0.022* 0.007 0.047 0.005 -0.048 
 (0.021) (0.012) (0.019) (0.045) (0.025) (0.071) 
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Table 4.12 continued       
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Board size t-1 0.008 -0.005 0.011** -0.029** -0.004 -0.012 
 (0.007) (0.004) (0.005) (0.013) (0.007) (0.018) 
Family ownership t-1 0.091 -0.027 0.052 -0.017 0.131* -0.022 
 (0.077) (0.049) (0.070) (0.143) (0.075) (0.240) 
Family divergence t-1 -0.289** -0.053 -0.186 -0.053 -0.179 0.251 
 (0.126) (0.083) (0.113) (0.252) (0.172) (0.416) 
Nonfamily ownership t-1 -0.059 -0.008 -0.107 0.163 0.264 -0.236 
 (0.117) (0.048) (0.104) (0.207) (0.210) (0.356) 
State ownership t-1 0.254 -0.009 0.531 0.026 -0.338 0.865 
 (0.349) (0.178) (0.366) (0.753) (0.430) (0.967) 
Foreign ownership t-1 -0.554 -0.895** 0.295 -3.101** -0.360 -1.966 
 (0.560) (0.356) (0.526) (1.528) (0.934) (1.717) 
Asset tangibility t-1 -0.001 -0.049 0.020 -0.301 0.001 -0.111 
 (0.093) (0.049) (0.073) (0.190) (0.136) (0.295) 
Cash holding t-1 0.130 -0.007 0.078 -0.092 -0.162 -0.314 
 (0.085) (0.049) (0.072) (0.217) (0.106) (0.248) 
Income tax rate t-1 0.204* 0.119** 0.046 0.504* -0.016 -0.106 
 (0.112) (0.056) (0.097) (0.259) (0.130) (0.286) 
Institutional environment t-1 -0.008 -0.001 -0.005 0.002 -0.003 -0.053*** 
 (0.006) (0.003) (0.005) (0.013) (0.006) (0.016) 
Industrial competition t-1 -0.107 -0.017 -0.079 0.198 -0.543*** 0.660 
 (0.185) (0.083) (0.132) (0.273) (0.154) (0.448) 
Early succession -0.009 -0.035** 0.027 -0.142** 0.001 -0.130* 
 (0.032) (0.015) (0.025) (0.063) (0.033) (0.070) 
Retire 0.068 -0.004 0.050 -0.202** 0.039 -0.050 
 (0.057) (0.034) (0.038) (0.101) (0.099) (0.113) 
Postsuccession founder 0.002 0.013 0.006 0.056 -0.012 0.007 
 (0.021) (0.012) (0.017) (0.039) (0.024) (0.066) 
Industry & year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 161 161 178 161 112 178 
R2/ Pseudo R2 0.389 0.468 0.355 0.453 0.554 0.633 
Adj. R2 0.171 0.279 0.154 0.252 0.272 - 
Firm-level clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level (two-tailed test), respectively. 
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Table 4.13—Guanxi-connected nonfamily successors 
This table presents the results for H2 when taking guanxi-connected nonfamily successors into 
account. Guanxi, therefore, is a dummy equal to one if the successor is a nonfamily member 
having a guanxi with the founder and zero otherwise. Guanxi*Manage is the interaction term 
between Guanxi and Successor manage.  
 
 Debt                  
difference 
Long-debt
difference 
Short-debt 
difference 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Family -0.152*** -0.080*** -0.068 
 (0.046) (0.021) (0.043) 
Guanxi -0.019 0.009 -0.018 
 (0.041) (0.022) (0.037) 
Successor manage t -0.015 -0.011** -0.008 
 (0.012) (0.005) (0.010) 
Family*Manage 0.026** 0.016*** 0.014* 
 (0.012) (0.005) (0.011) 
Guanxi*Manage 0.009 0.005 0.004 
 (0.012) (0.005) (0.011) 
Debt level t-1 -0.169**   
 (0.076)   
Long-debt level t-1  -0.415***  
  (0.104)  
Short-debt level t-1   -0.134* 
   (0.071) 
Firm age t-1 0.002 0.000 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Firm size t-1 0.027** 0.010 0.029** 
 (0.011) (0.007) (0.011) 
Firm profitability t-1 -0.556** -0.000 -0.494** 
 (0.239) (0.095) (0.218) 
Sales growth t-1 0.006 0.003 0.000 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) 
Business risk t-1 0.134 0.040 0.042 
 (0.196) (0.076) (0.184) 
Dividend payout t-1 -0.074** -0.041* -0.056* 
 (0.032) (0.023) (0.030) 
Interest coverage t-1 0.034 0.026** 0.007 
 (0.022) (0.012) (0.021) 
Board size t-1 0.007 -0.005 0.010* 
 (0.007) (0.004) (0.005) 
Family ownership t-1 0.086 -0.046 0.049 
 (0.079) (0.046) (0.075) 
Family divergence t-1 -0.276** -0.034 -0.198 
 (0.133) (0.077) (0.123) 
Nonfamily ownership t-1 -0.058 -0.012 -0.127 
 (0.125) (0.047) (0.108) 
State ownership t-1 0.190 -0.020 0.530 
 (0.368) (0.181) (0.388) 
Foreign ownership t-1 -0.948* -1.290*** 0.201 
 (0.561) (0.326) (0.552) 
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Table 4.13 continued    
 (1) (2) (3) 
Asset tangibility t-1 -0.013 -0.053 0.014 
 (0.086) (0.046) (0.070) 
Cash holding t-1 0.103 -0.020 0.069 
 (0.083) (0.046) (0.074) 
Income tax rate t-1 0.143 0.096* -0.014 
 (0.118) (0.054) (0.108) 
Institutional environment t-1 -0.008 -0.001 -0.004 
 (0.006) (0.003) (0.005) 
Industrial competition t-1 -0.095 0.003 -0.073 
 (0.180) (0.077) (0.135) 
Early succession -0.013 -0.040** 0.026 
 (0.035) (0.016) (0.028) 
Retire 0.045 -0.016 0.042 
 (0.061) (0.039) (0.038) 
Postsuccession founder TMT -0.002 0.010 0.006 
 (0.019) (0.011) (0.017) 
Industry & year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 161 161 178 
R2 0.417 0.527 0.341 
Adj. R2 0.196 0.348 0.123 
Firm-level clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level (two-tailed test), respectively. 
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Table 4.14—Definitions of variables 
Variable Definition 
Debt level Total debt / total assets 
Debt difference 
 
(Post-succession 2-year average Debt level) – (pre-succession 2-year average 
Debt level)   
Debt level t-1 Debt level in year t-1 
Long-debt level 
 
Long-term debt / total assets, where long-term debt is the borrowing with a 
maturity of more than 1 year 
Long-debt difference 
 
(Post-succession 2-year average Long-debt level) – (pre-succession 2-year 
average Long-debt level)   
Long-debt level t-1 Long-debt level in year t-1 
Short-debt level 
 
Short-term debt / total assets, where short-term debt is the borrowing with a 
maturity of not greater than 1 year 
Short-debt difference 
 
(Post-succession 2-year average Short-debt level) – (pre-succession 2-year 
average Short-debt level)   
Short-debt level t-1 Short-debt level in year t-1 
Debt maturity Long-term debt / total debt 
Debt maturity difference 
 
(Post-succession 2-year average Debt maturity) – (pre-succession 2-year 
average Debt maturity)   
Debt maturity t-1 Debt maturity in year t-1 
Debt cost Interest expense / (short-term debt + long-term debt) / 2 
Debt cost difference 
 
Debt cost t-1 
(Post-succession 2-year average Debt cost) – (pre-succession 2-year average 
Debt cost)  
Debt cost in year t-1 
Credit loan 
 
An indicator equal to 1 if the firm has credit loans during the 2-year post-
succession period, and 0 otherwise 
Past credit loan t  
 
An indicator equal to 1 if the firm has credit loans during the 2-year pre-
succession period, and 0 otherwise 
Family 
 
An indicator equal to 1 if the successor is the founder’s descendant, by blood 
or marriage, and 0 otherwise 
Guanxi 
 
An indicator equal to 1 if the successor is a nonfamily member having a 
guanxi with the founder, and 0 otherwise 
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Successor manage t 
 
The number of years the successor has worked as a director or a top manager 
in the firm till the succession announcement year 
Family*Manage The interaction term between Family and Successor manage t 
Guanxi*Manage The interaction term between Guanxi and Successor manage t 
Political connection 
 
An indicator equal to 1 if the founder has a political identity before the 
succession, and 0 otherwise 
Family*Political connection The interaction term between Family and Political connection 
Firm age t-1 The number of years since the firm’s founding year to year t-1 
Firm size t-1 The natural logarithm of total assets in year t-1 
Firm profitability t-1 ROA in year t-1 
Sales growth t-1 
 
The difference in total sales between year t-1 and year t-2 divided by total 
sales in year t-2 
Postsuccession sales growth The post-succession 2-year average sales growth ratio 
Business risk t-1 The standard deviation of ROA over the three years prior to the succession 
Dividend payout t-1 The dividend per share as a percentage of earning per share in year t-1 
Interest coverage t-1 
 
 
Board size t-1 
An indicator equals to 1 if the interest coverage ratio, calculated as earnings 
before interest and tax divided by total interest payable, is greater than 2 in 
year t-1, and 0 otherwise 
The number of directors on the board in year t-1 
Family ownership t-1 
 
 
 
The number of shares held by the family as a percentage of total shares 
outstanding in year t-1. If the family controls the firm indirectly through a 
pyramid structure, it is calculated as the product of the family’s ownership 
stakes along the control chain. 
Family control t-1 
 
 
The family’s votes as a percentage of total votes outstanding in year t-1. If the 
family controls the firm through a pyramid structure, it is measured by the 
minimum voting stake along the control chain. 
Family divergence t-1 The difference between Family control t-1 and Family ownership t-1 
Nonfamily ownership t-1 
 
 
The number of shares held by nonfamily block-holders / total shares 
outstanding in year t-1, where block-holders are individuals or institutions 
holding at least 5% ownership 
State ownership t-1 State-owned shares／total shares outstanding in year t-1 
Foreign ownership t-1 Foreign shares / total shares outstanding in year t-1 
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Asset tangibility t-1 Fixed assets / total assets in year t-1 
Cash holding t-1 (Cash + cash equivalents) / total assets in year t-1 
Income tax rate t-1 Income tax expense / earnings after interest and before tax 
Institutional development t-1 
 
Fan et al.’s (2011) index of the market development levels of Chinese 
provinces in year t-1 
Industrial competition t-1 
 
 
𝐻 = ∑ 𝑆𝑖
2𝑛
𝑖=1 , where Si is the market share of firm i (firm’s sales as a 
percentage of sales for the same industry), n is the number of firms in the 
industry 
Early succession 
 
An indicator equal to 1 if the founder leaves the leadership position before 65, 
and 0 otherwise 
Retire 
 
An indicator equal to 1 if the founder is reported to leave due to “retirement”, 
and 0 otherwise 
Postsuccession founder 
 
An indicator equal to 1 if the founder remains as a director or a top manager in 
the firm one year after the succession, and 0 otherwise 
Founder age t-1  The founder’s age in year t-1 
Family planning 
 
 
 
The average family planning rate in the firm’s headquartered province for the 
pre-succession years, where the family planning rate is the number of 
newborns whose birth conforms to the one-child policy as a percentage of 
total newborns 
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Chapter 5 Conclusion 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews research background and objectives, summaries the main 
findings, highlights the major contributions and implications, and indicates the 
limitations of this thesis.  
5.2 Review of research background and objectives  
This thesis focuses on the leadership succession issue in Chinese family firms. The 
transition of the leadership should be one of the most important issues for family 
businesses. This is because the ageing of the business founders makes the transition 
inevitable, and the leaders’ dominant role in the business makes the transition crucial to 
the firm’s future strategies, performance, and prosperity (Bennedsen et al., 2007). 
Given such importance, this issue has received a lot of attention in the existing 
literature. However, the vast majority of the literature is conducted on western and 
developed economies, the studies focusing on China, i.e. one of the largest and fastest-
growing economies in the world, are very scarce.  
I contend that the investigation of the above issue in the context of China is worthwhile 
and interesting for the following reasons. Firstly, family firms play a vital role in the 
Chinese economy. For example, there have been about 8 million family businesses in 
China since 2010, contributing more than 60% of the GDP, half of the tax revenues, 
and 90% of the new employment every year (Huang, 2010). Considering this situation, 
the issues about the leadership transition in Chinese family firms, such as the financial 
consequences of the transition, should be crucial to not only the firms per se but also 
China’s economy and living standards. 
Secondly, unlike many family businesses in developed economies having a history of 
more than 100 years, family firms in China have just started to emerge since 1978, after 
the implementation of the Reform and Opening policy (Qin & Wang, 2012). As a 
consequence, most Chinese family firms have always been managed by the founder 
over the past decades, and many of them are about to have their first leadership 
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transition after more than 30 years’ development. This makes the founders’ successor 
decision a particularly important issue, especially considering that successors are often 
viewed as much less valuable and capable than the founder of the business (Villalonga 
& Amit, 2006; Liu et al., 2012; Fan et al., 2012).  
Moreover, China is featured with a weak institutional environment, an underdeveloped 
managerial labour market, a high collectivist culture, a one-child policy, and a 
transitional economy from centrally planned to market-oriented. In such a background, 
the family businesses should be very distinctive from their counterparts in western and 
developed contexts who are provided with strong shareholder protection, developed 
managerial labour markets, and large talent pools for family successions, as well as 
strongly affected by individualist cultures. This makes China an interesting setting to 
explore family firms’ leadership succession issue. 
The above reasons motivate me to embark on this thesis, for the purpose of 
complementing people’s understanding of the leadership succession in Chinese family 
businesses. To this end, this thesis has three main objectives: (1) to investigate the 
driving force of the successor choice, (2) to explore the effects of the succession event 
and the successor choice on firm performance, and (3) to examine the impact of the 
successor choice on the firm’s access to debt finance. 
5.3 Summary of findings 
Chapter 2 addresses the first research objective. More specifically, I focus on five 
factors, i.e. foreign ownership, Confucianism, clan culture, the founders’ overseas 
experience, and the founders’ political connections. I mainly explore whether these 
factors affect the founders’ choice between a family successor, a nonfamily successor 
who is guanxi-connected with them, and a nonfamily successor without a guanxi. I 
suggest six criteria to identify a guanxi-connected nonfamily successor, i.e. whether the 
successor is (1) sharing the same surname with the founder, (2) sharing the same 
birthplace or native place with the founder, (3) graduated from the same college or 
university as the founder, (4) the founder’s former colleague before the startup of the 
family firm, (5) serving as a top executive in more than one company controlled by the 
Chapter 5 - Conclusion 
 235 
founder before the succession, (6) joining the family firm at its start-up stage. The 
rationale for these criteria has been elaborated in Section 2.4 of the chapter.  
Based on a sample of 348 leadership succession cases in listed Chinese firms during 
2003-2014, I find that, firstly, family firms with foreign ownership have a greater 
likelihood of appointing a nonfamily successor. Secondly, by using whether the firm is 
headquartered in a city with a Confucian centre as a proxy for the founder’s extent of 
being influenced by Confucian values, I observe that the founders who are strongly 
affected by Confucianism are more likely to choose a descendant or a guanxi-
connected member as the successor. Thirdly, by employing the percentage of internal 
top executives sharing the same surname with the founder as a proxy for the founder’s 
level of being affected by clan culture, I document that the founders who are more 
deeply affected by clan culture are more likely to choose a family successor. In 
addition, I find that the founders with overseas work or study experience before the 
succession have a greater likelihood of appointing a family or guanxi-connected 
nonfamily successor. Finally, I demonstrate that the founders with more political 
connections are more likely to choose a family or guanxi-connected successor. More 
detailed summaries of these findings and their contributions have been provided by 
Section 2.1 (the Introduction section) and Section 2.7 (the Conclusion section) of the 
chapter.  
Chapter 3 focuses on my second research objective. This chapter provides empirical 
evidence on the following three research issues: 
1) Whether the leadership transition from the founder to the successor causes a 
significant variation in firm performance, compared with the usual performance 
change in family firms without the transition.  
2) For firms experiencing a leadership succession, whether family successors lead to a 
significantly different firm performance change, compared with their nonfamily 
counterparts.  
3) Whether successors’ acquisition of the founder’s specialised assets plays a role in 
determining the firm performance after the succession.  
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The investigation of the first issue is based on the above 348 succession cases and 
another 337 founder-managed family firms during the period 2003-2014. After 
employing the PSM approach and a DID analysis to alleviate endogeneity concerns, I 
find that firms with the leadership transition do not experience a significant 
performance change around the transition, compared with their counterparts without the 
transition during the same period.  
The exploration of the other two issues is based upon the 348 succession cases only. 
The DID analysis approach is also employed, and the empirical results show that 
family successors do not have a significantly different impact on firm performance, 
compared with nonfamily successors.  
Moreover, for the third research question, I apply successors’ pre-succession internal 
experience as a proxy for their acquisition of the founder’s specialised assets. The 
rationale for this proxy has been elaborated in Section 3.4.3 of the chapter. However, 
because only the founders’ highly trusted members have access to the specialised 
assets, I contend that, the proxy, in China’s context, is applicable only to successors 
who are the founder’s descendants or having a guanxi with the founder.116  
My empirical evidence indicates that family or guanxi-connected successors’ pre-
succession internal experience is significantly and positively related to the firm 
performance increase after the succession. This suggests that these two types of 
successors’ acquisition of the specialised assets before the succession greatly 
contributes to the post-succession firm performance. In addition, the evidence shows 
that the above result is mainly derived from the successors’ pre-succession internal 
managerial experience rather than non-managerial working time. I attribute this finding 
to the fact that the former can provide the successors with some opportunities critical to 
the final assimilation of the assets and yet the latter cannot. Finally, I find that the 
closer the guanxi between the founder and the successor, the larger is the positive 
impact of the successor’s pre-succession internal experience on firm performance. 
                                               
116 As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, this is because the Confucian familism and guanxi culture make Chinese 
persons, more or less, have a clear in-/out-group concept, i.e. they normally have a high degree of particular trust in a 
limited group of people based on kinship or guanxi, yet their trust towards other “out-group” members tends to be 
low (Fukuyama, 1995; Gudykunst et al., 1996; Tsui & Farh, 1997). 
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Chapter 4 addresses the aforementioned third research objective. For that objective, the 
following two issues are examined: 
1) Whether family successors has a significantly different effect on the firm’s access to 
debt after the succession, relative to nonfamily successors. 
2) Whether family successors’ acquisition of the founder’s specialised assets affects the 
firm’s access to debt after the succession.  
Based on the 348 succession cases and the DID analysis approach, I find that family 
successors are significantly and negatively related to the firm’s access to debt financing 
after the succession, compared with their nonfamily counterparts. In addition, following 
Chapter 3, I use family successors’ pre-succession internal managerial experience to 
proxy for their obtainment of the specialised assets and find that the successors’ 
acquisition of the assets has a significant and positive impact on the firm’s access to 
debt finance after the succession. However, such a significant result attenuates if the 
firm is headquartered in a province with a high level of marketisation in the local 
economic resource allocation and the founder is not surrounded by strong 
Confucianism atmosphere. Moreover, I document that the founders’ political 
connections, as a type of the specialised assets, are more conducive to the firm’s post-
succession access to debt if the successor is the founder’s descendant instead of a 
nonfamily member.   
Finally, after separating nonfamily successors who are guanxi-connected with the 
founder from those without a guanxi, I find that the former’s pre-succession internal 
experience does not have a significantly positive impact on the firm’s access to debt 
compared with the latter. However, this result is inconsistent with my finding in 
Chapter 3, i.e. both family and guanxi-connected successors’ pre-succession internal 
experience has a significant and positive influence on firm performance, relative to 
successors without a guanxi. I attribute this inconsistency to the possibility that good 
firm performance and superior access to debt finance rely on different types of the 
specialised assets. The former primarily relies on the founder’s tacit knowledge, which 
can be assimilated by a family or guanxi-connected successor as long as the founder 
offers the successor the access to the knowledge and the opportunities to internalise the 
knowledge. However, firms’ access to debt capital mainly relies on the founder’s 
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personal connections with the lenders, which are much more difficult for guanxi-
connected successors to acquire due to their nonfamily identity.   
The above findings and their contributions have been discussed in more detail in 
Section 4.1 (the Introduction section) and Section 4.6 (the Conclusion section) of the 
chapter.  
5.4 Summary of contributions and implications 
This thesis contributes to the literature in several important ways. First, it complements 
the existing research about the leadership succession in family firms by investigating 
the issue in the second largest economy in the world, China, where family firms play an 
important role yet are largely neglected by researchers. 
Second, it makes a significant contribution to the literature on the driving forces of the 
successor decision in family businesses. Specifically, it identifies three new 
determinants of the successor choice, i.e. foreign ownership, clan culture, and the 
founders’ overseas experience. These factors have never been paid attention to 
theoretically and empirically in family business research. As for the rest two 
hypothesised determinants, Confucianism and the founders’ political connections, the 
former’s impact on the successor decision has been emphasised by some researchers in 
theory (e.g., Yan & Sorenson, 2006). However, this thesis provides original empirical 
evidence on the impact, showing that Confucianism makes the founders more likely to 
choose a family or guanxi-connected successor. The founders’ political connections 
have been confirmed to drive the selection of a family successor (Xu et al, 2015), and 
yet this thesis complements this evidence by showing that the political connections also 
facilitate the appointment of a guanxi-connected successor. The above contributions to 
the literature, in turn, may provide several new research avenues for future studies. For 
example, as foreign investors, clan culture, and leaders’ overseas experience have never 
been explored in the context of family businesses, it may be fruitful for researchers to 
consider the influence of the above factors on family firms’ various behaviours and 
financial consequences.  
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Third, this thesis enriches the literature on national culture, as it is among the first to 
empirically investigate the influence of the Chinese culture on the successor selections 
in family firms. The importance of cultural factors in the exploration of family 
businesses has been largely emphasised in theory (e.g., Fukuyama, 1995, Zhang & Ma, 
2009), yet there is limited empirical support.117 In this regard, my thesis fills the void. 
Specifically, I originally use three observable region-, firm-, and individual-level 
factors to proxy for the degrees that Chinese family business founders are influenced by 
Confucianism and clan culture, which are two important ideologies of the Chinese 
culture. My findings show that the above two cultural factors play an important role in 
determining the successor. This, in turn, implies that researchers may benefit from 
applying my propositions and proxies regarding the impact of Confucianism and clan 
culture to family businesses not only in China but also in other eastern and southeastern 
Asian contexts where the Chinese traditional culture still exert influence over people’s 
cognitions and behaviour.118 In such a way, researchers can empirically explore the 
influence of the Chinese culture on the family firms’ decision-making, including but 
not limited to the choice of successor. 
Fourth, unlike the extant literature focusing on family or nonfamily successors only, 
this thesis sheds initial light on the existence and importance of a unique type of 
successors, i.e. nonfamily members having a guanxi with the founder. This suggests a 
novel and interesting research direction, i.e. to investigate the founders’ guanxi-
connected members, for researchers interested in family firms in China or other Asian 
economies affected by Confucianism. This research direction applies not only to 
studies on the succession issue but also to any research topics related to the identities of 
family firms’ stakeholders, such as managers, employees, or shareholders. This thesis 
also proposes six criteria for identifying a guanxi-connected successor, which may be 
useful in future research. 
Fifth, this thesis provides initial evidence on the financial consequences of family 
business successors’ acquisition of the founder’s specialised assets, showing that the 
successors’ acquisition of the assets greatly contributes to the firm’s financial 
                                               
117 A potential reason for the lack of empirical evidence is that culture is an abstract concept whose impact is 
difficult to be quantified by researchers.  
 
118 E.g., Singapore, Taiwan, Vietnam, and Japan (Richter, 2002; Elman et al. 2002; Yan & Sorenson, 2006).  
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performance and access to debt finance after the succession. As mentioned in the prior 
chapters, the importance of the transfer of the assets from the founder to the successor 
has been largely highlighted in theoretical analyses119, and yet empirical research to 
demonstrate the importance is lacking. In this regard, this thesis adds to the literature 
on the specialised assets in family firms.  
This thesis also has some important theoretical implications. First, most extant studies 
on returnee managers are based upon human capital or social capital theories, thus 
focusing on the impact of the managers’ advanced knowledge, distinctive skills, and 
international network resources.120 However, my original evidence regarding the 
impact of the founders’ overseas experience implies that it will be productive to explore 
managers’ experience abroad from a novel viewpoint, i.e. the switching of the 
managers’ cultural beliefs and values. This suggestion should contribute to future 
research on returnee managers’ behaviour and decision-making in not only family 
businesses but also other forms of economic organisations.    
Second, this thesis also suggests a distinctive theoretical perspective regarding 
managers’ work experience. Specifically, researchers studying the effect of managers’ 
work experience usually base their arguments on upper echelon theory (e.g., Baysinger 
& Hoskisson, 1990; Peni, 2014). The theory suggests that managers’ demographics, 
such as age, education, and experience, are good proxies for their knowledge base and 
competences, which, in turn, affect the managers’ strategic choices and ultimately the 
firm’s financial consequences (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). This thesis, however, is the 
first to propose linking family business successors’ internal experience to their 
acquisition of the founder’s specialised assets. The validity of this proposition, in turn, 
is confirmed by the findings in this thesis. In this regard, for researchers particularly 
interested in managers’ tenures in family businesses, this thesis provides a new 
theoretical angle for their studies, i.e. to explore whether the experience is related to the 
managers’ obtainment of the family business founder’s specialised assets. 
                                               
119 E.g., Bjuggren & Sund (2002); Lee et al. (2003); Sharma & Irving (2005).  
 
120 E.g., Wright et al. (2008); Dai & Liu (2009); Filatotchev et al. (2009); Liu et al. (2010); Filatotchev et al. (2011); 
Deng et al. (2012); Li et al. (2012); Luo et al. (2013); Cui et al. (2015); Duan & Hou (2015).   
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Third, this thesis provides an in-depth theoretical analysis of how the efficacy of 
agency theory, stewardship theory, and the resource-based view, i.e. three prevailing 
theories in the literature on family business succession, varies when embedding the 
theories into China’s institutional, cultural, and social environment. The analysis, in 
turn, is supported by empirical evidence showing that the findings in this thesis are 
different from those widely observed in western and developed settings. This finding 
provides support for the institution-based view, which suggests that evidence in one 
context is not replicable in other contexts. It also highlights the importance for 
researchers to consider the applicability of their theoretical arguments when applying 
them to different contexts, especially applying the arguments that have been widely 
proved for the case of developed countries to solve questions in emerging or 
developing economies. This implication is not limited to studies on family businesses, 
but also research in other areas. 
Apart from the above implications in terms of theory, this thesis also has practical 
implications and suggestions for investors, the founders, and successors in Chinese 
family firms, as well as China’s policymakers. First, it may help the investors to 
understand a firm’s successor decision and to predict the identity of the successor more 
accurately based on the firm and the firm founder’s publicly available information. This 
implication is important, as many family firms in China nowadays are just about to have 
their first leadership transition. 
Second, as previously mentioned, family business founders often struggle between 
appointing a descendant and an unrelated agent as the successor, and what concerns 
them most should be the potential different impacts that these two types of successors 
may have on firm performance. This thesis may relieve such a concern of Chinese 
family business founders, as it indicates that family and nonfamily successors do not 
have a significantly different effect on firm performance. I find that this result is 
different from those obtained in western and developed countries, which 
overwhelmingly show that family successors are adverse to firm performance relative 
to their nonfamily counterparts (e.g., Pérez-González, 2006; Bennedsen et al., 2007; 
Cucculelli & Micucci, 2008). The reason for such a finding, based on my theoretical 
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analysis,121 is that the benefits of having a family successor are likely to be offset by 
the costs in China’s context. The above finding, in practice, may help investors to make 
an accurate evaluation of the successor in Chinese family firms, as the founders’ 
descendants are often deemed to be much less capable than nonfamily agents (Jiang & 
Peng, 2011). This, in turn, may contribute to the investors’ rationale investment on 
Chinese family firms which are going to experience a succession or have had a 
succession. 
Third, this thesis provides an implication for the founders regarding the selection of the 
successor, i.e. both their descendants and guanxi-connected members can acquire their 
specialised assets via pre-succession internal managerial experience and can use the 
assets to improve firm performance after the succession. This implication should be 
important, as the founder’s specialised assets are one of the key contributors of the 
firm’s competitive advantages and are crucial to the firm’s sustained development 
(Bracci & Vagnoni, 2011; Bennedsen et al., 2015; Xu et al., 2015). 
Fourth, this thesis provides a useful suggestion for the founders’ descendants who may 
inherit the business in the future, that their potential inferior capability of debt-
financing relative to nonfamily agents can be greatly remedied by the specialised assets 
they obtain from the founder before the succession.  
Finally, this thesis may have an important implication for the Chinese government. As 
discussed in the previous chapters, the leadership transition is a forthcoming event for 
many family firms in China due to the ageing of the firm founders. In addition, 
influenced by the Chinese traditional culture and the desire for preserving the 
specialised assets in the firm, the founders are very likely to appoint a family or guanxi-
connected successor. In this case, this thesis suggests the policymakers encourage or 
require the founders to appoint a successor with internal managerial experience before 
the succession. This is because, as mentioned above, such experience contributes to the 
successor’s obtainment of the founder’s specialised assets which are critical to the 
firm’s survival and development after the succession. The survival and development of 
Chinese family businesses, in turn, is crucial to China’s economy and living standards, 
                                               
121 The aforementioned theoretical analysis of how China’s institutional, cultural, and social context affects the 
validity of agency theory, stewardship theory, and the resource-based view.  
Chapter 5 - Conclusion 
 243 
as family firms make prominent contributions to the growth of the Chinese economy 
(Huang, 2010).122  
5.5 Limitations 
As with any research, this thesis has its limitations. For example, because many family 
firms in China nowadays are still under their founders’ management, the sample size of 
the succession cases in this thesis is quite small, i.e. only 348 cases, and the actual 
observations for the regressions are even more limited due to the missing values of 
various variables. However, this may adversely influence the generalisability of the 
empirical findings in this thesis. 
In addition, Chapter 2 suggests six criteria for identifying whether a family business 
founder and his or her successor have a guanxi. For four of the criteria, i.e. whether 
they share the same surname, share the same birthplace or native place, are graduated 
from the same college or university, or are former colleagues, the rationale is that these 
commonalities between two persons are the most prevalent guanxi bases in China. 
However, there are some other guanxi bases also pervasive in Chinese society, such as 
being neighbours, classmates (not just alumni), or having the teacher-student 
relationship. These guanxi bases are not considered in this thesis due to the information 
unobservability. However, they may also exist between the founder and the successor, 
and thus may adversely affect the reliability of my findings. 
Moreover, as previously mentioned, one of the findings in Chapter 3 is inconsistent 
with that in Chapter 4. More specifically, I posit that both family and guanxi-connected 
successors can acquire the founder’s specialised assets via pre-succession internal 
experience, and the assets are critical to the firm’s financial performance and access to 
debt finance after the succession. In Chapter 3, I indeed find that both family and 
guanxi-connected successors’ pre-succession internal experience has a significant and 
positive impact on the post-succession firm performance, compared with their 
counterparts without a guanxi. However, in Chapter 4, I find that only family 
successors’ pre-succession internal experience has a significant and positive effect on 
                                               
122 For example, as previously discussed, they contribute to more than 60% of the GDP, half of the tax revenues, and 
90% of the new employment in China every year (Huang, 2010). 
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the firm’s post-succession access to debt. I have explained that this inconsistency 
between the findings is because good firm performance mainly relies on the founder’  
tacit knowledge, which can be acquired by both family and guanxi-connected 
successors. However, firms’ access to debt capital primarily depends on the founder’s 
personal connections with the lenders, which are much more difficult for guanxi-
connected successors to acquire due to their nonfamily identity. For this explanation, it 
would be ideal if I could find some proxies for the tacit knowledge and the connections, 
respectively, and use the proxies to test its validity.  
Given the above limitations, it may be more appropriate to consider this thesis as 
preliminary empirical research regarding Chinese family firms’ leadership succession 
issue and a call for more and in-depth investigations of the issue in the future. The 
limitations, in turn, may be able to be solved when Chinese family firm leaders’ 
publicly available information becomes more completed and more succession events 
happen in the firms.
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